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Samenvatting 
Affectieve Overtuigende Communicatie: Verschillende Rollen van Affect in het 
Overtuigingsproces van de Consument 
Emoties spelen een belangrijke rol in de promotie van produkten en diensten. 
Ondanks diverse toepassingen, zijn deo nderliggende verklaringsmechanismen vaak 
niet erg helder en consistent. Onderzoek toont aan dat positieve gevoelens - zoals bv. 
uitgelokt door een aangename geur of door een leuke film - leiden tot meer 
aangename evaluaties. Het omgekeerde is waar voor negatieve gevoelens - zoals bv. 
de frustratie die men ervaart onder tijdsdruk of de ergernis als gevolg van teveel 
lawaai. Deze bevinding kan echter niet verklaren hoe het komt dat campagnes die 
gebruik maken van negatieve emoties (zoals bv. schuldgevoelens) toch effect hebben. 
Wij argumenteren in dit doctoraat dat er verschillende rollen zijn voor affect. We 
focussen hoofdzakelijk op de rol die affectieve valentie (positief versus negatief 
affect, zie hoofdstukken 2, 3 en 4) en activatie (geactiveerd versus niet geactiveerd, 
zie hoofdstuk 5) spelen op het overtuigingsproces van de consument. 
Ten eerste blijken, volgens de sociaal psychologische literatuur, de meeste mensen 
geneigd om hun positieve stemming te behouden, terwijl ze een negatieve stemming 
vermijden. Vermits een extensieve verwerking van een bepaalde (rec1ame)boodschap 
in vele gevallen leidt tot gevoelens van aversie (vooral wanneer de verwerking 
moeilijk is) vermijden vele mensen om uitgebreid (rec1ame)boodschappen te 
verwerken. Negatieve stemming signaleert daarenten dat de situatie problematisch is, 
en dat er iets moet ondernomen worden om de situatie te veranderen. Dit geeft 
aanleiding tot een meer systematische verwerking van de aangeboden informatie. In 
onder andere hoodstuk 2 wordt aangetoond dat negatief affect een uitstekende 
motivator kan zijn om de (rec1ame)boodschap in meer detail te verwerken. 
xi 
Samenvatting 
Een andere manier waarop affect het overtuigingsproces van de consument kan 
beïnvloeden is door de gedachten affectief te kleuren terwijl men een boodschap aan 
het verwerken is. Dit blijkt vooral het geval wanneer mensen erg gemotiveerd zijn om 
de advertentie, het verkoopspraatje of de reclamespot te verwerken. Wanneer iemand 
zich in een bepaalde affectieve toestand bevindt (bv. men is in een positieve 
stemming), dan wordt de overeenkomstige affectieve "geheugenknoop" geactiveerd, 
waarna de activatie zich zal verspreiden naar geassocieerde mentale concepten. 
Hierdoor zullen mensen die in een positieve stemming verkeren zich ook meer 
positief materiaal herinneren, en meer positieve evaluaties maken. 
Ten slotte, wanneer mensen niet erg gemotiveerd zijn om na te denken, vonden we 
evidentie voor "affect als informatie". De affect als informatie hypothese suggereert 
dat mensen soms hun gevoelens als informatief beschouwen wanneer zij een evaluatie 
maken, ook al hebben deze gevoelens vaak weinig of niets te maken met het te 
evalueren product. Men schijnt te redeneren "Ik voel me goed, dus het product zal ook 
wel goed zijn". 
Samengevat, in dit doctoraat wordt aan de hand van een waaier aan affectieve stimuli 
(waaronder zowel affect uitgelokt door de advertentie als de stemming van de 
consument) op consistente wijze aangetoond dat affect verschillende rollen speelt bij 
het overtuigingsproces van de consument. 
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Summary 
Mfective Persuasive Communication: Multiple Roles of Mfect in Persuading the 
Consumer 
Emotions play an important role in the marketing of products and services. Despite 
the e xtensive practical a pplications, t he explanatory m echanisms a re 0 ften not very 
clear and straightforward. Researchers have found that positive feelings - e.g. elicited 
by a pleasant odour or by a pleasant movie - lead to more positive product 
evaluations. The opposite seems to hold for negative feelings - e.g. the frustration one 
experiences under time pressure or the annoyance resulting from too much 
surrounding noise. These findings however can not account for the beneficial effects 
that are usually observed when advertisers and marketers use negative feelings such 
as guilt and sadness in their advertisement carnpaigns. 
We argue in the present dissertation that there are multiple roles for affect. We mainly 
focused on the role of affective valence (positive versus negative affect, see chapters 
2, 3 and 4) and arousal (activated versus sleepy, see chapter 5) on the consurners' 
persuasion process. 
First of all, according to social psychological literature, most people seem to act to 
maintain their positive moods, while they avoid being in a negative mood. Since 
processing a message extensively often results in feelings of aversion for the task 
(especially when the task is difficult), message recipients in a positive mood are 
motivated to avoid such thorough processing in order to maintain their positive 
moods. In contrast, negative mood signals that the situation is problematic, and that 
something has to be done in order to change the situation. Therefore, people in a 
negative mood are more likely to engage in a systematic processing of the presented 
inforrnation. This was confirrned for exarnple in Chapter 2. 
xiii 
Summary 
Another way that affect can influence consumers ' persuasion process is by coloring 
consumers ' thoughts while e valuating a n ew brand 0 r a n ew product. T his i s most 
likely when consumers are very motivated to process the ad, the commercial or the 
sales talk. As a person experiences a certain affective state, the affect's correspondent 
memory node is activated, and activation will spread towards associated concepts 
(nodes), thereby assisting in the encoding and / or retrieval of affect consistent ideas. 
Happy p eople w ill t herefore recall more pleasant material, and make more positive 
evaluations. 
Finally, especially when people were not very motivated to process the ad, we found 
evidence for "affect as information". The affect as-information hypothesis s uggests 
that people sometimes use their current feelings as the basis for forming evaluations. 
That is, people sometimes mistakenly take their current feelings as informative when 
they make an evaluation. They seem to think "I feel good, so the product / brand must 
be good". 
In sum, a variety of affective stimuli (including both ad elicited affect and consumers' 
general moods state) were used throughout this dissertation, who consistently showed 
evidence for the multiple role of affect on consumers ' evaluation process. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction: Affective Persuasion and Consumer Behavior 
1. Introduction 
Emotions play a prominent role in the marketing of products and services. Music and 
colors for example, are often used in a retail setting to create pleasant feelings and to 
make customers (unconsciously) feel tree and alive. Humor, tendemess, and erotici sm 
are just a grasp of positive feelings that are widely used in advertisements and 
commercials. The usage of feelings in the domain of advertising is not lirnited 
however to positive feelings: also negative feelings, such as sadness or guilt are often 
used to promote products or services. Feelings of guilt for example, are typicaUy 
associated with advertisement campaigns in support of charity organizations. 
Despite the extensive practical application of feelings in the domain of marketing, the 
explanatory mechanisms are often not very clear and straightforward. In fact, many 
questions remain unresolved. For instance, it is found in practice as weU as on a more 
academic level, that positive feelings lead to more positive product evaluations, while 
negative feelings lead to more negative product-evaluations (see for example Bagozzi, 
Gopinath, & Nyer, 1999). If this is the case, than how can the success of a charity 
campaign (such as Medecins Sans Frontiers, or 11.11.11) that elicit negative feelings 
of guilt be explained? AIso, the effect of feelings sometimes seems to depend upon 
the consumers' wiUingness to attend to the persuasive communication. Surprisingly, 
some theoretical studies have shown that the effect is more pronounced when 
consumers are less willing to pay attention or processing effort to the persuasion 
attempt (see for example Petty, Unnava, & Strathman, 1991). 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to take a closer look at the effects of 
feelings on the consumers' persuasion process. More specificaUy, we williook both at 
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elicited affect (for example positive affect that is elicited by a magazine ad or a 
television commercial) as weIl as mood (for example the positive mood people 
experience after they have watched a comedy movie). In the remaining of this first 
chapter we will fust take a closer look at the nature of emotions, followed by a short 
review of the effects of affective valence (i.e. the main component of an emotion) on 
consumers' persuasion. We will end t bis c hapter w ith a n 0 verview 0 ft he different 
studies that are discussed in tbis dissertation. 
2. Emotions and Consumer Behavior 
2.1.Emotions, Affect, and Mood: Definitions 
Affect can be considered as a mental state of readiness that arises from cognitive 
appraisals of events and thoughts. Affect is usually accompanied by physiological 
processes (such as heart beat acceleration or increase in blood pressure) and is often 
expressed physically (e.g. in gestures, posture, and facial features). 
The source of affect can be diverse. Affect can arise from one's preexisting mood 
state or affect can arise from the emotions that are called for by the ad. Hence, in this 
dissertation, affect generally covers both consumers' mood state as weU as their more 
specific emotions (for a related discussion, see Gom, Pham, & Sin, 2001). 
The line between an emotion and mood is often difficult to draw but by convention a 
mood is conceived as longer lasting (from a few hours up to days) and lower in 
intensity than affect. AIso, an emotion has a clear referent, whereas moods are mostly 
diffused or global, without a clear referent (e.g. Frijda, 1993). 
From a practical viewpoint it may become clear that while an emotion can be easily 
manipulated by the marketer (e.g. by means of fear appeals in ads or by cheerful 
music in a television commercial or by means of a funny or exciting advertisement), 
moods are more difficult to manipulate. Regarding the effects ofmood on consumers' 
persuasion, we believe that the present dissertation is important in that it provides a 
framework that takes into account the mood of the consumer and provides 
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recommendations about possible marketing actions. After all, consumers always are 
in some kind of mood when they are confronted with a persuasion attempt: the present 
series of studies show the importance of taking consumers mood state into account 
when one is trying to reach them. Of course, it is not always possible to know the 
mood states that consumers are in, but there are a number of situations in one can 
easily assume consumers' current mood state. After a soccer game for example, the 
supporters of the winning team will be in a very good mood, while those of the 
loosing team will be in a bad mood. If you were a beer manufacturer, would you 
employ the same advertising strategy for both groups of consumers? The results ofthe 
present series of studies will advice you not to do so. 
Importantly, the present series of studies will not look at specific emotions such as 
excitement, delight, surprise, contendedness, hostility, sadness, calmness, ... per se. 
Instead we will approach emotions from their basic two-dimensional affective 
structure (see infra, see Russell, 1997; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; Larsen and Diener, 
1992). 
2.2.Structure of Affect 
In the field of psychology, affect has been described by a two-dimensional circumplex 
model, that consists of two basic orthogonal dimensions: pleasure and arousal (i.e. 
state of activation). An example of such a circumplex structure is shown in Figure 1. 
This representation of emotions has been called the two-factor model, because, based 
on the techniques used to generate it (e.g. factor analysis and orthogonal scaling), 
emotions can be arranged around two orthogonal axes. Russell (1997) terms the axes 
pleasure-displeasure and arousal-sleepiness, while Watson and Tellegen (1985) label 
them high positive affect - low positive affect and high negative affect - low negative 
affect. 
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Figure 1 Two-Dimensional Structure of affect 
The idea behind the circumplex model is that specific emotions exist in bipolar 
categories (e.g. happy - sad, nervous - relaxed) and can be arranged in a continuous 
order around a perimeter ofa two - factor space. The closer emotions are to each 
other on the perimeter, the more similar they are. For example, excited and aroused 
are more similar than are content and aroused (see Figure 1). The origin or center of 
the circumplex is thought to represent a neutral point or adaptation level. 
In the first 3 chapters (Chapter 2,3 and 4) we will almostexclusivelylookatthe 
impact of affective valence (pleasure: positive versus negative) on consumers' 
persuasion. In our last series of studies (Chapter 5), we will also take a look at the 
effects of arousal (high versus low activation) on the persuasion process. 
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3. Effects of affect on consumers' persuasion 
Recent research has shown that affect has a considerable impact on people's 
processing strategies as weIl as on their evaluation of the attitude object. It is found 
for example that happy moods are usually associated with heuristic processing 
strategies, whereas sad moods are associated with a systematic elaboration of 
information (e.g. Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wölk, 1996; Sinclair & 
Mark, 1995, 1992; Clore, Schwarz & Conway, 1994; Schwarz & Clore, 1999). The 
logical conclusion from tbis is that people in sad or neutral moods spontaneously 
process information more effortfully than people in happy states. 
Although the increased reliance on heuristics by individuals in positive moods has 
been replicated many times, there have been studies that have shown opposite results, 
namely that positive moods could lead to both increased or diminished levels of 
cognitive processing (e.g. Martin, Ward, Achee, and Wyer, 1993). Wegener, Petty, 
and Smith (1995) showed that positive mood could lead to either lesser or greater 
levels of information processing, depending on whether happy individuals believe that 
systematic processing will lead to the maintenance or destruction of their positive 
mood. People in a positive mood-state, who believe that systematic processing of a 
message could help maintain their mood, may engage in more d etailed processing. 
However, if they view systematic processing of that message as a threat to their 
positive mood state, they would avoid elaborate processing. 
Recent research suggests, however, that this might be only a piece of the entire 
picture. Careful consideration of the mood literature indicates that the effect of mood 
may be not so equivocal as expected. In some studies (e.g. Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & 
Strack, 1990; Worth & Mackie, 1987) it was found that, when explicitly asked to 
evaluate message quality, happy participants differentiate b etween s trong a nd weak 
arguments as much as neutral or sad mood participants. If happy participants fail to 
detect differences in message quality when making their attitude judgment, it is not 
clear how they could have had available this information later on, when asked to rate 
the strength of the arguments. Similarly, in several studies (e.g. Bless et al. 1990) 
happy, neutral, and sad mood participants did not differ in their ability to recall the 
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content 0 fa message. As Bless and his colleagues (Bless et al. 1996) notice, these 
results suggest that happy individuals noticed the quality of the arguments presented 
to them but did not use this information when making an attitude judgment. It should 
also be noted that the conc1usion of reduced processing under happy moods seems at 
odds with other available evidence (Bless. et al. 1996). For example, happy 
participants outperform participants in a neutral or sad mood in creativity and problem 
solving tasks (for an overview see Isen, 1987). In a related vein, Martin and his 
colleagues (Martin, Ward, Achee & Wyer, 1993) found that good mood could 
decrease as weIl as increase processing depending on how participants interpreted the 
implications of their mood. Similarly, it has been shown that a happy mood can lead 
to more creativity (Martin & Stoner, 1996; Hirt, Levine, McDonald, Melton and 
Martin, 1997). 
3.1.Multiple roles for affect 
3.1.1. The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) perspective 
It may be c1ear from the above reported findings that the influence of mood on 
consumers' persuasion can not be ascribed to a simple shift in processing ability or 
motivation. The thesis that is taken in the present dissertation is that there are multiple 
roles for affect depending on a number of circumstances. This assumption is largely, 
but far from exclusive, inspired on the Elaboration Likelihood Model ofPersuasion. 
According to the elaboration likelihood of persuasion (ELM) developed by Petty and 
Cacioppo (1986), tbe influence exerted by various comrnunication elements (such as 
the influence of affect in tbe ad) will depend on tbe amount of issue relevant thinking 
(referred to as elaboration) that occurs during processing. When elaboration is high, 
the central route to persuasion is foIlowed, in which only those message elements 
(referred to as arguments) that are relevant to tbe comrnunication attempt are 
influencial. Conversely, the peripheral route to persuasion occurs under low levels of 
elaboration as elements (referred to as peripheral cues) that are irrelevant to 
developing a reasoned opinion become influential. Botb arguments and peripheral 
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Persuasive 
Communication 
Motivated to Process? 
(personal relevance; 
need for cognition; personal 
responsibility; etc.) 
Yes 
Ability to Process? 
(distraction; repetition; 
prior knowiedge; message 
comprehensibility; etc.) 
Yes 
What is the nature of the processing? 
(argument QuaIity; initial attitude; etc.) 
More favorable 
thoughts than before? 
Yes 
More unfavorable 
thoughts than before? 
Peripheral attitude shift 
Changed attitude is relatively 
temporary, susceptible to 
counterpersuasion, 
and unnredictive of behavior 
Yes 
Is peripheral processing operating? 
(identification with source, 
use ofheuristics, balance theory, etc.) 
No 
Retain initial attitude 
Attitude does not change 
from 
previous position 
Is there a change in cognitive structure? No 
(thought rehearsal, reflection time, etc.) 1----------------------' 
Yes 
(Favorable) 
Central positive 
Attitude change 
Yes 
(Unfavorable) 
Central negative 
attitude change 
tively enduring, resistant to 
and predictive of behavior 
Figure 2: The Basics ofthe Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) 
cues may have an effect under moderate levels of elaboration. The basics of the ELM 
are outlined in Figure 2. 
Elaboration, in turn, depends on the person's motivation and ability during message 
processing. A person motivated and able to elaborate will take the central route. The 
peripheral route is travelled when motivation or ability is lacking. 
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One of the hallmarks of the ELM perspective is that a given variabie can impact 
persuasion via different processes at different levels of elaboration likelihood. That is, 
a given variabie might act as a peripheral cue (when elaboration likelihood is quite 
low), might act as an argument or bias information processing (when information 
likelihood is quite high), or might influence the amount of message processing that 
occurs (when elaboration likelihood is not constrained to be particularly high and low, 
and especially ifmessage recipients are not sure ifthe message warrants scrutiny). 
In an examination of multiple roles for mood, Petty et al (1993) found that the mood 
state of message recipients (induced by a television program or music) directly 
influenced attitudes toward a product or advocacy when elaboration likelihood was 
10w (when the product was 10w in personal relevance or the message recipients were 
low in need for cognition). However, the same difference in mood influenced attitudes 
only through mood-based biases in the thoughts that were generated in response to the 
message when elaboration likelihood was high (when the product was high in 
relevance or message recipients were high in need for cognition). 
The Petty et al. (1993) study is, to our knowiedge, the only study that directly tested 
the multiple role of affect on consumers' persuasion process. The main purpose ofthis 
dissertation is threefold: a) to provide further evidence for this assumption, b) to 
extend this (primarily psychological) finding to the domain of consumer behavior, and 
c) to provide additional insights in the field of affective (consumer) persuasion by 
relating affect to other important consumer behavior related constructs. The multiple 
role of affect is investigated a) in relation with techniques that enhance the application 
of self-relevant information in an advertisement context (i.e. self-referencing, Chapter 
2), b) in relation with the possible effects 0 fambient o dor in a persuasion context 
(Chapter 3), c) with regard to products and services that have negative connotations 
(such as meat and blood donation, Chapter 4) and c) with regard to the way people 
deal with ambiguous and / or suspicious persuasion attempts. A more detailed 
description of the different chapters is discussed at some length in the next section. 
First however we will take a more detailed look at the different roles for affect in the 
persuasion process. 
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3.1.2. Different Roles for Affect 
3.1.2.1. Affect as Motivator to Process 
In a typical affective persuasion study, Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack (1990) 
induced a happy 0 ras ad m ood b y a sking participants top rovide a vivid report of 
either a pleasant or an unpleasant life event. As part of a purportedly independent 
second study, participants were subsequently exposed to a tape-recorded 
communication that presented either strong or weak arguments in favor of an increase 
in fees for student services. After participants listened to the message, their attitudes 
toward an increase in these fees were assessed. Bless and bis colleagues found that 
participants in a sad mood reported more favourable attitudes toward an increase in 
fees for student services when they were exposed to strong arguments than when they 
were exposed to weak arguments. Participants in a happy mood, on the other hand, 
were equally persuaded by s trong a nd b y w eak a rguments, and s howed m oderately 
positive attitude change under bOth conditions. 
This pattem of findings has been replicated in a number of studies with a range of 
different mood inductions and persuasive messages about different attitudinal issues 
(for examples see Petty, Unnava and Strathman, 1991). In sum, these studies suggest 
that recipients' processing of persuasive communications depends on their affective 
state. Whereas recipients in a neutral or negative mood are persuaded by strong but 
not by weak messages, recipients in a positive mood are about equally persuaded by 
both. 
These findings can be explained by the fact that mood has a motivational impact on 
people's persuasion process. Most people seem to act to maintain subjective feelings 
of well-being, preferring to expo se themselves to positively rather than negatively 
toned material (Isen & Simmonds, 1978; Mischel, Ebbesen, & Zeiss, 1973) and to 
engage in behaviors that maintain rather than destroy positive mood (Isen & Levin, 
1972). Ifextensive thinking a bout an issue is difficult (Janis & Mann, 1979), or if 
processing a message may result in exposure to aversive information, message 
recipients in a positive mood might be motivated to avoid such processing in order to 
11 
Chapter I 
Introduction: Affective Persuasion and Consumer Behavior 
maintain their mood (see Mackie and Worth, 1989 for a discussion; Isen, Means, 
Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982). In this motivational view of mood, people in a positive 
mood suffer from motivational deficits: They can systematically process incoming 
material, but they just do not want to. 
3.1.2.2. Affect as a Peripheral Cue: Affect as Information 
The affect as inforrnation model (Schwarz, 1990; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz & 
Clore 1983) suggests that individuals mayassume that their mood states are affective 
reactions to the object being evaluated and thus base their evaluations on their 
affective states. For example, a happy individual when asked to evaluate a painting 
may ask the question "How do I feei?" and infer that bis or her positive mood is a 
reaction to the painting and therefore come to the conclusion that he or she likes the 
painting. Tbe feelings as inforrnation hypothesis suggests that when individuals 
attribute their mood state to something else than the object being evaluated, the effect 
ofmood on evaluation should disappear. Schwarz & Clore (1983) found support for 
this bypothesis when they showed that peoples' mood affected their judgments oflife 
satisfaction. They telephoned people on either warm and sunny or cold and rainy 
days. They found that weather influenced mood, and that mood affected perceptions 
of well-being. The effect however disappeared when the interviewer casually 
mentioned the weather to the individuals. Presumably, the casual mention of the 
weather made people attribute their mood to the weather, and hence the mood lost any 
diagnostic value in evaluating life satisfaction. In other words, people may use their 
moods as the basis for forrning evaluations of objects unless the diagnostic value of 
the mood is discounted. Clore, Schwarz, and Conway (1994) moreover showed that 
individuals may use feelings as inforrnation when the evaluation task is affective in 
nature, when other inforrnation is lacking, when the inforrnation is complex, or when 
there are time constraints. 
This affect as inforrnation process is very similar to the affect transfer hypothesis 
(Zajonc, 1980), which has received considerable less attention in the field of 
consumer behavior. The affect transfer hypothesis maintains that affect can exert 
influence without affecting prior cognitive mediation. Affect transfer was first 
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suggested by a mere exposure experiment (Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980) in which 
subjects, by virtue of repeated exposures, developed affective preferences for 
previously novel Chinese ideographs. One way of interpreting these results is to allow 
for the possibility that gross affective discriminations can be made virtually without 
awareness, whereas cognitive discriminations require greater access to stimulus 
information. Indeed, the affect transfer hypo thesis hinges on the assumption that the 
simple affective qualities of stimuli, such as good versus bad or positive versus 
negative, can be processed more readily than their non affective attributes. Murphy 
and Zajonc (1993) tested this affect transfer hypothesis by comparing the effects of 
affective and cognitive priming under extremely brief (suboptimal and longer 
(optimal) exposure durations. At suboptimal exposures only affective primes 
produced significant shifts in participants judgments of novel stimuli. These results 
suggest that when affect is elicited outside of conscious awareness, it is diffuse and 
non-specific, and its origin and address are not accessible. Having minimal cognitive 
participation, such gross and non-specitic affective reactions can therefore be diffused 
or displaced onto unrelated stimuli. At optimal exposures this pattem of results was 
reversed such that only cognitive primes produced significant shifts in judgment. 
3.1.2.3. Affect and (Biased) Information Processing: Affect 
Priming 
Memory-based affective persuasion models (e.g. Bower, 1981) argue that mood-
congruent judgment is thought to occur because of a connection between mood and 
memory that is often described in terms of a spreading activation model of memory 
(Collins & Loftus, 1975). A spreading activation model describes the memory system 
consisting of interconnected nodes in a network; most nodes represent cognitive 
concepts. A subset of these nodes however represented individual moods such as 
happiness and sadness. As a person enters a given mood, the mood's correspondent 
node in memory is activated, and that activation spreads to associated concepts, 
thereby assisting in the encoding and / or retrieval of mood-associated ideas. Happy 
people will, therefore, better recall pleasant material; sad people will better recall 
unpleasant material. Vnder such conditions the effect is said to be symmetrical in 
happy and sad moods. 
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Isen (1987) and Mackie and Worth (1989) have argued that since positive memories 
are highly interconnected, positive mood will prime and activate more related and 
many unrelated positive memories, thus leading to 1) colored evaluations and 2) 
cognitive capacity constraints. According to this memory-based explanation, 
individuals suffer from capacity constraints because too much positive material is 
activated, resulting in the adoption ofheuristic processing strategies. 
Related to this view, affect has been shown to influence retrieval of information, 
whereby persons in a positive mood state at the time of retrieval have been found to 
show superior recall of positive material learned during encoding, relative to neutral 
or negative material. Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp (1978) for example had 
respondents study positive, negative and neutral words. Either positive, neutral or 
negative mood states were induced in these respondents. Respondents in the positive 
mood condition retrieved more positive words compared with neutral or negative 
words. These results can be explained by the fact that positive mood at the time of 
retrieval functions as a cue that primes the positive material in memory, making this 
material more accessible. The easier accessibility of positive material may then 
influence other cognitive processes, such as evaluations and decision making, and also 
subsequent behaviors. 
3.1.2.4. Summary 
It is clear from the above that affect may act as a peripheral cue (i.e. affect as 
information, when processing motivation is low), affect may bias information 
processing by activating sirnilarly valenced material (i.e. affect priming, when 
processing motivation is high), or affect may influence the amount of message 
processing (when processing motivation is medium and / or when processing ability is 
not constrained). In a number of studies we will extend the view that there are 
multiple roles for affect under different kinds of processing motivation. 
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3.1.3. Alternative explanatory mechanisms 
In theorizing about the different roles for affect, we argued that we based ourselves 
mainly on the ELM perspective. It is important to note however that this multiple role 
for affect is not a unique contribution of the ELM. Other researchers (e.g. Forgas, 
1995; Chaiken, 1980) have also theorized about multiple roles for a same cue in the 
domain of persuasion. 
3.1.3.1. Chaiken's Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) 
Tbe heuristic-systematic model (HSM; Chaiken 1980, 1987), which is more silent 
with regard to the impact of affect on persuasion, also assurnes multiple roles for a 
same cue under different conditions of processing motivation, and may therefore also 
account for the seemingly inconsistent findings in the affective persuasion literature. 
The HSM also accommodates for the joint impact of systematic processing on 
attitudes. Tbe HSM also represents an explicit attempt to explain why certain cues, 
such as affective valence of an ad, or people's mood, or message strength, influence 
the persuasion process. The model focuses on heuristics retrieved from memory rather 
than decision rules generated on-line. That i s, C haiken proposes t hat in contrast t 0 
"systematic" (or centra!) processing, many source cues, message cues, and other cues 
are processed by means of simple schernas or cognitive heuristics that people have 
learned 0 n t he basis 0 f past e xperience a nd 0 bservation. To the extent that various 
persuasion rules of thumb are available in memory, they may be retrieved to evaluate 
persuasive communications. 
3.1.3.2. Forgas' Affect Infusion Model (AlM) 
Forgas (1992, 1995) has recently proposed a multiroute model of the impact of affect 
on judgment: the affect infusion model, or AIM. In the AIM, several information 
processing modes are described. Two of the modes address when affect has an impact 
on judgment, and two address when affect does not have an impact. Specifically, 
Forgas notes that affect can have an impact on judgment in two ways. In what Forgas 
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caUs "heuristic processing", affect influences judgment because people "use their 
affect as a shortcut to iofer their evaluative reactions to the target". When the 
evaluative target is simpIe, the personal relevance is low, cognitive capacity is limited, 
or when the accuracy requirements are not high, the individual may resort in this 
heuristic, high affect infusion strategy. Under these circumstances, evaluations may be 
based on the existing mood, as in the feelings-as-information hypothesis (Schwarz & 
Bless, 1983). 
In what he caUs "substantive processing", affect influences judgment "through its 
selective influence on attention, encoding, retrieval, and associative processes". When 
the judgmental situation requires the individual to leam and process novel 
information, and when he or she has adequate cognitive capacity and motivation to 
process the information, substantive, high affect infusion processing is predicted to 
take place. 
In essence, these two processing modes map nicely onto the ELM notion that affect 
can influence judgment under low-elaboration conditions by serving as a peripheral 
cue, and under high-elaboration conditions by biasing thinking. 
Forgas further notes that affect will not have an impact on judgment if a person has a 
strong prior attitude that is retrieved directly (i.e. the "direct access mode"). Forgas 
suggests that direct-access processing (i.e. low affect infusion) is used when the 
evaluative target is familiar and when there are no strong cognitive, affective or 
situational factors t hat c all f or s ystematic processing. A ccordingly, individuals who 
evaluate very familiar objects would be using direct-access processing, and hence, 
mood effects would not be found in such cases. 
Another low-affect infusion strategy is motivated processing, where the information 
search and the evaluative outcome are guided by prior motivational goals such as 
mood repair. 
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4. Overview of tbe Studies 
The general purpose of this dissertation is to take a closer look at the multiple role of 
affect in the domain of advertising and consumer behavior. More specifically, we aim 
to 1) provide further evidence for the multiple role of affect in the persuasion domain, 
2) extend the (primarily psychological) findings to the domain of consumer behavior 
and 3) use acquired knowledge to gain insight in other relevant consumer behavior 
related constructs. In this dissertation, a number of research papers are integrated, that 
deal with this multiple role of affect in an advertising (Chapters 2-4) or consumer 
behavior setting (Chapter 5). 
In a first series of studies (Chapter 2) we will take a closer look at the motivational 
effect of affect on consumer persuasion, and relate it to a persuasion-enhancing 
technique that is related to people's self-concept: self-referencing. In Chapter 3, affect 
is operationalized by the use of ambient odor (e.g. the scent of the ad), and we will 
look at the different roles of affect (ambient odor) under different conditions of 
processing motivation. In the next chapter (Chapter 4), we will extensively look at the 
effects of affect when consumers have to evaluate a product or service that is 
associated with negative feelings or beliefs. Again we williook at different processing 
motivation and ability factors. In our last chapter (Chapter 5) we williook mainly at 
the arousing part of emotions (instead of the affective valence) and show that arousal 
affects consumers' ability to deal with a persuasion attempt, resulting in different 
evaluative outcomes under different conditions of arousal. 
4.1.Self-Referencing: Affect as Motivator 
The first research paper investigates the moderating role of affect in an advertisement 
context. More specific, the study investigates the dual-role of affect on the way that 
consumers process and evaluate ads that use of self-reference techniques. Self-
reference techniques are often employed to enhance self-referencing, a cognitive 
process whereby individuals associate self-relevant incoming information with 
information that is previously stored in memory (one's self-concept) in order to give 
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the new infonnation meaning. Tbis process has beneficial effects on both infonnation 
processing and evaluation. 
Affect, as a motivator to process, is used to take a closer look at the mechanisms 
underlying self-reference effects. Both mood as weU as ad elicited affect are 
successfully employed to manipulate consumers processing motivation. While the 
study mainly focuses on the mechanisms underlying self-referencing, it also nicely 
shows that affect is a motivator to process, and that it moderates the impact of self-
reference cues in an advertisement context. Several practical implications are 
discussed. 
4.2.Ambient Odor: Different Roles of Affect Under Different 
Conditions of ELM 
In this research paper the dual-role of affect is investigated by manipulating the 
ambient odor that surrounds a persuasion attempt. Odors are frequently used in the 
field of advertising and marketing, and are thought to elicit pleasant moods and affect 
(Bone & Ellen, 1999). We show that when consumers are motivated to process the 
advertisement, a pleasant odor only enhances product evaluations when the ambient 
odor is congruent with the advertized product. That is, when an orange juice ad smells 
like fruit, and not like soap for example. In contrast, when consumers were not 
motivated to process, congruency of the ambient odor did not matter. These results 
can be explained in the light of dual-process models of persuasion: when processing 
motivation is low, consumers take the affect (elicited by the odor) as informational for 
the judgment, and do not notice the incongruency with the product category. When 
processing motivation is high, consumers will notice the incongruency with the 
product category (either because (un)related constructs are activated because of affect 
priming or because consumers think more elaborately about the message because of 
increased processing motivation, or a mixture of both). Some interesting and useful 
practical implications will be discussed. 
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4.3.Affect and the Evaluation of Negatively Valenced Mental 
Categories: New Evidence for The Multiple Role of Affect 
The third research paper investigates the multiple role of affect in the context of 
product categories that are associated with negative beliefs and feelings. The results of 
four studies suggest multiple roles for affect. Besides evidence for affect as 
information under conditions of low processing motivation, and for affect priming 
under conditions ofhigh processing motivation, we find enhanced product evaluations 
when our participants were in a bad mood. Interestingly, because we are dealing with 
schemata that had negative connotations, we find that negative mood motivated 
people even more to think about the presented messages, such that evaluations 
become also more positive when mood was negative. This effect, which we label the 
cognitive tuning effect, is only found when our participants are sufficiently motivated 
to process. Some straightforward practical implications are discussed. 
4.4.How Arousal Affects Consumers' Use of Persuasion 
Knowledge 
In our last research paper, we investigate the role of affect on the way consumers try 
to deal with persuasion attempts. This paper is somewhat different from the previous 
ones. First, the conceptual framework that is used is not directly related to the ELM. 
Instead, the Persuasion Knowledge Model of Friestad and Wright (1994) is used as a 
starting point. This model describes how consumers try to deal with persuasion 
attempts when they go shopping, when they read ads, when they watch commercials, 
etc. Second, while the previous research papers mainly concentrate on the affective 
valence part of emotions (e.g. Russell, 1997), this study deals with the arousal part of 
emotions. As discussed throughout this introductory section, affective valence has 
been found to fulfil multiple roles in the persuasion process. One of it is its influence 
on consumers' processing motivation. In the present series of studies, it is found that 
arousal affects consumers processing ability. Note that both motivation and ability are 
factors that influence consumers' elaboration likelihood ofpersuasion (see Figure 2). 
The results of three studies indicate that when arousal is high (i.e. low processing 
ability), consumers are not further able to apply their persuasion knowiedge, and will 
19 
Chapter 1 
Introduction: Affective Persuasion and Consumer Behavior 
be more likely to succumb to even blatant persuasive tactics. Also, when arousal is 
high, they are more likely to be persuaded by peripheral message cues, such as a T-
shirt wom by the salesperson, or the mere exposure to a message advocacy. 
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1. Abstract 
The present study investigates the influence of affect (both feIt affect and mood) while 
consumers process and evaluate ads that make use of self-reference techniques. Self-
referencing is defined as the cognitive process whereby individuals associate self-
relevant incoming information with information that is previously stored in memory 
(one's self-concept) in order to give the new information meaning. The process has 
beneficial effects on both information processing and evaluation. 
Affect (as a motivator to process) is used to take a c loser look at t he m echanisms 
underlying self-reference effects. Two altemative explanations regarding self-
referencing are contrasted. On the one hand, it can be hypothesized that self-
referencing i s a d ata-driven, high e laboration b ottom-up p rocess, t hat is manifested 
under conditions of high processing motivation (e.g. when mood is negative, or when 
involvement with the product is high). Altematively, it can also be hypothesized that 
self-referencing is a schema-based top-down process, manifested under conditions of 
low processing motivation (e.g. when mood is positive, or when involvement with the 
product is low). 
The results of two studies indicate that self-referencing resembles an active, data-
driven bottom-up process, that is likely to occur when consumers have sufficient 
1 Part ofthis chapter is adapted from Bosmans, A., P. Van Kenhove, P. Vlerick, & H. Hendrickx, 2001. 
The Effect of Mood on Self-Referencing in a Persuasion Context. Published in Advances in Conswner 
Research, 28,115-121. 
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processing motivation available to process the information (in the ad). Several 
practical implications are discussed. 
2. Introduction 
Advertisers often try to persuade consumers by encouraging them to relate the 
information presented in the ad to aspects of oneself (e.g. one's own personal 
experiences). This information processing strategy, known as self-referencing, can be 
induced by a variety of techniques: Photo's are presented that visually place 
consumers in the position of the scene actor or participant (instead in that of an 
uninvolved onlooker), or relatively personal second-person wording is used ('You are 
going to a party') as opposed to rather removed third-person wording ('He is going to 
a party') (Debevec & Romeo, 1992). 
Self-referencing has been described in the literature as a cognitive process whereby 
individuals associate self-relevant incoming information with information previously 
stored in memory (one's self-concept) in order to give the new information meaning 
(e.g. Kuiper and Rogers 1979; Markus 1980). 
Research suggests that self-referencing has a considerable impact on the recall of 
information (e.g. Baumgartner, Sujan and Bettman 1992; Sujan, Bettman and 
Baumgartner 1993), as well as on product evaluations (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 1992; 
Sujan et al. 1993; Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1996; Sujan et al. 1993). It has been 
found for example, that performance of a self-referencing task rather than some other 
task leads to a greater recall of words and phrases that are presented during the task 
(see for example Rogers, Kuiper, & Kirker, 1977). However, the results obtained from 
the different studies are not at all unequivocal. Although most studies show enhanced 
memory and evaluation effects as a result of self-referencing, others show detrimental 
effects (for a meta-analysis see Symons and Johnson 1997). Under some 
circumstances a positive effect of self-referencing on recall has not been obtained. It 
was for example not obtained when people were asked to form an image or picture in 
their minds (i.e. visualization strategy) that are related to to-be-remembered words to 
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themselves (Lord, 1980). It seems as if self-referencing depends upon people's 
specific processing strategies: visualization for example (see above) seems to be 
unaffected by self-referencing. Why is this? 
In the present studies we try to clarify the inconsistency in findings in the self-
reference literature. As we will discuss later, we argue that the conditions under which 
self-reference effects occur depend on consumers' processing motivation. Since mood 
has been found to influence people's processing strategies in a significant manner (see 
for example Bagozzi, Gopinath, and Nyer, 1999), we argue that people's mood can 
influence the way they process self-reference prompts. 
The present paper presents two studies that show how peoples' affective state (their 
mood state or the affect that they feel after seeing an ad or a commercial) influence 
the way they process an ad that is either relevant (in the self-referencing condition) or 
not relevant (in the not self-relevant condition) for themselves. For practitioners, 
insight into this problem is of considerable importance. In the present research, we 
will try to clarify a number of the conditions under which self-referencing is most 
effective. Naturally, this will give insight into conditions under which self-referencing 
will or wiIl not be successful. After all, it would be rather dull to invest a considerable 
amount of money in a self-referencing campaign that has no or little additive value or 
effect. At the same time, if some specific (yet to be investigated) conditions in your 
market are satisfied, why not use self-referencing in your campaign, given that it has 
beneficial effects on consumers' evaluations as well as on their comprehension ofthe 
ad. More specifically, the present research aims to explore under which affective 
conditions (e.g. positive or negative mood) referring to consumers' self-concept wiIl 
be most effective? Does self-referencing work better if people are in a positive mood 
(for example, after they have watched a happy tv-show), or does it work better ifthey 
are in a sad mood (for example after having watched the daily news)? In the first 
study we will deal with consumers' mood state ( defined a s a general, non specific 
state of affective activation), while in the second study we will deal with consumers' 
affect that they feel after they have looked at an emotional colored ad (i.e. we will 
look at the effect of affective stimuli). On the basis of the literature (see for example 
Soldat, Sinclair, & Mark, 1997) we argue that both feIt affect and mood will have a 
similar effect on self-referencing. 
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Besides these more practical research questions, the irnportance of mood - and 
affective stimuli in general - as plausible moderators for self-referencing, can help us 
clarify the mechanisms underlying self-referencing effects, and give us more insight 
into the self-concept in general. In general, we hypothesize that the effectiveness of 
self-referencing will depend upon people's processing motivation. Two altemative 
explanations concerning self-referencing are contrasted. We will discuss these in the 
very next section. Also, since mood has been found to influence people's processing 
motivation (e.g. Isen, 1984; Mackie & Worth, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), we find 
it an interesting manipulation of processing motivation. We will discuss this in a 
subsequent section. 
3. Self-referencing effects: Exploratory mechanisms 
The self-reference effect is thought to occur because knowledge of oneself is rich and 
plentiful, containing many associations that can be related to the incorning 
information. The self is described in the literature as an elaborate and organized 
network of associations (e.g. Markus 1980). Consequently, i t affects e laboration 0 f 
relevant stimulus information and also individuals' evaluative judgrnents in a 
persuasion context. 
3.1.Self-referencing as a top-down process 
According to Brewer (1986), self-referencing can be seen as a process whereby 
knowledge structures of oneself are accessed and used to understand the incoming 
information. 
This abbreviated way of information processing, whereby one's mental processing is 
guided by means of the ''top'' level of knowledge stored in memory, has been labeled 
in the cognitive psychological literature as "conceptually driven processing" (see for 
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example Ashcrafi, 1993 for a discussion). Other current synonymous tenns are 
"analysis by synthesis" (e.g. Neisser, 1967), and "top-down" or "schema-based" 
processing. Conceptually or schema-based processing is characterized by the fact that 
the "top" level of knowledge (for example the self-concept) exerts an influence 
"down" toward the actual perceptual process. Consequently, people will rely almost 
exclusively on what they already know when processing infonnation: i.e. on their 
general knowledge structures or mental schemas. 
This reliance on knowledge structures or schemas typically leads to subjective 
perception. A few years ago for example, this was demonstrated by a controversial 
advertisement that was developed for the famous clothing manufacturer Benetton. 
Because a black man and a white man were handcuffed together, the ad was the target 
of m any c omplaints a bout r acism a fier i t a ppeared i n magazines and on hoardings, 
even though the company has a reputation for promoting racial tolerance. People 
interpreted it to mean that the black man had been a rrested b y a w hite man. Even 
though both men are dressed identically, people's prior assumptions shaped the ad's 
meaning. 
Research in the domain of cognitive psychology shows that relying on general 
knowledge structures or schemas does not necessarily lead to dysfunctional 
processing such as biased thinking and use of stereotypes. hlstead, it allows the 
individual to reduce the complexity of infonnation processing at different stages. That 
is, a reliance on general knowledge structures promotes parsimonious and efficient 
processing (see for example Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Bless & Fiedler, 1995). At the 
encoding stage, schemata allow the individual to ignore unrelated and unimportant 
details of a situation and, therefore, reduce infonnation complexity, rendering more 
elaborate processing unnecessary. Moreover, general knowledge structures influence 
retrieval processes (e.g. Hastie, 1981), and judgments can be fonned parsimoniously 
on the basis of schemalike knowledge structures (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg). hl 
sum, relying on one's knowledge structure when processing infonnation can he seen 
as a heuristic, effortless infonnation processing strategy (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
Consistent with this schema-based view of self-referencing, Baumgartner, Sujan, and 
Bettman (1992) demonstrated that an increase in self-referencing changes the context 
29 
Chapter 2 
The Effect of Affect on Self-Referencing in a Persuasion Context: Affect as Motivator 
of consumers' thoughts. Baumgartner and his colleagues manipulated self-referencing 
by letting people relate the information in the ad to an autobiographical event. They 
found that consumers' thoughts were more focused on the autobiographical episode, 
and thoughts about and memory for product features was less accessible. These 
findings indicate that self-referencing is a schema-based and conceptually driven 
process. In a related vein, Sujan, Bettman, and Baumgartner (1993) showed that ads 
that encouraged self-referencing (again via the retrieval of autobiographical 
memories) e licited a transfer 0 f affect 0 ft he self-concept to the brand, resulting in 
enhanced ad evaluation. 
If these findings are generalizable to the complete field of self-referencing, they have 
serious practical implications for evaluations: when self-referencing is high, 
evaluations will be based less on arguments presented in t he message. I n a ddition, 
when the self-related knowledge structure (e.g. an autobiographical memory) has 
strong positive affect, this affect will transfer to the product attitudes resulting in 
favorable product evaluations. On the other hand, when the self-related knowledge 
structure has negative affect, the affect transfer will result in less favorable 
evaluations. 
3.2.Self-referencing as a bottom-up process 
In contrast, Meyers-Levy and Perrachio (1996) found that whether people would 
actually respond to self-reference prompts depended on people's motivation to 
process carefully. They observed for example that only when people employed a 
rational decision making style2 (as opposed to an intuitive decision making style) they 
were responsive to self-reference prompts. According to their findings, self-
referencing will only manifest itself if respondents are sufficiently motivated to 
process the information presented in the ad, making them responsive to the self-
reference prompts (Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1996). 
2 In Meyers-Levy and Peracchio's (1996) study, decision making style was a measured individual 
difference variabIe. They did not manipulate processing motivation. 
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Tbis reasoning is based on evidence that when processing motivation is limited, ad 
recipients tend not to respond to nonsalient cues such as the self-reference prompts in 
question (Meyers-Levy and Maheswaran 1991; Meyers-Levy and Stemthal 1991). It 
has been shown that individuals who favor such perfunctory processing typically base 
their evaluations on simple heuristic cues, such as the affect they associate with the 
product category, the enjoyment they derive from the ad photo or the ad copy's 
writing style, and the like (e.g. Alba and Hutchinson 1987; Mick 1992), but not on 
information that needs a certain amount of processing motivation. According to 
Meyers-Levy and Perrachio (1996), self-referencing is a processing device that is 
associated with a considerable motivation to process. 
Note that this line of reasoning is more consistent with a data-driven processing style 
(see Ashcraft, 1993). Tbis processing strategy implies that people work from the 
bottom up, using only the features and clues in the stimulus - the data in the 
environment (e.g. the ad) - to process the information. Data driven or bottom-up 
processing means that one processes the information with very little existing 
knowiedge. Hence, t bis processing s tyle iso pposite tot he conceptually or schema-
based processing style. 
3.3.Research objective 
The main objective of this research is to distinguish between these two a Iternative 
self-referencing explanations. Since mood has been found to affect people's 
processing motivation (i.e. detailed systematic processing versus use ofheuristics and 
short cuts, see below), we believe that manipulating our participants' mood will give 
us more insight into the process of self-referencing. First we will briefly discuss the 
effects of mood on consumers' information processing and persuasion process. 
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4. Mood 
Recent research has shown that mood states have a considerabie impact on people's 
processing strategies as weIl as on their evaluation of the attitude object. It is found 
that happy moods are associated with heuristic processing strategies, whereas sad 
moods are associated with systematic elaboration ofinforrnation (e.g. Bless, Clore, 
Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe and Wölk 1996; Sinclair and Mark 1995). With regard to 
evaluations, it is observed that when people in different moods make evaluations, the 
typical result is that those in positive moods render more favorable evaluations than 
those in negative moods (e.g. Mayer, McCormick and Strong 1995; Sedikides 1992). 
Several explanations have been forrnulated to account for the fact that mood 
influences people's processing strategies. According to memory-based models (e.g. 
Bower 1981; Isen 1984), mood influences evaluations by increasing the accessibility 
ofmood-congruent information. According to Mackie and Worth (1991) for example, 
being in a positive mood causes people to bring more positive information to mind 
than does being in a negative mood. According to this affect priming principle (Isen 
1987; Mackie and Worth 1989), being in a good mood limits processing capacity 
because of the activation of a large amount of interconnected positive material stored 
in memory. Hence, individuals in a good mood may not have the cognitive resources 
required by systematic processing strategies and may therefore default to less taxing 
heuristic strategies. 
Altematively, according to the affect-as-inforrnation view (Schwarz and Clore 1983), 
negative affect signals that the environment poses a problem, whereas positive affect 
signals that the environment is benign. As aresult, negative affective cues may 
motivate detail-oriented, systematic processing, which is usually adaptive in handling 
problematic situations. In contrast, positive affective states, by themselves, signal no 
particular action requirement, and happy individuals may hence not be motivated to 
expend cognitive effort unless called for by other goals. In accordance with this 
affect-as-inforrnation hypothesis, Bless (Bless et al. 1996) found that happy m oods 
increase, whereas sad moods decrease the reliance on general knowledge structures. 
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Similarly, Bodenhausen (1993) argues that happy mood participants make more use 
of stereotypic infonnation when making a judgment. 
Distinguishing between these different mood theories is far from crucial at this point 
and would lead us too far from the actual purpose of this study. What is important to 
remember at this point is that positive mood seems to decrease whereas negative 
mood seems to increase a systematic, detail oriented processing strategy. 
5. The Relationship between Mood and Self-Referencing 
The purpose of the present research is twofold. First, we investigate the moderating 
influence of one of these p lausible factors, n amely t he i nfluence 0 fm ood, 0 n s elf-
referencing. Secondly, we attempt to, through the use of mood as plausible moderator, 
clarify the mechanisms underlying self-referencing. hl the present study we 
hypothesize that the effect of self-referencing is moderated by people's processing 
motivation. Two alternative explanations concerning self-referencing effects are 
contrasted. 
Since mood has been found in the literature to moderate people's processing 
motivation, we find this an interesting manipulation of processing strategy. As a 
result, our main research question concerns the influence of mood on self-referencing. 
We argue that insight into the plausible moderating influence of mood on self-
referencing can help us to clarify the mechanisms underlying self-referencing effects. 
hl addition, it will give us more insight into the self-concept in general. We 
furthennore argue that through the manipulation of mood under different self-
reference conditions, more theoretical insight can be obtained conceming mechanisms 
responsible for observed mood effects in the persuasion literature. 
As we discussed above, being in a positive mood usually results in a decrease in 
processing motivation (see for example Bagozzi et al., 1999). This leads to an 
increase in the adoption of processing heuristics and to a greater reliance in general 
knowledge structures (see Bless et al., 1996; Bodenhausen, 1993). Because the self-
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schema is such a well-organized cognitive schema, it can be expected that self-
referencing prompts will be more effective for persuasion under conditions of positive 
mood: the self-reference prompt activates the self, and because people are in a good 
mood (and experience the situation as benign) they will rely on their self-concept 
when making evaluations. Note that in this case, we hypothesize that self-referencing 
is a top-down or schema-based process (Schank and Abelson 1977). 
On the other hand we argued that self-referencing will only manifest itself if 
respondents are sufficiently motivated to process the information that is presented in 
the ad, making them responsive to the self-reference prompts (Meyers-Levy & 
Peracchio, 1996). Since negative affect has been found to be an effective motivator to 
process information in a more detailed and systematic manner than does positive 
affect (Bodenhausen, 1993; Petty et al., 1993), it can be expected that self-referencing 
prompts will only be used by respondents under conditions of negative mood. Note 
that in this case we hypothesize that self-referencing is a bottom-up or stimulus-based 
process (Schank & Abelson, 1977). 
6. Study 1 
6.1.Hypotheses 
6.1.1. Effects of Self-Referencing and Mood on Product 
Evaluations 
Because the present study does not deal with mental schemas associated with negative 
emotions (such as fear or guilt), it can be expected that self-referencing will lead to 
more positive product evaluations. Consistent with results obtained by studies dealing 
with the effect of self-referencing on persuasion, it can be expected that: 
UIa: Product evaluations will be more positive In self-referencing conditions 
compared to no self-referencing conditions. 
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We can furthennore expect that if self-referencing is a top-down process (see ahove), 
and is the result of a reliance in general knowledge structures (the self-concept in this 
case), product evaluations will he more positive under conditions of positive mood: 
BIb:3 If self-referencing can he considered as a top-down process, it can he expected 
that under conditions of self-referencing, product evaluations will he more 
positive when suhjects are in a positive, compared to a negative mood. 
Ifhowever, self-referencing can b e considered as a hottom-up process (see above), 
and will only manifest itself when suhjects are sufficiently motivated to process, 
product evaluations will he more positive under conditions ofnegative mood: 
BIc: If self-referencing can be considered as a hottom-up process, it can he 
expected that under conditions of self-referencing, product evaluations will be 
more positive when subjects are in a negative, compared to a positive mood. 
Moreover, it can he expected that under low elaboration likelihood (e.g. Petty et al. 
1993) mood can he taken as an affective cue when making evaluations (see earlier, 
affect-as-infonnation hypothesis). So, for the no self-referencing condition, the 
following hypothesis concerning the effects of mood on evaluations can he 
fonnulated: 
BId: In the no self-referencing condition, product evaluations will he more positive 
when suhjects are in a positive, compared to a negative mood. 
Hence, if se1f-referencing can he seen as a schema-hased top-down process, we expect 
a main effect of self-referencing (Hla) and a main effect ofmood (HIb and HId) on 
3 We acknowledge that it is not very usual, but for reasons of simplicity, we chose to contrast all sub-
hypothesis band c in the next sections to indicate contrasting explanations. 
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product evaluations. If however, self-referencing is more like a bottom up process, a 
main effect of self-referencing (RIa) and an interaction effect of mood and self-
referencing (R1c and H1d) on product evaluations can be expected. 
6.1.2. Effects of Self-Referencing and Mood on Positivity of 
Thoughts 
Self-referencing is also thought to have an effect on the valenced thoughts subjects 
have (Anand and Stemthal 1990; Burnkrant and Unnava 1995; Meyers-Levy and 
Peracchio 1996). This is because as elaboration rises (as is the case for self-
referencing), people have a greater opportunity to recognize, appreciate, and reflect on 
the cogency of a message and the favorable information that the persuasive message 
mostly conveys (Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1996). As aresuit, respondents generate 
predominantly favorable thoughts. Another explanation is that self-referencing leads 
to the activation of the self-concept that is in most cases (except in cases of 
depression) a positively valenced mental knowledge structure (e.g. AHoy, Abramson, 
Murray, Whitehouse and Hogan 1997). Through the principle of affect transfer 
(Baumgartner et al. 1992; Sujan et al. 1993) thoughts about the product and the ad 
also become more positive. At this point however, distinguishing between these two 
explanations is not crucial. 
H2a: In genera!, self-referencing will lead to a greater positivity of thoughts 
(number of positive thoughts compared the total number of thoughts) 
compared to when there is no self-referencing. 
Furthermore, we can hypothesize that in the case self-referencing is a top-down 
process: 
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Hlb: If self-referencing can be considered as a top-down process, it can be expected 
that in the self-referencing condition positive mood will lead to a greater 
positivity ofthoughts compared to negative mood. 
In contrast, when self-referencing is a bottom-up process: 
H2c: If self-referencing can be considered as a bottom-up process, it can be 
expected that in the self-referencing condition negative mood w illl ead toa 
greater positivity ofthoughts compared to positive mood. 
6.1.3. Effects of self-referencing and mood on purchase 
intentions 
Because self-referencing has generally been found to enhance advertising 
effectiveness (Baumgartner et al. 1992; Burnkrant and Unnava 1995), it can be 
expected that self-referencing will lead to increased purchase intentions (e.g. 
Krishnamurthyand Sujan 1999): 
H3a: Overall, self-referencing will lead to higher purchase intentions compared to 
no self-referencing. 
AIso, when self-referencing can be considered as a top-down process: 
H3b: If self-referencing can be considered as a top-down process, it can be expected 
that in the self-referencing condition purchase intentions will be higher when 
mood is positive compared to when mood is negative 
In contrast, when self-referencing is a bottom-up process: 
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H3c: If self-referencing can be considered as a bottom-up process, it can be 
expected that in the self-referencing condition purchase intentions will be 
higher when mood is negative compared to when mood is positive 
6.1.4. Effects of Self-Referencing and Mood on Recall of 
Product Features 
It should be noted that the literature is not very clear upon what can be expected 
concerning the effects of self-referencing on the recall of product features. 
On the one hand, it has been extensively shown that self-referencing enhances 
message r ecall (for a review s ee S ymons a nd Jo hnson 1 997). Because the self is a 
complex, well organized knowledge structure, its activation provides more potential 
linkages between new information and information that is already stored (memory 
structures). Because of these linkages, elaboration of the incoming information is 
facilitated (Anderson and Reder 1979). 
On the other hand, detrimental effects of self-referencing on recall have been reported 
in the literature (e.g. Sujan et al. 1992). Referencing the selfis an attention-consuming 
task, and as this referencing increases, attention to the environment diminishes 
(Carver and Scheier 1981) and there may be interference with the encoding of new 
information. Baumgartner (Baumgartner et al. 1992) showed that increased retrieval 
of autobiographical memories (a form of self-referencing) results in more thoughts 
about the autobiographical episode, and less thoughts about the product features. 
Given these different research findings, we argue that it is not very opportune to 
formulate specific hypotheses regarding the effect of self-referencing and mood on the 
recall of product features. Therefore we consider our recall variabie, although 
previously investigated in the literature, as exploratory. After all, neither of these 
findings is in support for data-driven or top-down processing. Both exploratory 
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mechanisms are able to account for the two above mentioned observations (increase 
or decrease in recaIl). 
6.2.Method 
6.2.1. Participants and Design 
Participants were 83 undergraduate university students. They participated on a 
volunteer basis. 
Participants were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Mood: positive versus 
negative) x 2 (Self-referencing: self-referencing versus not) fuIl factorial between-
subjects design. Participants were received in groups up to 4 by the experimenters, 
who briefly explained that participants would be completing some independent tasks 
that had been combined into one session. These tasks (described below) included (a) 
the mood induction, (b) presentation ofthe ad (for a fictitious brand of orange juice), 
and (c) measurement ofthe dependent variables related to the ad: product evaluations, 
positivity ofthoughts, purchase intentions, and recall of product attributes. 
For the mood induction task, participants were asked to provide a vivid written report 
of either a happy or a sad life event, purportedly to help with the construction of a 
"Life Event Inventory" (as done by Bless et al. 1996). Subjects were led to believe 
that this Life Inventory Task was unrelated to the remaining of the tasks. Reporting a 
happy event was intended to induce a happy mood, whereas focusing on an 
experienced sad event was intended to induce a sad mood. Participants were given 12 
minutes to complete their reports. They were then asked several questions about the 
task. Embedded among these questions was a manipulation check question that read 
"How do you feel right now?". Consequently 6 9-point semantic differential items 
(ranging from -3 over 0 to 3) were presented. These items were derived from the 
Mehrabian and Russel (1974) Pleasure scale (happy/ unhappy, pleased! annoyed, 
satisfied! unsatisfied, contended! melancholic, hopefull despairing, relaxed! bored). 
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Subjects were asked to indicate to what extent these items described their feelings at 
themoment. 
Self-referencing was manipulated by systematically varying the introductory 
paragraph 0 ft he a d. Int he high s elf-referencing condition, t he messages addressed 
subjects directly by using very personal second person wording (e.g. "Citrus Orange 
and your breakfast is complete ... You love a good breakfast? ... "). In the low self-
referencing condition, the message was written in the third person (e.g. "Citrus 
Orange and his breakfast is complete ... He loves a good breakfast ... "). Similar self-
referencing techniques have been described in the literature (e.g. Bumkrant and 
Unnava 1995; Meyers-Levy and Peracchio 1996). After the presentation of the ad, 
subjects were asked to answer a series of questions designed to provide a check on the 
validity of the self-referencing manipulation. The questions asked about the extent 
subjects believed the ad was meant for them, they were personally involved by the ad, 
the ad was written with them in mind, the ad was relevant for them, they felt 
personally attracted to the ad, the ad related to them personally, and about the extent 
they t hought a bout t heir 0 wn e xperiences w ith 0 range j uice (inspired 0 n B umkrant 
and Unnava 1995). For each of these seven questions, they indicated their agreement 
on a 7-point scale (strongly disagree to strongly agree). 
6.2.2. Procedure 
Subjects were first asked to help the department of Psychology of the university with 
the collection of sad and happy life events (see earlier). Afterwards, they were 
presented the critical ad (either containing a self-referent prompt or not) in a 
standardized way. Participants were told that it was a pretest ad. The ad depicted a 
fictitious brand for orange juice (Citrus Orange), together with a picture of a breakfast 
situation and some text describing the new brand. Afterwards, subjects were asked to 
fill in a questionnaire containing measures about the dependent variables. 
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6.2.3. Dependent Variables 
The questionnaire began with the measurement of the validity of the self-referencing 
manipulation (see earlier). After this manipulation check, subjects were given a three-
minute cognitive response task in which subjects were asked to list all the thoughts 
they had when they read the orange juice ad. After they had listed all their thoughts, 
subjects were asked to code each thought as positive, negative, or neutral in terms of 
its implications for the orange juice. Instructions on the thought-listing and coding 
task followed Cacioppo and Petty (1981). These valenced thoughts were used to 
calculate the positivity ofthoughts index: (number ofpositive thoughts I total number 
ofthoughts) X 100. 
After this thought-listing procedure, attitudes towards Citrus Orange orange juice 
were measured on 4 7-point semantic differential items: positive/negative, love/hate, 
goodlbad, desirable/undesirable (Simons and Carey, 1998). These product evaluation 
items were averaged for analysis (alpha = 0.90). 
Behavioral intention was measured by asking subjects about their purchase intentions 
on one 7-point item: "How likely is that you will actually buy Citrus Orange when it 
is for sale?" (e.g. Krishnamurthy and Sujan 1999). Answers had to be given from very 
unlikely to very likely. 
The questionnaire concluded with a recall question, in which subjects were asked to 
write down as much as they could remember about the orange juice ad. We 
subsequently scored each subjects' recall protocol by counting the number of 
arguments from the ad that were recalied (maximum 6). 
6.3.Results and Discussion 
A MANOV A analysis was performed on our dependent variables product evaluation, 
positivity of thoughts, purchase intentions and recall of product attributes. Overall, 
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tbis analysis shows a significant main effect of self-referencing: F(4, 76) = 2.80, P < 
.05 (power = .74), as weU as a significant interaction effect of self-referencing and 
mood: F(4, 76) = 3.21, P < .05 (power = .81). The main effect of mood was not 
significant (F < 1). 
Table lMeans and Standard deviations as a function of Mood and Self-Referencing 
Effect Product Positivity of Purchase Recall of 
Evaluation Thoughts Intentions Features 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Self-Referencing 
High 3.32 (1.14) 46.16 (31.06) 3.14 (1.63) 2.00 (1.56) 
Low 2.77 (1.17) 36.24 (26.66) 2.15 (1.30) 1.80 (1.75) 
Mood 
Positive 3.06 (1.20) 37.21 (29.53) 2.63 (1.54) 1.98 (1.71) 
Negative 3.04 (1.18) 45.61 (28.63) 2.68 (1.58) 1.83 (1.60) 
High Self-Referencing 
Positive Mood 2.99 (1.34) 35.99 (28.83) 2.82 (1.59) 2.41 (1.74) 
Negative Mood 3.68 (.76) 57.36 (30.20) 3.50 (1.64) 1.55 (1.23) 
Low Self-Referencing 
Positive Mood 3.13 (1.06) 38.49 (30.90) 2.43 (1.50) 1.52 (1.60) 
Negative Mood 2.40 (1.19) 33.87 (21.91) 1.85 (.99) 2.10 (1.89) 
Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations as a function of mood and self-
referencing for each dependent variabie. In the remaining, we will report separate 
univariate tests f or e ach variable. F irst h owever w e will discuss the validity of our 
manipulations. 
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6.3.1. Manipulation Checks 
Participants' ratings of how happy and sad they feIt after the mood induction task 
indicated that the mood manipulation had been successful. Mean scores on the mood 
items (alpha = .80) were higher for participants who had described a positive life 
event compared to subjects who had described a negative life event (M = 2.18 vs. M = 
1.62), t(81) = 2.30, P < .054. 
With regard to self-referencing, a significant effect of second- versus third-person 
wording was found after averaging our manipulation check items (alpha = .91): t(81) 
= 2.27, P < .05 (M = 3.08 vs. M = 2.52). As intended, subjects felt that the ad related 
more to themselves when second-person wording was used compared to when third-
person wording was used, suggesting that our self-referencing manipulation was 
successful. 
6.3.2. Product Evaluations 
ANOV A shows a significant main effect of self-referencing on subjects' attitudes 
towards the advertised orange juice (F(I, 79) = 5.36, p < .05), as weIl as a significant 
interaction effect (F(I, 79) = 8.04, P < .01). No main effect of mood on product 
evaluations was found. 
Consistent w ith hypothesis H 1 a i t was f ound t hat in general, self-referencing has a 
significant effect on product evaluations: subjects attitudes in the self-referencing 
condition were more positive compared to attitudes of subjects in the no self-
referencing condition (M = 3.32 vs. M = 2.77). This finding is consistent with existing 
literature showing that self-referencing is beneficial for product evaluations. It should 
be noted however, that the mental knowledge structure caIled for by the ad is a 
4 Note that both scores are at the positive end of the mood scale. We argue that this has no further 
implications for our research. In a pilot study we found that both positive and negative mood 
rnanipulation conditions differed significantly from a neutral condition. lnstead of taIking about 'more 
than usual positive' or 'more than usual negative', it seerns more opportune to talk about positive and 
negative moods. 
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positive one (drinking orange juice in a breakfast situation), such that the possibility 
remains that because of affect transfer (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 1992, Sujan et al. 
1993) self-referencing has detrimental effects on product evaluations when negatively 
valenced knowledge structures are used (see our discussion earlier). 
More importantly however, as our interaction effect already indicated, planned 
comparisons show more positive product evaluations when mood is positive (M = 
3.13) compared to when mood is negative (M = 2.40) when self-reference prompts are 
absent: F(I, 79) = 4.42, p < .05. This finding is consistent with our hypothesis Hld. 
On the contrary, when the self has been prompted, product evaluations are more 
positive when mood is negative (M = 3.68) compared to when mood is positive (M = 
2.99): F (1, 79) = 3.40, P < .05. Hence, support was found for our hypothesis Hlc, 
suggesting that self-referencing indeed needs a certain level of motivation (by the 
induction of negative mood) to become effective and can be considered as an active 
bottom-up process. No evidence was found that self-referencing wiIl result in a 
reliance in general knowledge structures when subjects are in a positive mood. 
6.3.3. Positivity of Thoughts 
ANOV A shows a near to significant main effect of self-referencing on the positivity 
of thoughts: F(l, 79) = 2.86, P < .10 and also a significant interaction effect of self-
referencing and mood: F(l, 79) = 4.39, p< .05. No main effect ofmood on positivity 
ofthoughts was found (p > .10). 
Consistent with our hypothesis H2a, i t was found (although m arginally significant) 
that thoughts were more positive when a self-reference prompt was given compared to 
when this prompt was absent (M = 46.16 vs. M = 36.24), suggesting that self-
referencing leads to a higher positivity of thoughts (at least when positively valenced 
mental knowledge structures are activated by the ad). 
Moreover, planned comparisons show that, consistent with hypothesis H2c, when 
personal second-person wording is used (self-referencing condition), more positive 
44 
Affective Persuasive Communication: 
Multiple Roles of Affect in Persuading the Consumer 
thoughts are generated when mood is negative, compared to when mood is positive 
(M = 57.36 vs. M = 35.98) (F(I, 79) = 6.00, P < .05). As for product evaluations, tbis 
suggests that self-referencing is a bottom-up process. No evidence for H2b was found. 
In the no self-referencing condition, no effects of mood were found on positivity of 
thoughts (M = 38.49 vs. M = 33. 87) (F < 1). Tbis is not so surprising, since in this 
condition little message elaboration is expected to occur, and subjects will base their 
judgment more on peripheral cues (such as feIt affect during ad presentation) instead 
of on extensive elaborations. 
6.3.4. Purchase Intentions 
In line with our hypothesis H3a, ANOV A revealed a significant main effect of self-
referencing on subjects' purchase intentions: F (1, 79) = 10.13, p < . Ol. In general, 
subjects had higher intentions to buy the advertised orange juice in the future when 
theywere exposed to the self-referencing condition compared to subjects in the no 
self-referencing condition (M = 3.14 vs. M = 2.15). This suggests that self-referencing 
enhances advertising effectiveness. No m ain effect 0 fm ood 0 np urchase intentions 
was found (F < 1). 
Again, as for our product evaluation and positivity of thoughts results, superior self-
referencing effects were found when mood was negative compared to when mood was 
positive: a significant interaction effect of self-referencing and mood was found on 
purchaseintentionsF(1, 79)= 3.87,p = .05. This interaction effect shows a slight 
increase in purchase intentions in the self-referencing condition as mood becomes 
more negative (M = 2.82 vs. M = 3.5), and a slight decrease in purchase intentions in 
the no se1f-referencing condition as mood becomes more negative (M = 2.43 vs. M = 
1.85). However, these effects could not be supported for by our planned comparison 
analysis. 
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6.3.5. Recall of Product Attributes 
Neither a significant main effect of self-referencing (F < 1), nor a main effect of mood 
(F < 1) was found on the recall of product attributes presented in the ad. In contrast, 
we did find a significant interaction effect: F(I, 79) = 3.99, P < .05. In our self-
referencing condition, a decrease in recall was observed as mood became more 
negative (M = 2.41 vs. M = 1.55) (F(I, 79) = 2.89, P < .10), while no significant effect 
of mood was observed in our no self-referencing condition (M = 1.52 vs. M = 2.1) (p 
> .10). 
These recall results support the findings of studies on the effects of autobiographical 
memories (e.g. B aumgartner et al. 1992; Sujan et al. 1993) suggesting that as self-
referencing increases (as in our negative mood manipulation), thoughts become more 
focused on the autobiographical episode, and thoughts about, and memory for, 
product features become less accessible. 
6.4. Conclusion 
By investigating the moderating effect of mood on self-referencing, we observed 
enhanced self-referencing effects under conditions of negative mood. Vnder self-
referencing c onditions, product e valuations were more p ositive, p urchase intentions 
higher, and positivity of thoughts greater when mood was negative compared to when 
mood was positive. These findings suggest that self-referencing cues are only picked 
up by respondents when they are sufficiently motivated to process the information 
that is presented to them. As a consequence, self-referencing can be seen as an active, 
data-driven bottom-up process. 
One can argue that, because individuals in a positive mood will be less likely to 
process information in a detailed manner, they may have 'missed' the self-reference 
prompt all together. So, if subjects in the positive mood condition did not completely 
process the self-reference prompt, it is not possible to make the above inferences 
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conceming bottom-up processing. However, at-test between our two mood conditions 
with regard to the self-referencing manipulation check revealed no significant 
differences between these two conditions, suggesting that positive mood respondents 
did pick up the self-reference prompt. This fmding makes it more likely to assume 
that self-referencing is a bottom-up process. 
It should furthermore be noted that our results indicate that further research into mood 
effects is needed. If we take a closer look at the effects of mood under different self-
referencing conditions, we found that, consistent with the mood literature, mood-
congruent product evaluations were observed in our low elaboration, no self-
referencing condition. At the same time, no mood effects were found on the positivity 
of thoughts in this condition. Both observations are consistent with dual theories (e.g. 
Forgas 1995; Petty et al. 1992) stating that under low elaboration conditions, mood is 
considered by subjects as an affective cue (heuristic process), and leads to mood 
congruent judgments, without affecting the valence of generated thoughts. This line of 
theorizing however, also predicts that under conditions ofhigh elaboration (like in our 
self-referencing condition), because of the spread of activation, positive mood leads to 
more positive thoughts and to more positive product evaluations (see the affective 
priming hypothesis, Mackie and Worth 1991). In contrast, in our high elaboration 
condition, negative (and not positive!) mood led to enhanced evaluations and more 
positive thoughts. It is more than likely that this finding is due to the effects of self-
referencing. Although this is behind the scope ofthis research project, it would be 
interesting to investigate this effect in closer detail. We believe that this is material for 
an additional research program. 
In the present study we assumed that processing motivation was very limited. We 
used a product category that did not call for much involvement (orange juice). AIso, 
our participants received no credits for participation in the study (resulting in rather 
low levels of processing motivation, see for example Soldat et al., 1997). 
Consequently, since negative affect has been found to be an e ffective m otivator t 0 
process information in a more detailed and systematic way (see for example also 
Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993), we assumed that negative affect was 
the main motivating force in our study. Under the assumption that self-referencing is a 
data d riven b ottom-up p rocess, wei nferred that self-referellcing prompts were only 
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picked up by respondents in the negative mood condition. That is because in our other 
(positive mood) conditions, our ad recipients are not expected to respond to non-
salient cues such as the self-reference prompt in question. The main question that 
follows from this is what would happen with a self-referencing ad when processing 
motivation is sufficiently high for participants to engage in effortful systematic 
processing, irregardless of participants' mood. That is, an intermediate to high 
involvement product normally motivates people to process ad information in detail. 
According tot he b ottom-up hypothesis, p eople w ould r espond t 0 the self-reference 
prompts independent ofthe affective valence. 
In our second study we tried to replicate the findings of our first study. More 
specifically, we tried to find evidence for a bottom-up processing account for self-
referencing effects. In this study we increased processing motivation by using a new 
brand of an intermediate to high involvement product: the new "Steffino bike". 
In a pretest we investigated whether our student population was indeed more involved 
with t he product c ategory 0 fa b icycle compared tot he product category of orange 
juice. Therefore we used 10 involvement items that were derived both from Mittal's 
(1995) involvement questionnaire as weIl as from Laurent and Kapferer's (1985) 
Consumer Involvement Profiles Questionnaire (cronbach alpha = 0.84). Forty 
university s tudents were q uestioned ( on a 7 -point s cale r anging f rom 1 to 7) about 
their involvement with both bycicles and orange juice. As expected, students showed 
significantly more involvement with bicycles (M = 5.12, SD = 0.94) compared to 
orange juices (M = 3.97, SD = 1.09): t(39) = 5.20, P < 0.001. 
7. Study 2 
7.1.Expectations 
Consistent with the results that are obtained in studies that deal with the effects of 
self-referencing, and consistent with our hypotheses of our first study, we expect that 
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self-referencing will have salutary effects on consumers product evaluations as weIl as 
on the valence of their thoughts. In addition, we expect purchase intentions to be 
higher when we refer to the selfversus when we do not. 
The main objective of this study is to distinguish between bottom-up processing and 
top-down processing as competitive explanations for self-referencing effects. 
Dependent upon which mechanism is responsible for self-referencing (i.e. top-down 
versus bottom-up), different expectations come up for our dependent variables 
(product evaluations, purchase intentions, as weIl as positivity of thoughts) when 
affective valence of a ds is t aken i nto a ccount. Int he r emaining 0 ft his s ection, we 
contrast hypothesis 1 and 2 to indicate contrasting expectations. Hypothesis 1 
describes what can be expected if self-referencing can be considered as a top-down 
process. Hypothesis 2 describes what can be expected if self-referencing can be 
considered as a bottom-up process. Hypothesis 3 deals with mood effects in general. 
Note that these expectations are somewhat different from those that were forrnulated 
in the first study. That is because we are now dealing with an interrnediate to high 
involvement product category (instead of a low involvement product category), and 
we assume that our participants in all our conditions are sufficiently motivated to 
respond to the self-referencing cues. 
Hl: As discussed above, if self-referencing can be considered as a top-down process, 
we can expect only self-referencing effects under conditions 0 f p ositive affect. 
More specific, one can expect that in our self-referencing condition (compared to 
our no self-referencing condition), only when affect is positive: 
a. product evaluations will be more positive 
b. purchase intentions will be higher 
c. thoughts will be more positive 
When affect is negative, no effects of self-referencing can be expected. 
H2: In contrast, if self-referencing can be considered as a bottom-up process, it can be 
expected that under both positive and negative affective conditions self-reference 
effects will occur. This will resuIt in the fact that in both positive and negative 
affect conditions: 
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a. product evaluations will be more positive 
b. purchase intentions will be higher 
c. thoughts will be more positive 
H3: Moreover, apart from underlying self-referencing mechanisms, one can expect a 
main effect 0 fa ffective condition on our dependent variables (see for example 
Bless et al., 1996). More specific, it can be expected that in our positive affective 
condition, compared to our negative affective condition: 
a. product evaluations will be more positive 
b. purchase intentions win be higher 
c. thoughts win be more positive 
7.2.Method 
7.2.1. Participants and Design 
Ninety-one participants were r andomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (Affective 
Valence: positive versus negative) by 2 (Self-Referencing: self-referencing versus 
not) fun factorial between-subjects design. 
For the negative affective condition we primed the mental concept oftraffic jam (i.e. a 
negative loaded mental knowledge structure). This was done both in the headline 
("the annoyance ofbeing struck in traffic jam") as wen as in the ad picture (picture of 
traffic jam). For the positive affective condition we primed the mental concept of 
riding a bike in the woods ("isn't it great to ride the bike in the woods?"). Similar to 
the negative affective condition, positive affect was also created in the picture. The 4 
ads are shown in Appendix 2. The effeetiveness of this manipulation was measured as 
in the first study: 6 9-point semantic differential Pleasure items were used that were 
adopted from the Mehrabian and Russen (1974) Pleasure, Arousal and Dominance 
scale. 
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Self-referencing was manipulated by using both second person wording ('nJ' (Dutch 
for YOU) instead of 'HET' (Dutch for IT» as weIl as placing the ad recipient in the 
position of the scene actor (as opposed to being in the position of an uninvolved 
onlooker). For the negative affective condition, the following two headlines were 
used: "Isn't it annoying to be stuck in traffic?" (for the no self-referencing condition) 
and "Don't you find it annoying to be stuck in traffic?" (for the self-referencing 
condition). For the positive affective condition, the following two headlines were 
used: "Isn't it wonderfui to ride through the woods?" (for the no self-referencing 
condition) and "Don't you find it wonderfui to ride thrOUgh the woods?" (for the self-
referencing condition). Similar self-referencing techniques have been described in the 
literature (e.g. Burnkant and Unnava, 1995; Meyers-Levy and Perrachio, 1996). A 
manipulation check was performed on our self-referencing ads by using the same 7 
items as in our previous study. 
Besides these two manipulations (affective valence and self-referencing), our 4 
different ads were identical. This can be seen in Appendix 2. 
7.2.2. Measures 
After presentation of the ad, and after our manipulation checks, our dependent 
variables were measured. This was done in the same way as in the first study: 
Subjects were asked to list their thoughts, and to code each thought as p ositive 0 r 
negative in terms of its implications for the bicycle (after Cacioppo and Petty, 1981). 
These valenced thoughts were the used to calculate the positivity of thoughts index: 
(number of positive thOUghts / total number of thoughts) x 100. After this thought-
listing procedure, attitudes towards the Steffino bike were measured on 4 7-point 
differential items (ranging from 1 to 7) (cronbach alpha = 0.80). Behavioral intention 
was measured by asking subjects about their purchase intentions on one 7-point item: 
"It is a good idea to buy a Steffino bike". 
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7.3.Results 
A MANOV A analysis was performed on our dependent variables product evaluation, 
purchase intentions and positivity of thoughts. Overall, this analysis shows a 
significant main effect of self-referencing: F(3, 85) = 6.25, P = 0.001 (power = 0.96), 
as weIl as a significant main effect 0 faffective valence: F(3, 85) = 5.25, P < 0.01 
(power = 0.92). The interaction effect was not significant. 
7.3.1. Manipulation checks 
As indicated by our averaged Pleasure items (cronbach alpha = 0.80), participants feIt 
significantly more happy after seeing the positive ads compared to the negative ads: 
F(I, 89) = 13.97, p < 0.001 (M = 0.97 versus M = 0.20). 
In addition, our self-referencing manipulation was also effective: F(1, 89) = 12.00, P < 
0.001. Average self·referencing scores (cronbach alpha = 0.89) indicate higher self· 
referencing scores when an involving second person ad was used compared to a more 
removed third person ad. 
Table 1 gives the means and standard deviations as a function of self-referencing and 
affective valence for each dependent variabie. 
7.3.2. Product Evaluations 
Consistent with H2a, ANOV A shows a significant main effect of self·referencing on 
subjects' attitudes towards the new brand of a bicycle: F(I, 87) = 8.89, p < .01. In 
general, subjects product evaluations were more positive in the self·referencing 
condition compared to the no-self-referencing condition. This finding suggests that 
self-referencing can be considered as an active, data driven bottom-up process: in both 
affective conditions, self-referencing enhanced product evaluations. The interaction 
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effect, as predicted by our Hla, did not reach significance (F < 1). Hence, no support 
for self-referencing as a top-down process was found. 
In addition, as predicted by H3a, a near to significant effect of affective valence was 
found: F(I, 87) = 3.31, P = .07. Product evaluations were more positive when 
respondents were confronted with a positively valenced ad compared to a negatively 
valenced ad. 
7.3.3. Purchase Intentions 
A significant main effect of self-referencing (F(1, 87) = 11.17, P = .001) as well as a 
significant main effect of affective valence (F(1, 87) = 11.25, P = .001) was found on 
respondents' purchase intentions. Again, this is consistent with both hypotheses H2b 
and H3b. Purchase intentions were higher in the self-referencing condition compared 
to the no self-referencing condition. Also, purchase intentions were higher when 
subjects were confronted with a positively valenced ad compared to a negatively 
valenced ad. The interaction effect was not significant (F < 1). No support was found 
for Hl b. Again, this suggests that self-referencing can be considered as a data driven 
bottom-up process. 
7.3.4. Positivity of Thoughts 
As for our product evaluation and our purchase intentions resuIts, ANOV A shows a 
significant main effect ofself-referencing on subjects' positivity ofthoughts: F(I, 87) 
= 4.03, P < .05. Our results show that thoughts were more positive in the self-
referencing condition compared to the no self-referencing condition. Again, evidence 
was found for self-referencing being an active bottom-up process (as predicted by our 
H2c). The interaction effect of self-referencing and affective valence on positivity of 
thoughts was not significant (F < 1): No evidence was found for top-down processing 
(Hlc). 
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AIso, as predicted by H3c, respondents' thoughts were more positive when they 
previously had seen a positively valenced ad compared to when they were exposed to 
the negatively valenced ad. 
Table 2 Means and Standard Deviations as a Function of Self-Referencing and Affective Valence 
Effect Product Purchase Positivity of 
Evaluation Intentions Thoughts 
M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
High Self-Referencing 
Positive Affect 3.43 .77 3.09 1.54 54 34 
Negative Affect 3.15 .69 2.08 1.67 40 22 
Low Self-Referencing 
Positive Affect 2.98 .62 2.09 1.31 42 33 
Negative Affect 2.74 .67 1.05 1.25 27 29 
7.4.Discussion 
In sum, these results are consistent with expectations and suggest that self-referencing 
effects o ccurboth when an ad elicits positive as weIl as negative feelings: product 
evaluations and thoughts were more positive and purchase intentions were higher 
under both positive and negative affect but high self-referencing conditions. That is, a 
main effect of self-referencing w as f ound. T his a gain s uggests t hat s elf-referencing 
leads subjects to base their evaluations on the data being present in the ad, and not as 
much on their general knowledge structures. 
This conclusion is based on the argumentation that 1) since positive affect leads to a 
reliance on general knowledge structures (Bless et al., 1996), and 2) in the case self-
referencing could be considered as a schema-based top-down process, this summed up 
reliance on general knowledge structures would lead to self-referencing effects that 
are more pronounced in the positive affective condition compared to the negative 
affective condition (because negative affect does not lead to a reliance on general 
knowledge structures, and as a consequence, no summed up "schema-reliance" is 
expected to be present). No such effects were found. Instead, our results are consistent 
with a data-driven account: Since we used a product category that induced sufficiently 
high levels of involvement, we assumed that all participants would be sufficiently 
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motivated to piek up the self-reference cues. We indeed found self-referencing effects 
in all affective conditions. 
Note that our findings are also in line with results that can be expected from the mood 
literature (e.g. Bless et al., 1996). Product evaluations and thoughts were more 
positive and purchase intentions higher when subjects were confronted with a positive 
compared to a negative advertisement. Hence, additional support for the effeetiveness 
of our affective manipulation was found. 
8. General discussion 
In two studies we were able to show that self-referencing is an active, on the data 
driven process, that makes people consciously think about the information that is 
presented in the ad. In the first study, where our participants were not very motivated 
to process (because we used a very low involvement product, and did not use 
incentives in our study to motivate participants), we found that self-referencing cues 
were only picked up under conditions of negative mood. Since negative mood is 
usually associated with an increase in processing motivation, this led us to believe that 
people need to be sufficiently motivated in order for self-referencing to be effective. 
In the next study, where our participants were somewhat higher motivated, we 
showed that self-referencing is unaffected by affective valenee of the ad. The latter 
finding is irreconcilable with a schema-based explanation for self-referencing, since 
this would suggest higher self-referencing under conditions of positive affect (see for 
example Bless & Fiedler, 1995). Instead, a data-based account is suggested. 
Our results are not consistent with the hypothesis that self-referencing is the result of 
a reliance in general knowledge structures (such as the selt), because being in a 
positive mood - usuallY thought to increase a reliance in knowledge structures (e.g. 
Bless et al. 1996) - did not lead to increased self-referencing results. In contrast, 
opposite results were found. At first, this finding seems in contradiction with research 
conceming the automatic activation of the self-concept (e.g. Bosmans, Vleriek, Van 
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Kenhove, Hendrickx 2000), that shows an increased reliance on general knowledge 
structures when the self-concept is confronted with infonnation relevant for it (e.g. a 
self-relevant personality trait). We would like to argue however, that automatic 
activation and self-referencing are two distinct mechanisms, both operating under 
different conditions: the fITst mechanism being an automatic process, the second a 
conscious control process. Further research however is needed to gain more insight 
into the similarities of and differences between automatic activation effects and self-
referencing. 
We used both mood (in Study 1) as weIl as ad elicited affect (in Study 2) as 
operationalizations of consumers' affective state. We acknowledge the fact that both 
are not perfectly comparable5, but they do elicit similar affective valence states 
(positive versus negative affect). For marketers tbis implies it is not only important to 
take into account the affective valence in the ad, but also consumers' current mood 
state. 
One of the shorteomings of the present study is that we did not take into account 
specific process measures with regard to self-referencing. Additional evidence for 
self-referencing would for example be obtained if we had taken into consideration our 
participants ' self-related thoughts they had wbile looking at the ads. Higher ratios of 
self-related thoughts (as opposed to "other" thoughts) could have delivered additional 
evidence for self-referencing. 
9. Practical Implications 
Last but not least we want to point to the practical implications of the present 
findings. Dur society is suffering from an advertisement overload, and as aresult, it 
has become extremely difficult to capture consumers' attention in advertising 
campaigns. Self-referencing can be a helpfui persuasion enhancing device. But under 
what conditions is it opportune to use self-referencing prompts in advertisements? The 
5 Mood is usually lower in intensity as more specific emotions, and has no clear referent (see for 
example !sen, 1984). In contrast, emotions that are elicited by the ad do have a c1ear referent. 
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present series of studies suggest that, at least when it comes to a ffective a ds, s e1f-
referencing prompts are effective in both positive and in negative affective ads. 
However, given the beneficial effects of positive affect, best product evaluations are 
obtained in the positive affective condition. Importantly, there is one 1imitation to this 
conclusion (see study 1): subjects have to be sufficiently motivated to process the ad 
(otherwise, a negative ad will be more effective). Study 1 moreover shows that our 
effects are not on1y valid for affective ads, but also for ads (or commercials) that are 
placed in a given valenced "atmosphere". A positive atmosphere can for example be 
created / looked for after a happy television program. A sad atmosphere can for 
example be assumed in a newspaper, after the announcements dea1ing with people 
who passed away. 
Of additional practical importance is the finding that self-referencing enhances 
bottom-up processing, and that consumers win base their evaluations upon the 'data' 
being present in the information that is presented to them. Tbis can for example have 
beneficial effects when one wants to communicate new product features or unknown 
product benefits. However, when one wants the consumer to rely on already stored 
knowledge to make a judgement, self-referencing is not a very good communication 
device. 
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Appendix IA 
Stimulus Material of Study 1 
Self-Referencing Ad 
Citrus Sinaas 
en je ontbijt is compleet 
Hou je van een lekker ontbijt? Hou je 
van de fruitige smaak van 
sinaasappelsap? 
Speciaal voor jou 
is er Citrus Sinaas 
sinaasappelsap, een non-alcoholische 
drank met vruchtvlees en vezels. 
Citrus Sinaas geertje de nodige energie 
om de dag mee te beginnen. 
Citrus Sin aas lest ook jouw dorst. 
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Appendix tB 
Stimulus Material of Study 1 
No Self-Referencing Ad 
Citrus Sinaas 
En zijn ontbijt is compleet 
Hij houdt van een goed ontbijt ... 
Hij houdt van de fruitige smaak van 
sinaasappelsap ... 
Speciaal voor hem 
is er Citrus Sinaas 
sinaasappe/sapJeen non-alcoholische 
drank met vruchtvlees en vezels. 
Citrus Sinaas geeft hem de nodige 
energie om de dag mee te beginnen. 
Citrus Sinaas lest ook zijn dorst. 
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Appendix 2A 
Stimulus Material of Study 2 
Self-Reference Ad 
Positive Affect 
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Appendix 2B 
Stimulus Material of Study 2 
No Self-Reference Ad 
Positive Affect 
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Appendix 2C 
Stimulus Material of Study 2 
Self-Reference Ad 
Negative Affect 
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Appendix2D 
Stimulus Material of Study 2 
No Self-Reference Ad 
Negative Affect 
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Chapter 3 
SmeIIs Like Soap: When Congruency of Ambient Odor 
Matters 
1. Abstract 
We show that when consumers are motivated to process (e.g. when need for cognition 
is high), pleasant ambient odor only affects product evaluations when the odor is 
congruent w ith t he product c ategory. W hen t he a mbient 0 dor was i ncongruent (but 
also pleasant), product evaluations did not differ significantly from evaluations when 
no ambient odor was present. A different pattem was observed when consumers were 
not motivated to process: here, both congruent and incongruent odor affected product 
evaluations positive (compared to a no odor control condition). These findings are 
discussed in the light of recent dual process theories. 
2. Effects of odor 
In recent years, retailers and advertisers have used ambient odors in order to influence 
consumers' shopping behavior and evaluations. Practitioners generally assume that 
choosing the right odor can positively impact consumers' behavior. Odors are 
frequently used in both retail settings as wen as in the field of advertising. 
We all know the smell of fresh baked pastries distributed in department stores that is 
just aimed at luring us all to the stores' bakery department. More generally, ambient 
scent is c urrently f ound ins uch diverse locations as retail stores (Helmsley, 1997), 
supermarkets (Bainbridge, 1998), restaurants (Petran, 1998), office buildings (Marsh, 
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1998), gambling casinos (Chase, 1998), and subway stations ("The scent of the 
subway", 1999). Morrin and Ratneshwar (2000) also discuss some new applications in 
the field of fragrancing. For example, some companies are testing the use of scent-
kiosks in grocery stores: Touching the key for a particular product on a touch-screen 
results in the release ofthat product's scent into the atmosphere (Schick, 1999). Other 
companies are in the process of "scent-enabling the Internet" (Wilder, 1999) by 
selling computer hardware devices that attach to personal computers and ernit scents 
according to specific software instructions. 
Odors have also been frequently used in the field of advertising. Most often they are 
used in advertisements for products in which scent is a primary attribute (e.g. 
perfumes, room fresheners) and, when used in that context, are a form of sampling. 
However, scents have also been used for products for which scent has been 
considered as irrelevant. For instance Tanquery gin ran a pine-scented ad in USA 
Today, Rolls Royce advertised its cars in Architectural Digest using leather-scented 
strips, and the state of Utah used floral and spice-scented panels in a four-page 
tourism ad (examples derived from Bone & Ellen, 1998). 
Despite the extensive interest in and use of odors by firms and advertising / marketing 
agencies, scholarly research on the effects of odors on consumer behavior has been 
limited. Hirsh (1991) conducted a study involving sport shoes. Participants of the 
study looked at a pair of shoes in both a scented and unscented room. 84% of those 
asked preferred the shoes in the scented room and 10% of them were willing to spend 
more per pair. In a similar vain, Spangenberg and his colleagues (Spangenberg, 
Crowley and Henderson, 1996) diffused a number of different aromas into a mocked 
up store. When asked to make an evaluation of the store, respondents rated the 
scented environments as more favorable, positive and modem. They also expressed a 
greater intent to visit the store and regarded the merchandise as more up-to-date, 
varied and of higher quality. Spangenberg concluded that the presence of an 
inoffensive scent in a store is an inexpensive way to enhance consumer reactions to 
the store and its merchandise. 
The present study deals with ambient odor. Ambient odor refers to odor that does not 
originate from any particular object, but that is present in the environment. Research 
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on ambient scent has been even less common (Bone & Ellen, 1994; Gulas & Bloch, 
1995), but may be of greater interest to retailers and other service providers than 
product-specific scents. Ambient odor could affect perceptions of the store and its 
products, including those products that are difficult to scent (e.g. office supplies and 
furniture, Gulas & Bloch, 1995). 
3. Odor and affect 
One of the most common findings in olfactory research is that pleasant odors create 
pleasant mood states (Ehrlichman & Bastone, 1992). Also, consurners seem to 
perceive the primary dimension of an odor to be its pleasantness (Henion, 1971; 
Richardson & Zucco, 1989). Moreover Ellen and Bone (1998) point out that olfactory 
responses are primarily autonomie, and affect a person physiologieally before 
affecting cognition. Odors moreover seem to stimulate the limbic system, the part of 
the brain responsible for emotional responses. 
These fmdings suggest that odors influence consurners ' evaluations via the affect (or 
pleasantness) they elicit: because the odors are pleasant or unpleasant, associated 
objeets are also perceived to be pleasant or unpleasant. 
4. Congruity of odor 
However, as indicated by Bone and Ellen (1999), the effects of ambient odor on 
evaluations and purehase intentions are not at all unequivocal. While some studies 
found positive effects of pleasant ambient odors on consumers' evaluations, others 
have not been able to show that odor increases the nurnber of items purchased or the 
amount of money spent (Knasko, 1989). Also, Spangenberg et al.'s study (1996) 
showed some unexpected findings: while he found effects of odor on people's 
evaluations, nor the type of scent, nor its intensity did matter in formingjudgments. 
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Mitchell, Kahn, and Knasko (1995) showed that the effect of ambient odor on 
consumers' persuasion depends upon the congruency of the odor with the product 
class. They found that pleasant congruent odors, which are odors that thernatically 
match the product class, lead to more elaborate processing (e.g. more time spent on 
processing the data, higher recall scores) compared to incongruent pleasant odors. 
Along similar lines, Bone & Jantrania (1992) found that lemon-scented cleaner was 
rated more positively than was coconut-scented cleaner. Conversely, coconut-scented 
sunscreen lotion was rated more positively than was lemon-scented lotion. If a 
disinfectant was scented with lemon instead of coconut, it was regarded as 
disinfecting better. Both odors were regarded as pleasant. Hence, scents that are 
inconsistent with the product tend to have a negative effect on product or ad 
evaluations. 
Similar findings were also found with regard to purchase intentions and prices that 
consumers are willing to pay for products. Fiore, Yah, and Yoh (2000) found that the 
purchase intentions and the prices consumers were willing to pay was higher for 
products in an appropriate fragranced display than for those in an inappropriate 
fragranced display. In addition, they found an effect of fragrancing on imagery: the 
appropriate smeU increased the level of seeing oneself in a fantasy image, whereas the 
inappropriate smeU interfered with the formation of a fantasy image, compared to the 
condition using a display without fragrance. 
The basic premise underlying the scent congruity effect is one of semantic matching. 
This means that, for brands for example, stronger links should be formed in memory 
when a brand is meaningfully related to an ambient scent. The associative network 
model of memory (e.g. Anderson, 1990; Collins & Loftus, 1975) implies that nodes in 
memory share meaning (i.e. nodes that are highIy semanticaUy related) will resuit in 
greater associative strength. Consequently, it is expected that sernantic matching 
between a brand and a product will have beneficial effects. 
Related to this, Mandier (1982) argues that when an extemal cue (such as ambient 
odor) is consistent with the consumers' expectations or schema, he or she should 
respond with a "primitive positive evaluation" (p.I3). When information is 
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incongruent and disrupts the consumers' expectations, Mandier predicts negative 
effects. Hence, a consumer seeing an ad about lemon-scented detergent would expect 
the accompanying scented strip to hold a lemon scent. If instead the consumer were 
exposed to a mint scent, it could lead to a violation ofthe schema resulting in negative 
affect. 
5. Congruency of scent and affect priming 
Considering scent as an affective cue, the finding that a congruent scent leads to more 
positive evaluations than an equally pleasant incongruent scent can be explained by 
the affect priming hypothesis (e.g. Bower, 1981; Mackie & Worth, 1991). According 
to affect priming, affect (e.g. being in a positive mood) cues similarly valenced 
materials in memory, thereby biasing people's perceptions ofthe target at the time of 
evaluation. Hence, when affect is positive, activation will spread towards related 
positive constructs, resulting in more positive evaluations compared to when the 
affect is more negative or neutral. 
However, odors not only convey valenced information (positive or negative), but are 
also associated with semantic information. Odors are often t ied tos pecific 0 bjects, 
events and people in the consumers' long-term memory (Ellen & Bone, 1998). In fact, 
an odors' effect may vary dramatically among individuals, depending upon their 
cognitive associations with that odor. For example, though some people may find the 
scent of cigar smoke unpleasant, it may evoke in others pleasant memories of a 
specific cigar smoker (Engen, 1972). Previous research has shown that odors serve 
pretty well in retrieving information from long-term memory (e.g. Schab, 1991). For 
example, confrontation with certain odors can automatically evoke autobiographical 
memories that are tied to product classes (e.g. Baumgartner, Sujan, and Bettman, 
1992), or call for personal relevant attitudes (Fazio, Powell, and Williams, 1989). 
Hence, when introducing a congruent pleasant ambient odor into the environment, we 
argue that activation is spread (see for example Collins & Loftus, 1975) towards 
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congruent attitudes, autobiographical memories, and product-class knowiedge. In 
contrast, when we introduce an incongruent but pleasant ambient odor, we expect that 
this will interfere with consumers' elaboration. If ambient odor is a memory cue, 
information that is incongruent with the product class is activated, resulting in 
cognitive interference. 
6. Congruency of scent and affect as information 
The purpose of the present study is to take a closer look at this congruity effect of 
odor. As will become clear later in this paper, we are not convinced that congruity of 
pleasant ambient odor is always a necessary condition for positive evaluative effects. 
On t he basis 0 fr esearch int he field of affective persuasion (e.g. Petty, Schumann, 
Richman, & Strathman, 1993) we argue that the congruency effect of odor is 
dependent upon consumers processing motivation. That is, the importance of a 
congruent odor will only matter when consumers are sufficiently motivated to process 
the information in the ad (or sufficiently motivated to carefully inspect the retail 
environment when shopping). We will try to clarify this argumentation in the 
remaining ofthis section. 
Affect priming is especially likely when consumers are sufficiently motivated to 
process. Petty and his colleagues (Petty et al., 1993), and a few years later also Forgas 
(1995) have suggested that there are different roles for affect under conditions of high 
and low processing motivation: in both conditions affect influences persuasion. But 
Petty et al. (1993) showed that positive affect has a direct effect on product 
evaluations when consumers' processing motivation is low, while positive affect has 
an indirect effect 0 n product evaluations by activating associated positive thoughts. 
This means that when consumers are not very motivated to process, affective stimuli 
(such as ambient odor) affect persuasion irregardless of what people are thinking. 
Hence, there is no association of the felt affect with currently activated mental 
schemata. In contrast, because high processing motivation has been found to influence 
consumers' judgment via their thoughts, we can assume an associative link between 
feIt affect and consumers' currently activated knowledge structures or schemata 
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The process whereby affect directly influences consumers' evaluation corresponds 
with the affect as infonnation hypothesis (when processing motivation is low), while 
the process whereby affect indirectly influences consumers' judgments corresponds to 
the affect priming hypothesis (when processing motivation is high) (e.g. Soldat, 
Sinclair, & Mark, 1997; see below). 
7. Affect priming versus affect as information 
We can therefore expect that congruency of ambient odor will have a significant 
influence when consumers are sufficiently motivated to process, since under these 
conditions a link between ambient odor and consumers' activated schemata is 
expected. More specifically we expect that: 
BIa: When processing motivation is high, a pleasant ambient odor that is congruent 
with the product category williead to more positive product evaluations compared to 
a pleasant ambient odor that is incongruent with the product category. 
AIso, 
BIb: When processing motivation is high, a pleasant ambient odor that is congruent 
with the product category will lead to more positive product evaluations compared to 
a neutral condition where no ambient odor is present. 
However, according to Petty et al.'s (1993) dual-process theory of affect, when 
processing motivation is low, affect is expected to serve as a simple cue when making 
an e valuation (see a lso Soldat eta 1., 1997). According to this affect-as-infonnation 
hypothesis (originally fonnulated by Schwarz & Clore, 1983), people sometimes 
mistake their current feelings for their reactions towards an attitude object. This 
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means that when consumers are not very motivated to process, affect will have a 
direct effect on consumers' evaluations, and will not influence associated thoughts 
and beliefs. Here, no association between experience of the ambient odor and 
activated schemata is expected. Considering ambient odor as an affective cue, we can 
therefore expect that under low processing motivation conditions, the congruency of 
the odor with the product c1ass will have no significant influence on product 
evaluations: both congruent and incongruent pleasant ambient odor produce pleasant 
affect, and this affect will have a direct influence on consumers' evaluations. 
H2a: When processing motivation is low, a pleasant ambient odor that is congruent 
with the product category williead to more positive product evaluations compared to 
a neutral condition were no ambient odor is present. 
Also, 
H2b: When processing motivation is low, a pleasant ambient odor that is incongruent 
with the product category will also lead to more positive product evaluations 
compared to a neutral condition were no ambient odor is present. 
8. Study 
8.1.Participants, Design, and Procedure 
Participants were 116 undergraduate students who volunteered in this study. The 
design was a 2 (Need for Cognition: High versus Low) by 3 (Ambient Odor: 
Congruent, Non Congruent, No Odor) full factorial between-subjects design, with 
Pleasure of scent as a covariate. 
Need for Cognition (NFC, see Petty & Cacioppo, 1982), as a measured individual 
difference variabie, was considered as our processing motivation variabie. People 
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scoring high on NFC usually think about things thoroughly, and are most of the time 
highly motivated to process. People scoring low on the NFC measures are 
characterized by shallow information processing, and they do not like to think 
profoundly. We measured NFC using the Pieters, Verplanken, & Modde (1987) 
questionnaire (items ranged from -3 over 0 to +3), and averaged the items for analysis 
(cronbach a1pha = 0.84). People scoring below the NFC median score (Md = 0.97) 
were included in the NFC condition, while people scoring above or equal to the 
median were categorized in our High NFC condition. 
Participants were presented an ad for a new (fictitious) brand of grapefruit juice 
(Pompeitje). The ad is shown in the Appendix. This ad was surrounded by our 
ambient odor (which was either congruent or incongruent with the product category of 
grapefruit) or was not surrounded by any odor (in our neutral No Odor control 
condition). For our Congruent Ambient Odor condition we scented the ad with a 
natural grapefruit scent, while in our Incongruent Ambient Odor condition we used 
the scent of lavender. A prior study revealed that both scents are perceived as 
p1easant. Participants were asked to look at the ad from a brand evaluating 
perspective, and were told that they had to fill in a short questionnaire afterwards. 
While looking at the ad, we did not drawattention to the surrounding odor. 
8.2.Dependent Measures 
Besides NFC (as a measured independent variabie, see above) we measured 
partieipants' evaluation of the advertised grapefruit brand. This evaluation was 
measured using four 7-point semantic differential items ranging from 1 to 7 (positive 
/ negative, good / bad, like / dislike, desirabie / not desirabie). These items were 
averaged for analysis (eronbaeh alpha = .90). 
We do not exclude the possibility that some people prefer the 1avender more than 
grapefruit seent (or vice versa). Therefore we inc1uded liking for the scent (lavender 
or grapefruit) as a covariate in our analyses. This measure (Scent Liking) was 
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presented to our participants after they filled in their questionnaire (one i tem s cale 
reanging from 1 (dislike it) to 7 (like it). 
8.3.Results 
Figure 1 shows mean evaluation scores as a function of Congruency of Ambient Odor 
and NFC. The outcomes of our ANCOV A analysis are displayed in Table 1. 
!ow NFC high NFC 
__ congruent arrbient ador ----..- incongruent arrbient ador -<>-- no ader 
Figure lMean Evaluation Scores as a Function of Congruency of Ambient Odor and NFC 
A 2-way Ancova was performed with Congruency of Ambient Odor and NFC as 
between-subjects variables, and Scent Liking as covariate. Scent Liking as a covariate 
did not have a significant influence on the remaining of our analysis. Therefore we do 
not report further effects ofthis variabie. 
We found a significant main effect of Congruency of Ambient Odor on evaluations of 
the grapefruit brand: F(2, 109) == 4.38, P == .01. The main effect of NFC was near to 
significant: F(l, 109) == 2.79, P == .09. More importantly however, we found a 
significant 2 by 3 interaction effect: F(2, 109) = 4.09, P = .01. Planned comparisons 
show that, as expected, in our high NFC condition Congruent Ambient Odor led to 
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more positive evaluations compared to when Ambient Odor was Incongruent (Hla: 
M = 5.72, SD = 0.63 versus M = 4.42, SD = 1.40) or to when No Odor was present 
(Hlb: M = 5.72, SD = 0.63 versus M = 4.78, SD = 0.76): F(l, 109) = 10.52, P = .001 
and F(1, 109) = 6.15, P = .01. Also as expected, when NFC was low, compared to the 
No Odor condition, both Congruent Ambient Odor (H2a) as weIl as Incongruent 
Ambient Odor (H2b) led to more positive evaluations (M = 4.80, SD = 0.65, M = 
5.55, SD = 0.83, M = 5.47, SD.= 0.61 respectively): F(l, 109) = 3.92, p = .05 and F(l, 
109) = 4.30, P < .05. 
Table 1: 2-way ANCOVA with Pleasnatness as a Covariate 
Source of variation Sum of squares DF MeanSquare F P 
Pleasantness (COV) 1.21 0.73 1.65 0.20 
Congruence 3.20 2 0.73 4.38 0.01' 
NFC 2.04 0.73 2.79 0.09 
Congruence x NFC 2.99 2 0.73 4.09 0.02' 
9. Discussion 
Our results are consistent with dual-process theories (see Petty et al., 1993; Forgas, 
1995), in that different processing mechanisms are responsible for the effects of affect 
on persuasion. We hypothesized that under conditions of low processing motivation, 
subjects would not notice (or take into account) the inconsistency between the 
ambient odor and the product category. At the same time we expected that when 
processing motivation was sufficiently high, they instead would notice the 
inconsistency, leading to less positive evaluations. Our results are consistent with our 
expectations. 
Our high need for cognition (NFC) results are consistent with the affect priming 
hypothesis: congruent odors seemed to activate attitudes and memories that are 
associated with the product category, resulting in more positive evaluations. 
Incongruent odors however seemed to activate attitudes and memories that are not 
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associated with the to-be-evaluated product, and interfere with judgments. The forrner 
applies to conditions were consumers are very motivated to process the information. 
When NFC was low, this effect was not found. When processing motivation was low, 
our results are consistent with the affect-as-inforrnation hypothesis and that 
irregardless of its semantic content, affective valence is taken as inforrnative for the 
judgment: congruency of the ambient odor did not have any effect on product 
evaluations. 
Our results extend those obtained by Mitchell at al. (1995) in that we not only show 
that congruence of ambient odor is of considerable importance when consumers have 
to make evaluations or decisions, but that the level of consumers' processing 
motivation is a substantial moderator ofthis relation. 
At fust sight, our results seem not completely consistent with those obtained by Bone 
and Ellen (1998). They presented their participants an ad containing a "scratch-and-
sniff' panel that was either congruent or incongruent with the ad (an ad promoting a 
fictitious travel destination). They found that the addition of a more congruent (versus 
no) scratch and sniff panel to an advertisement improved neither attitude toward the 
ad nor attitude toward the brand. In contrast, we found scent-congruency effects in all 
processing motivation conditions. We would like to argue that this inconsistent 
finding may be due to the fact that in Bone and Ellen's study participants were made 
attentive to the odor by letting them smell the very salient scratch-and-sniff panel. 
Consequently, they were not really dealing with ambient odor, since they made the 
source of t heir 0 dor salient. In contrast, t he present s tudy dealt w ith a mbient 0 dor, 
since the people were not made attentive to the presence of the odor. Importantly, 
research in the field of affective persuasion (e.g. Schwarz & Clore, 1983) shows that 
making people attentive to the source of their feIt affect has a considerable effect on 
the outcome of the persuasive process. For example, Schwarz & Clore (1983) called 
up people on either a rainy or a sunny day and asked about their "general feeling of 
well-being". They found that people were more satisfied with their lives on a sunny 
compared to a rainy day. However, when the same procedure was used, but when 
people were pointed at the weather ("by the way, how is the weather over there?"), the 
mood-effect disappeared. According to Schwarz & Clore (1983) and their affect-as-
information theory, the effect of mood on evaluation disappears when people can 
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make an extemal attribution about the cause oftheir mood. We want to argue that this 
may have happened in Bone and Ellen's study: people may have ascribed their current 
affect to the odor of the scratch-and-sniff panel, and may have corrected for it while 
making evaluations. This difference between ambient and no ambient odor may be a 
very interesting topic for further investigation. 
10.Practicallmplications 
From a managerial perspective our findings indicate that one should be careful when 
using ambient odor that does not correspond with the product category. This is 
especially the case when customers are highly motivated to process (e.g. when the 
purchase is highly relevant for them). Distributing floral scents in a store selling 
electronic equipment for example (where/when motivation to process information is 
expected to be high) would not be such a good idea. However, when consumers are 
not very motivated to process, all pleasant odors, irregardless of their congruency, are 
expected to have a positive effect on evaluations and shopping behavior. This is for 
example the case when customers have habitual shopping pattems, mostly found in 
grocery shops. For retailers, this suggests that it may even be beneficial when your 
food department smells like soap. 
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Appendix 
Stimulus Material: Ad ofPompeltje 
Pompellje is een fruitbom! Eén glas Pompellje is ruim 
voldoende voor je dagelijkse behoefte aan vitaminen en 
is daarom aanbevolen voor jong en oud. Pompeitje is een 
natuurlijk product zonder toevoeging van suiker.; of 
bewaarmiddelen. rijk aan vitamine C. Daarom is 
Pompeitje even gezond als ver.; geperst pompelmoessap. 
Het is caloriearm en dus goed voor de lijn. Pompeitje is 
binnenkort te vinden in elk warenhuis! 
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Chapter 4 
Affect and the Evaluation of Negatively Valenced Mental 
Categories: N ew Evidence for the Multiple Role of Affect 
1. Abstract 
The present series of studies investigated the effect of affective valence on 
consumers' evaluation of product categories that are associated with negative beliefs 
and feelings. In the first two studies we manipulated participants' mood and 
confronted them with an ad for a service (blood donation in Study 1) or product 
category (condoms in Study 2) that has negative connotations. In our last 2 studies, 
both dealing with consumers' evaluation of a new meat label after a meat crisis, we 
manipulated affect by using different kinds of emotional ads. 
The results of these 4 studies suggest multiple roles for affect, as was also suggested 
by Forgas (1995) and Petty, Schumann, Richman and Strathman (1993): affect is 
taken as infonnation under conditions of low processing motivation, while affect 
colors people's thoughts under conditions of high processing motivation. Both 
mechanisms enhance the persuasive process. While the fonner finding is not 
completely new in the domain of affective persuasion, and confinns what has been 
suggested int he 1 iterature b efore ( e.g. F orgas, 1 995), we were a lso a bIe tos how a 
persuasive effect when mood was negative. Interestingly, because we were dealing 
with schemata that had negative connotations we found that negative mood motivated 
people even more to think about the presented messages, such that evaluations 
became also more positive when mood was negative. This means that when marketers 
have to deal with products or services that have some negative associations attached 
to them (such as genetically manipulated food, meat, drugs, life insurances, ... ), it will 
be beneficial to urge consumers to think very elaborately about the message that is 
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presented to them. After all, thinking thoroughly about a new quality meat label, or 
about condom use or blood donation should lead one to the natural conclusion that the 
label / condom / donation is indeed a very positive product or act. This finding is very 
different from studies that deal with positive to neutral valenced product categories, 
because they usually find that product evaluations become more negative as people 
scrutinize on the presented message arguments (Petty, Unnava, & Strathman, 1991). 
That is, when the valence of a certain product category is positive or neutral in nature, 
increased message elaboration usually leads to increased recognition / production of 
negative arguments. The opposite seems to be true for product categories that are 
associated with negative be1iefs. 
2. Introduction 
Advertisers and marketers often have to deal with products or services that are 
associated with negatively valenced beliefs or feelings. The main purpose of the 
present study is to explore consumers' evaluations of products / services (or their 
associated advertisement campaigns) that have negatively valenced connotations. An 
in essence emotionally neutral advertisement for a certain brand of pain killers for 
example is very likely to caU for negatively valenced thoughts of painful head aches, 
stomach complaints and the like. The mere thought of using a sedative is associated 
with these negative representations. In a related vein, a govemmental campaign 
stimulating blood donation will probably evoke mental images of dizziness, a s ore 
arm, nausea, ... 
More specifically, we aim to investigate the influence of affective states (e.g. being in 
a happy or sad mood; being positively or negatively affected by the advertisement 
campaign) on the evaluation of these negative product / service categories. For 
example, advertisement campaigns concemed with charity donation (such as 
organizations against child abuse, or organizations helping developing countries), 
often try to elicit feelings of sadness or guilt. These negatively valenced feelings are 
often consistent with the negative feelings that are associated with one's mental 
representation (one's mental schema) of child abuse or developing countries. Will a 
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'sad charity commercial' lead to better evaluative effects than a 'happy charity 
commercial' in this context? Will evaluations be more positive when one is in a 
negative mood when evaluating a new brand of pain killers, or will they, in contrast, 
be more positive when one is in a positive mood (because the negative mood is more 
consistent with feelings and beliefs associated with associations ofpain killers)? 
In the first two studies we will investigate the influence of mood (as a more global 
and nonspecific affective state) on the evaluation of negatively valenced mental 
categories. In the last two studies we will focus on the effects of consumers ' felt affect 
(resuiting from an emotionally laden advertisement) on the relevant product 
evaluation. 
We believe that insight into the underlying mechanisms of evaluation of negatively 
valenced mental schemata is not only of practical importance. Past studies concerning 
mood effects on persuasion exc1usively measured evaluations of products or services 
that were associated with neutral or positively valenced beliefs. In the present studies 
we argue that more insight into the persuasion process can be gained when taking 
products and services into consideration that are very likely to caU for negatively 
valenced associations (e.g. transport of nuclear material, cigarettes, condom use, 
blood donation, ... ). 
Regarding the influence of affective states on the evaluation of negative products or 
services, a number oftheoretical frameworks can be invoked in order to come up with 
some theoretically based expectations. In the next sections, we will discuss what 
appear to us the three most important theoretical frameworks in the field of affective 
persuasion: affect priming, affect-as-information, and cognitive tuning. All these 
models originate from social psychology. Only recently, some attempts are made to 
translate these models in a more consumer behavior and marketing related context 
(see for example Bagozzi, Gopinath, & Neyer, 1999). In what follows, it becomes 
clear that these different theoretical considerations predict different outcomes when it 
comes to mood effects on evaluation of negatively valenced products / services. But 
note that in the case of evaluating positive or neutral products / services, all these 
frameworks predict the same outcomes, namely mood-congruentjudgments. 
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3. Affective Persuasion 
When people in different affective states make evaluations, those people in positive 
affective states render more favorable evaluations compared to those in negative 
moods (e.g. Mayer, McCormick, & Strong, 1995). In addition to these evaluative 
effects, mood also affects information processing. In general, it has been found that 
whereas people in neutral or negative affective states are differentially affected by the 
quality of diverse persuasive messages and report more favorable attitudes after 
exposure to strong rather than weak argurnents, recipients in a good mood are as 
persuaded by weak as by strong argurnents (e.g. Bless, Mackie, & Schwarz, 1992). 
These results have supported the idea that the processing of information by 
individuals in positive affective states is characterized as heuristic and less systematic, 
wbile individuals in mildly negative affective states often show amore careful and 
analytic type of processing (e.g. Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz & Bless, 
1991). In the past decade, a number of theoretical models are formulated to account 
for these findings. 
3.1.Affect Priming 
According to the affect-priming hypothesis (e.g. Bower, 1981; Mackie & Worth, 
1991), m ood s tates (positive 0 r n egative m ood) cue similarly valenced materials in 
memory, thereby biasing people's perceptions of the target at the time of evaluation. 
Hence, when in a positive mood, activation will spread towards related positively 
valenced constructs, resulting in more positive evaluations compared to when mood is 
more negative or neutral. 
Tbis model also explains some persistent findings that p ositive m ood i s a ssociated 
with a more shallow and heuristic kind of processing (see for example Bagozzi et al., 
1999 for a review). When people are in a positive mood, more material, and more 
diverse material comes to mind (e.g. Boucher & Osgood, 1969; Isen, 1984): unless 
people are clinical depressed, they have more positive material stored in memory than 
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negative material (Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982). The easy accessibility of 
this material, or its presence in working memory, seems to reduce cognitive capacity. 
Mackie and Worth (1989) discuss a number ofpossible explanations. The presence of 
positive material, for example, might merely reduce space in a capacity-limited 
system (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). AIso, the easy and simultaneous accessibility of 
material rnight defocus attention (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987). A conscious 
decision may be made to deal with the material in some way (Shennan, 1987), or the 
presence of positively toned material in working memory might automatically draw 
available attention to itself (Nielson & Sarason, 1981; Zajonc, 1980). Mood might 
therefore function as a distraction, interfering with the ability to engage in careful 
elaborative processing (Petty & Brock, 1981). 
Differentiating between these altemativ<,! mechanisms is behind the scope of the 
present studies, but the ultimate consequence of the induction of a positive mood is 
that it (1) provides in more positive product evaluations as a result of accessibility of 
similar valenced material and (2) reduces the overall capacity available for other tasks 
or leads to a more heuristic fonn of processing ofthe primary (evaluation) task due to 
reduced processing capacity (see also Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). 
In a series of studies Worth and Mackie (1987, 1989) found evidence for this affect-
priming hypothesis. In one of these studies, subjects in whom a positive mood had 
been induced and subjects in a neutral mood were both exposed for a limited amount 
of time to a message concemed with controlling the impact of acid rain. Messages 
were delivered by either an expert 0 r a nonexpert a nd c omprised e ither s trong and 
valid or weak and specious arguments for the advocated position. Subjects in a 
positive mood appeared to engage in little systematic processing of the message, as 
indicated by their failure to differentiate strong from weak arguments in their 
postexposure attitudes (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981) and theirreducedelaborationand 
retrieval of message-relevant material in recall protocols (Chaiken, 1980; Craik & 
Lockhart, 1972). In addition, the postexposure attitudes of subjects experiencing 
positive mood showed greater relative impact of a heuristic cue (expertise of the 
source) in the persuasion context. In contrast, both the postexposure attitudes and the 
cognitive response listings of subjects in a neutral mood indicated the persuasive 
impact of Strong (but not of weak) arguments and the relative impact of the heuristic 
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cue. In sum, recipients in a positive mood failed to engage in systematic or central 
route processing. 
According to Petty, Schumann, Richman and Strathman (1993), affect-priming is 
most likely observed when people are relatively high motivated to process the 
information. Especially when processing motivation is high, the mood colored 
thoughts will be taken into account when making an evaluation. In other words, 
positive mood increases the net positivity of the thoughts generated (Mathur & 
Chattopadhyay, 1991). Because highly motivated people are more likely to take their 
thoughts into account when making an evaluation (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986; Petty et 
al., 1993), we can expect that our results are consistent with the affect priming 
hypothesis especially when likelihood to process is high (see also Smith & Shaffer, 
1991). 
Applied to our current research question, we can therefore expect that evaluations of 
our negatively valenced product / service will be more positive under positive mood 
conditions (compared to negative mood conditions ), since more positive material is 
expected to become accessible in memory. Thus, according to affect priming, mood-
congruent evaluations are expected. 
3.2.Affect as Information 
According to the affect-as-information model (Schwarz & Clore, 1983), people 
sometimes mistake the affective feedback that is provided by their current mood state 
with the affective feedback they experience when evaluating a target stimulus. That is, 
people sometimes mistake aspects of their reactions to a non-target s ource ast heir 
reaction to the target. One consequence of this confusion is a shift in people's target 
evaluations toward the valence of their moods (i.e. mood-congruent judgements). This 
process, whereby mood is seen as informative for the judgement to be made, has been 
labeled in the literature as the "How do I feel about it?" heuristic. 
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In their original research, Schwarz and Clore (1983) examined the role of attributions 
in the relation between mood and judgments of life satisfaction (subjective well-
being). They telephoned people on either warm and sunny or cold and rainy days. 
They found that the weather influenced people's mood, and that the mood affected 
perceptions of well-being. Those who were in a good mood reported being generally 
more satistied with their lives than did those in a bad mood. In some conditions, 
Schwarz and Clore also cued people directly to the weather, as a source oftheir mood. 
When people in a bad mood were cued to the weather, they made an extemal 
attribution to the source of their mood, and reported greater life satisfaction than did 
people in a negative mood who were not cued to the weather (see also Sinc1air, Mark, 
& Clore, 1994). 
In their affect-as-information hypothesis, Schwarz and Clore (1983) posit that mood 
influences judgments, such as judgments of life satisfaction, only when the mood's 
affective cues are perceived as informative, in that they appear to be part of the 
reaction to the object of judgment. In other words, mood will have such effects only 
when respondents do not make extemal attributions for their feelings. 
According to Petty and bis colleagues (Petty et al., 1993), affect-as-information is 
likely to occur under conditions oflow processing motivation: affect-as-information is 
thought to influence judgments directly (i.e. without affecting people's cognitive 
thoughts), and this process is most likely to take place under conditions of 
"peripheral" or "heuristic" processing (see Petty and Cacioppo, 1986 or Chaiken, 
1980). Indeed, in a series of studies (Schwarz, 1990; Bless, Schwarz, & Wieland, 
1996; Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) it has been shown that taking one's 
affect as a source of information, is the result of a decreased processing motivation: 
when participants are explicitely instructed to pay attention to the argument strength 
(i.e. increasing one's motivation), people base their evaluations on the strength of the 
arguments, and no longer on their own affective state (see Bless et al., 1996). Hence, 
when motivation to process increases, the affect-as-information effect disappears (for 
a related discussion upon the motivational effect of mood, see Bless & Schwarz, 
1999). 
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Although the underlying mechanism is different from the affect-priming hypothesis, 
the affect-as-information model also predicts that evaluations will be more positive 
when people are in a positive compared to a negative mood. Hence, affect-as-
information also predicts mood-congruent judgments. 
3.3.Cognitive Tuning 
The cognitive tuning hypothesis (e.g. Schwarz, 1990; Sinclair & Mark, 1992; Clore, 
Schwarz, & Conway, 1994), which can be seen as a "cognitive" extension of the 
affect-as-information hypothesis, assumes that affective cues do not only provide 
substantive, but also procedural information. A cognitive tuning effect occurs when 
feedback about the nature of a situation modifies how information is processed. 
Negative affective cues (such as negative moods) signal that a problem has been 
encountered and that ongoing efforts and strategies are inadequate. This perception 
triggers more detailed, systematic processing. On the contrary, positive affective cues 
signal that a situation is benign and that one's current effort and strategies are 
adequate. More positive affective cues should therefore elicit less systematic, more 
heuristic processing. 
Given this tendency of happy individuals toward parsimonious and effortless 
processing (e.g. Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wölk, 1996), it is not so 
surprising that happy individuals seem to rely on general knowledge structures (e.g. 
Bless & Fiedler, 1995). Because general knowledge structures allow the individual to 
reduce the complexity of information processing at different stages, they often 
promote parsimonious and efficient processing (see for example Fiske & Taylor, 
1991; Hastie, 1981). At the encoding stage for example, schemata allow the individual 
to ignore unrelated and unimportant details of a situation and, therefore, reduce 
information complexity. As aresult, people need not elaborate excessively on the 
information that is provided to them. General knowledge structures also seem to 
influence retrieval processes (Hastie, 1981), and judgments can be based 
parsimoniously on the basis of schemalike knowledge structures (e.g. Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1990). Hence, this parsimonious aspect of knowledge structures may 
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explain why happy individuals are more influenced than sad individuals by activated 
general knowledge structures (e.g. Bless & Fiedler, 1996; Bless et al., 1992; Bless et 
al. 1996). 
Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süsser (1994) for example found that happy people who 
were simply asked to make some judgments about a case of alleged student 
misbehavior were significantly more likely to render harsher judgments about a 
stereotyped judgment target than were people in a neutral mood. 
In a related vein, in an impression formation task, Ottati, Terkildsen and Hubbard 
(1997) found that when their participants were confronted with a happy face they 
engaged in a heuristic processing style. In their study, participants were presented a 
video showing a political candidate who emitted neutral, happy-reassuring, or anger-
threat facial displays. The candidate's verbal statements consistently advocated 
conservative solutions to a number of domestic policy problems facing the nation. 
Systematic or piecemeal processing in thls situation would entail that participants 
consider both pros and cons of the candidate specific issue positions and combine 
these to evaluate the candidate (e.g. Fishbein & Coombs, 1974). A heuristic 
processing style would involve categorizing the candidate as a conservative, perhaps 
on the basis of the candidate's initially expressed issue positions, and judging the 
candidate on the basis of an evaluation of this stereotypic category (e.g. Fiske & 
Neuberg, 1989). Ottati and hls colleagues found that neutral facial displays elicited a 
systematic processing style, with individuals judging the candidate on the basis ofhls 
specific issue positions. Use of the candidate's global ideology as a heuristic device 
was absent in this condition. The happy displays elicited a heuristic processing style, 
with individuals judging the candidate on the basis of his global ideology (but not his 
specific issues). Angry displays elicited a processing style falling in between these 
extremes. This pattem of findings was only observed for the low motivated 
participants. When motivation to process was high, all participants engaged in 
systematic, issue-based processing, regardless ofthe candidate's facial expression. 
If we apply this reasoning to our research problem with regard to the effects of affect 
on negatively valenced mental schemata, we can expect that subjects in a positive 
mood will make more negative evaluations. This is because they base their 
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evaluations on a knowledge structure that is loaded with negative affect. In contrast, 
because negative mood is hypothesized to caU for systematic processing, we can 
expect that since we are dealing with negatively valenced mental schemata, 
evaluations wiIl be more positive when mood is negative. This is because as 
elaboration of the arguments increases (as a result of negative mood), subjects will 
have more opportunities to recognize the positive aspects ofthe product / service or of 
the advertisement campaign (for a related discussion, see Bagozzi, 1996). Ifyou are 
for example first confronted with an ad campaign for a new meat label, it can be 
expected that your evaluation will be rather negative, given the recent meat crisis and 
the health related issues involved. But ifyou think about it more systematicaIly, it will 
come to you that a new quality controllabel is indeed important to guaranty safe and 
healthy meat. 
Hence, according to cognitive tuning, opposite results are expected as from affect-
priming or affect-as-information hypotheses, namely more positive evaluations when 
mood is negative and more negative evaluations when mood is positive. 
4. Overview of the studies 
In a fust study we simply contrasted positive and negative moods and their influence 
on the evaluation of a negative associated service. Ihe negative service category of 
interest was that of blood donation. Interestingly, and despite our mood manipulation 
that was successful, we did not fmd any effects of mood on evaluations at all. Ihis led 
to a number of post hoc explanations, that were tested in the second study. More 
precisely, we assumed that processing motivation was so high, such that we both 
found evidence for affect priming (in our positive mood condition) as weIl as for 
cognitive tuning (in our negative mood condition). 
Our second study, which dealt with condom use, tested this post hoc explanation. 
When our subjects were in a state of high processing motivation, we found evidence 
for both affect priming as weIl as cognitive tuning. When our participants were not 
very motivated , we found evidence for affect-as-information. 
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Our last two studies, dealing with meat consumption (after a meat crisis), further 
tested our assumptions by taking into account additional process measures. Our 
results ofthe first two studies are both replicated and extended. 
Throughout the remaining of this paper it wi11 become evident that our research 
findings, at first intended to be practical in nature, have also far reaching theoretical 
implications. 
5. Study 1: Blood Donation 
The purpose of this first study was to explore the proposed effects of mood (positive 
versus negative) on the evaluation of a negatively valenced category. We expected 
that at least one of the above mentioned frameworks would be able to explain the 
observed effects. The negative mental category of interest was that ofblood donation. 
5.1.Negativity of the Mental Schema 
In this study, we measured subjects' attitudes towards a blood donation initiative at 
the university. Although people hold both negative and positive beliefs towards 
giving blood, research suggests that beliefs are more often negative (e.g. giving blood 
would lead to a sore arm, dizziness, nausea) than positive (e.g. feelings of self-
satisfaction) (see Bagozzi, 1996). A free elication procedure (Cacioppo and P etty, 
1981) was used to check for the negativity ofthe menta! schema of blood donation for 
the student population used in our study. In a pilot study 27 students were asked to 
indicate the beliefs they associated with donating blood. After they had written down 
these associations, they subsequently were asked to indicate whether these 
associations were negatively, neutral or positively valenced. As suggested by other 
research (e.g. Bagozzi, 1996), people retrieved or constructed many negative beliefs 
(e.g. It will be painful, I will feel faint or dizzy, I would get a sore arm, ... ) and few 
positive beliefs (e.g. I would fulfi11 a social obligation to help others, It would help to 
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save lives, ... ) about the consequences of giving blood. Moreover, positive beliefs 
tended to occur later in the sequence, suggesting less salience and/or general inability 
to retrieve them. 
5.2.Participants, Design and Procedure 
Participants were 46 undergraduate university students. They participated on a 
volunteer basis for what was presented as an advertising study. None of the 
participants had ever donated blood before. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two mood conditions: positive versus 
negative mood. Participants were received in g roups up t 0 4 b y t he experimenters, 
who briefly explained that participants would be completing some independent tasks 
that had been combined into one session. These tasks (described below) inc1uded (a) 
the mood induction, (b) presentation of the critical ad concerning the blood donation 
initiative, and (c) measurement ofthe dependent variabie: evaluation ofthe initiative. 
For the mood induction task, participants were asked to provide a vivid written report 
of either a happy or a sad life event, purportedly to help with the construction of a 
"Life Event Inventory" (as done by Bless et al., 1996). Subjects were led to believe 
that this Life Event Inventory task was unrelated to the remaining of the tasks: They 
were told that the Psychology department needed their help with the construction of 
the Inventory, and that the departrnents was still looking for happy for the positive 
mood condition) or negative (for the negative mood condition) life experiences. 
Reporting a happy event was intended to induce a happy mood, whereas focusing on 
an experienced sad event was intended to induce a sad mood. Participants were given 
12 minutes to complete their reports. They were asked several questions about the 
task. Embedded among these question was a manipulation check question that read 
"How do you feel right now?". Consequently 6 9-point semantic differential items 
(ranging from -3 over 0 to 3) were presented. These items were derived from the 
Mehrabian and RusselI (1974) Pleasure Scale (happy / unhappy, pleased / annoyed, 
satisfied / unsatisfied, contended / melancholic, hopeful / despairing, relaxed / bored). 
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Subjects were asked to indicate to what extent these items described their feelings at 
the moment. These items were later on averaged for analysis (Cronbach alpha = .89). 
After this mood induction, subjects were presented an ad describing a new (i.e. 
fictitious) blood donation initiative organized by the university. The initiative stated 
that from next year on, every student was obliged to donate blood at least once a year. 
After this statement, some arguments promoting the blood donation initiative were 
given. Participants were given one minute to look at the ad. The ad is shown in 
Appendix 1. 
After presentation of the ad, the dependent variabie as weIl as an additional mood 
manipulation variabie was measured. First, subjects were asked ''How do you feel at 
this moment" (e.g. Sinclair et al., 1994). Answers had to be given on a 9-point scale 
ranging from extremely bad (score 1) to extremely good (score 9). This was done to 
make sure that our mood manipulation lasted as long as the ad was presented. 
Evaluation of the blood donation initiative was measured on 4 7-point semantic 
differential items: positive / negative, love / hate, good / bad, and desirabie / 
undesirable (Simons & Carey, 1998). Lower scores indicated less positive attitudes. 
These attitudes were then averaged for analysis (Cronbach alpha = .88). 
5.3.Results 
5.3.1. Mood manipulation. 
Participants' rating ofhow happy and sad they felt after the mood induction task (but 
before presentation of the ad) indicated that the mood manipulation had been 
successful. Mean scores on the mood items were higher for participants who had 
described a positive life event compared to subjects who had described a negative life 
event (M = 2.02, SD = 0.87 versus M = 0.73, SD = 1.80): t(43) = 3.10, p < .10. 
Moreover, according to the mood manipulation item that was presented after 
presentation of the ad, subjects in the positive mood condition still had a more 
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positive mood compared to subjects in the negative mood condition (M = 6.77, SD = 
0.87 versus M = 5.29, SD = 1.87): t(44) = 3.38, p < .01. 
5.3.2. Evaluation of tbc blood donation initiativc. 
Contrary to expectations, no significant mood effects were found on evaluation of the 
blood donation initiative. Subjects in a positive mood did not evaluate the initiative on 
a significantly different way compared to subjects in a more negative mood (M = 
2.99, SD = 1.41 versus M = 2.75, SD = 1.62): t(42) = 0.51, P > .50. 
5.4.Discussion 
No effects of mood on the evaluation of the blood donation initiative were found. 
Hence, no support for affective persuasion effects was obtained. 
One possible explanation for this null finding is an unsuccessful mood manipulation. 
However, given the fact that a significant effect on subjects' feelings was found both 
before and after presentation ofthe ad makes this possibility unlikely. 
It is important to note that our blood donation schema was a very negative one. 
Several subjects reported feeling nauseous and dizzy when looking at the ad and 
thinking about the blood donation initiative. This negativity alone may have resulted 
in the fact that people's affective states in all experimental conditions became so 
negative that the negativity of the mental schema alone overrode all other mood 
effects. In other words, we might have been confronted with a floor effect. Again, the 
fact t hat m ood m anipulation effeets p ersisted e ven a fier ad presentation makes this 
explanation very unlikely. Moreover, mean mood effeets didn't even reaeh the 
negative half of the seale, suggesting that m oods were 0 nly s lightly lower (for 0 ur 
negative mood condition) and higher (for our positive mood eondition) than baseline 
mood levels. 
100 
Affective Persuasive Communication: 
Multiple Roles of Affect in Persuading the Consumer 
Another possibility is that processing motivation was too high in order for mood 
effects to take place, resulting in a ceiling effect. On top of the extreme negativity of 
the mental schema of blood donation, which might have caused a heightened 
processing motivation (see Clore et al., 1994). After all, the blood donation message 
that was given to our participants was of high personal relevance: the initiative told 
participants that they themselves would be obliged to donate blood next year. Since 
personal importance also heightens people's processing motivation (for a review see 
Forgas, 1995) this might have resuIted in extremely high levels of processing 
motivation. This remark is important because several studies did not find any effects 
of mood states when subjects were highly motivated to process (e.g. Soldat, Sinclair, 
& Mark, 1997; Ottati, Terkildsen, & Hubbard, 1997). The authors of these studies 
explain their results by proposing that increased motivation can lead to systematic 
processing even if affective cues suggest that the situation is benign. This reasoning 
however is not very consistent WÎth what can be expected from the affective prirning 
hypothesis, assuming that positive mood facilitates the retrieval of positive 
information: several studies (e.g. Petty, Schumann, Richman, & Strathman, 1993; for 
a review see Bagozzi, Gopinath, & Nyer, 1999) have documented that affect prirning 
results are especially likely under conditions of high processing motivation. So if we 
assume that processing motivation was relatively high in our first study, why did we 
not find evidence for affect priming? 
The lack of asolid explanation for our null findings made us think (aIthough post hoc) 
that maybe mood did affect persuasion, but that the effects were present in both our 
positive as wen as in our negative mood conditions, hence filtering out any observabie 
effects. In this case, two different mechanisms are expected to be responsible for these 
effects: active in both mood conditions. Hence, evaluations in both positive AND 
negative mood conditions may be more positive than in a neutral control condition. 
Unfortunately, we did not inc1ude a control condition in the present study. Since we 
can safely assume that all our participants were highly motivated, we suggest that 
affect priming was observed in our positive mood condition (since affect prirning is 
mostly found under conditions of high processing motivation, see earlier), and 
cognitive tuning was observed in our negative mood condition. 
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As we mentioned earlier, affect priming predicts that positive mood leads to a spread 
of activation towards related (i.e. positively valenced) concepts when processing 
motivation is sufficiently high (see Bower, 1981; Clark & Isen, 1982). This results in 
more positive attitudes when mood is positive compared to when mood is more 
neutral: mood affects evaluation by biasing the thoughts that come to mind as a 
person thinks about the persuasive communication. Hence, when mood is positive, it 
can be assumed that more positive memory nodes become active because of the 
spread of activation towards mood-congruent constructs. As aresuit, it can be 
expected that evaluations will be more positive when mood is positive. 
In contrast, when mood is negative, we propose that cognitive tuning will boost 
motivation to process, resulting in eva1uations that are based on message scrutiny. 
Since we are dealing with negatively valenced mental categories, we argue that 
elaborately thinking about and investigation of the presented ad, will result in more 
positive eva1uations. Take for examp1e the case of our blood donation initiative: 
people looking carefuIly at the folder and investigating the pro's of donating blood at 
the university are very likely to hold positive attitudes towards the initiative: after aU, 
donating blood IS a positive act. 
From a more practical point of view, this reasoning would suggest that, as long as 
consumers have sufficient processing motivation, both positive as weIl as negative 
mood would lead to more positive evaluations when the product has negative 
connotations. 
This post hoc reasoning might explain the fact that we did not find any result ofmood 
on evaluations when assuming that processing motivation was high: both positive as 
weIl as negative mood might have caused more positive evaluations, although through 
different mechanisms. Study 2 was designed to test this post hoc explanation. If our 
assumptions hold, then we should find mood effects' under two conditions: a) when 
processing motivation is very low, so subjects are not motivated enough to elaborate 
on the presented message (i.e. no cognitive tuning under conditions of low processing 
motivation), and b) under conditions where there are no message arguments available 
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to e1aborate on, for example when the presented ad is completely emotional and 
provides no further information (i.e. cognitive tuning has no effect because there are 
no arguments available to elaborate on). 
6. Study 2 
Study 2 was conducted to further test this post hoc explanation. In this study we used 
a negatively valenced product category that was not as extremely negative as our 
blood donation initiative: condoms (see below). This was done in order to prevent that 
our participants would be too motivated to process (because of the negative affect 
associated with the product category). We also manipulated involvement in order to 
obtain a low and a high processing motivation condition. 
If our post hoc explanation holds, we again should find no effect of mood on 
persuasion if processing motivation is high (high involvement condition), but we 
should find a mood effect if processing motivation is low (low involvement 
condition). In this latter condition, we expect that the results will be consistent with 
the affect-as-information hypothesis. After all, affect-as-information is usually 
observed under conditions of lower processing motivation (Soldat et al., 1997). 
Moreover, since we expect that under conditions of high processing motivation there 
are t wo m ood m echanisms at p lay (affect priming and cognitive tuning) we expect 
that evaluations in both mood conditions will be more positive compared to baseline 
levels. Hence, mean evaluation scores in both mood conditions are not expected to be 
significantly different from evaluation scores in conditions where also mood effects 
are expected (low involvement / positive mood condition; affect-as-information is 
expected), but we do expect that these evaluation scores will be significantly higher 
than evaluation scores in conditions where we do not expect mood effects (low 
involvement / negative mood condition: no cognitive tuning effect because processing 
motivation is too low). 
1 With a mood effect we mean here a significant difference in evaluations between a positive and a negative 
mood condition. 
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Additional support for cognitive tuning when processing motivation is sufficiently 
high AND mood is negative would be provided by the absence of a mood effect under 
conditions w here participants do not have the opportunity to scrutinize on message 
arguments because, for example, when there are no arguments provided in the ad. To 
test this prediction, study 2 included also a visual ad were no textual information was 
given. I f our effect in our high processing motivation / negative mood condition is 
driven by heightened message scrutiny as a result of cognitive tuning, we should find 
no such effect under similar conditions when message arguments are absent. Hence, 
when the ad is exclusively visual, we expect more positive evaluations when mood is 
positive, independent of involvement level. 
6.1.Negativity ofthe Mental Schema 
As in the previous study, the negativity of the mental schema of condom use was 
investigated in a pilot study. Using a free elication procedure (Cacioppo & Petty, 
1981),22 subjects were asked what kind ofbeliefs they associated with condom use. 
After summing up their beliefs, they were asked to indicate the valence of these 
beliefs. It was found that, as expected, condom use was associated with more negative 
(e.g. unnatural, sexual diseases such as AIDS, unwanted pregnancies, ... ) compared to 
positive beliefs (e.g. protection, sexual freedom, ... ). Looking at the ratio ofnegative 
beliefs, we found that condom use was associated with less negative beliefs compared 
to blood donation: the ratio of negative beliefs was smaller for condom use compared 
to blood donation (0.57 versus 0.67). This suggests that, although condom use is 
associated with a lot of negative beliefs, the mental schema is less negative than that 
of blood donation. 
6.2.Participants, Design and Procedure 
Participants were 191 undergraduate university students. They participated on a 
volunteer basis for what was presented as an advertising study. 
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A 2 (processing motivation: high versus low involvement) by 2 (mood: positive 
versus negative) by 2 (advertisement type: textual versus visual) full factorial between 
subjects design was used. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the eight 
conditions. They were received in groups up to 4 by the experimenter, who briefly 
explained that participants would be completing some independent tasks that had been 
combined into one session (as in Study 1). 
Mood was manipulated the same way as in the previous study: subjects were led to 
believe that they helped to complete a "Life Event Inventory" (Bless et al., 1996). 
Processing m otivation was m anipulated u sing different involvement instructions. In 
the high involvement condition, participants were told that their university was 
thinking about setting up a campaign about condom use, because prior research had 
shown that their students did not have safe sex. Participants were told that the 
campaign would run in collaboration with a new brand of condoms: Flexus. 
Participants were told that it was very important to look carefully at the ad presented 
to them, because the university wanted to be certain that their campaign was effective, 
given the high costs associated with advertising campaigns. In the low involvement 
condition participants were told that another university was doing some research 
about the way people look at advertisements. They were asked to look at the ad in the 
same way as they would normally look at advertisements. 
After these involvement instructions, the critical ad of condom use was presented. 
Dependent upon advertisement type condition, this ad was either textualor visual. 
The textual ad presented a number of arguments why people should use a condom. 
The visual ad depicted a romantic get together of two young people, no textual 
information was given. Both the visual as weIl as textual ad displayed the new brand 
of condoms. The ad was presented to the participants for one minute. The ads are 
displayed in Appendix 2. 
After presentation of the ad, the dependent variabie as weIl as a mood manipulation 
check and involvement check was measured. The mood manipulation check was the 
same as in the previous study. As done before, the Mehrabian and Russell (1974) 
Pleasure items were averaged for analysis (Cronbach alpha = .89). Involvement was 
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measured using 3 items that were derived from Mano (1997): "When looking at the 
folder 1) I strongly concentrated on the content of it, 2) I paid a lot of attention to the 
content, and 3) I did my best in understanding the message". Answers had to be given 
on a5-point scale going from strongly disagree (score 1) to stronglyagree (score 5). 
These items were averaged for analysis (Cronbach alpha = .80). Evaluation ofthe new 
brand of condoms was measured on the same 4 7-point semantic differential items as 
in S tudy 1 : p ositive / n egative, love / hate, good / bad, and desirabie / undesirable 
(Simons & Carey, 1998). Again, these attitude items were averaged for analysis 
(Cronbach alpha = .83). 
6.3.Results: Manipulation checks 
6.3.1. Mood manipulation 
Mean scores on the mood items were higher for participants who had described a 
positive life event compared to subjects who had described a negative life event. This 
was the case before as weU as after presentation of the ad (M = 2.17, SD = 1.17 versus 
M = 1.15, SD = 1.54 and M = 6.60, SD = 1.58 versus M = 5.93, SD = 1.64): t(189) = 
5.l4, P < .001 and t(189) = 2.84, P < .01. So, we can conclude that, as in Study 1, our 
mood manipulation was successful. 
6.3.2. Involvement manipulation. 
Participants' involvement ratings were higher in the high involvement condition 
compared to the low involvement condition (M =3.97, SD = 0.76 versus M = 2.89, SD 
= 0.95): t(188) = 8.70, P < .001. 
6.4.Results: Evaluation of Flexus Condoms 
106 
Affective Persuasive Communication: 
Multiple Roles of Affect in Persuading the Consumer 
For reasons of simplicity we will discuss evaluation on Flexus condoms for each 
advertisement type separately. 
The results of the omnibus ANOV A are displayed in Table 1. 
Source ofVariation Sum of Squares MeanSquare p 
Ad type (AT) 8.83 1.05 .01 
Processing Motivation (PM) 2.04 183 1.05 1.94 .17 
Mood(M) 6.36 183 1.05 6.06 .02 
ATxPM 1.27 183 1.05 1.21 .28 
ATxM 0.01 183 1.05 0.01 .95 
PMxM 3.56 183 1.05 3.39 .06 
ATxPMxM 3.51 183 1.05 3.35 .06 
Table 1: 3-way ANOVA results of Study 2 
6.4.1. Textual Advertisement Type. 
Figure 1 displays mean evaluation scores as a function of involvement level and mood 
condition for the textual advertisement type. No main effect of Mood (F(I, 90) = 2.18, 
p> .10) nor a main effect of Jnvolvement was found (F(1, 90) = 2.24, P > .10). As 
expected, the interaction effect did reach significanee: F(1, 90) = 4.74, P < .05). 
Planned comparisons show that, consistent with expectations, the effect of Mood on 
product evaluations is not significant when involvement is high (F < 1: M = 3.20, SD 
= 1.11 and M = 3.37, SD = 1.02). When involvement is low however, it is found that 
evaluations are more positive when subjects are in a good compared to a bad mood 
(M = 3.37, SD = 1.30 versus M = 2.45, SD = 1.41): F(1, 90) = 6.36, P = .01. 
Additional planned comparisons showed that evaluations in the high involvement 
condition (when affect priming AND cognitive tuning was assumed) were 
significantly more positive than evaluations of the condition were no m ood effects 
were expected (the low involvement, negative mood condition): F(l, 90) = 7.19, P < 
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.01. Moreover , mean evaluations of conditions where mood effects were expected as a 
result of either affect-as-information (low involvement, positive mood condition), 
affect priming (high involvement, positive mood condition) or cognitive tuning (high 
involvement, negative mood condition) did not differ significantly from each other (F 
< 1), suggesting mood effects in these three conditions. 
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Figure 1 Mean Evalaution Scores as a Function of Mood and Involvement for tbe Textual Ad 
Type 
6.4.2. Visual Advertisement Type. 
Figure 2 displays mean evaluation scores as a function of involvement level and mood 
condition in the visual advertisement type. A significant main effect of Mood was 
found: F(l, 93) = 4.73, P < .05. Participants evaluated the brand of condoms more 
positive when in a good (M = 3.71, SD = 0.83) compared to a bad (M = 3.35, SD = 
0.78) mood. No effect of Involvement was found (F < 1). Importantly, the interaction 
effect was not significant: F < 1. This suggests that, as expected, when people don't 
have any message arguments available to elaborate on, their evaluations do not 
become more positive when in a negative mood. As expected, evidence for affect 
priming (high involvement condition) and affect-as-information (low involvement 
condition) was found, but not for cognitive tuning. 
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6.5.Discussion 
As expected, when processing motivation was low, we found that the new brand of 
condoms was evaluated more positive when our participants were in a positive 
compared to in a negative mood. Tbis was the case both when our participants were 
confronted with a textual (inc1uding relevant message arguments) or with a visual 
(with no message arguments included) ad type. This result is consistent with the 
affect-as-information hypothesis that predicts mood-congruent evaluations under 
conditions oflow processing involvement. 
Interestingly, and as expected, we found no difference in evaluations between mood 
conditions when our participants where highly motivated and when they were 
presented a textual ad type. In addition, the evaluation scores in both mood conditions 
were as high as those obtained in the positive mood condition when processing 
motivation was high, suggesting that we indeed did find mood effects in both our 
mood conditions. This finding suggests that there are two mechanisms responsible for 
this "null" -finding: an affect priming mechanism 0 perating w hen m ood is p ositive, 
and a cognitive tuning mechanism operating when mood is negative. The affect-
priming mechanism deals with a spread of activation towards those constructs that are 
similarly valenced (Bower, 1 981), r esulting in more p ositive e valuations, w bile t he 
cognitive tuning mechanism results in increased processing motivation, leading to an 
increased elaboration of arguments. Since we are dealing with a negative schema that 
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elicits negatively valenced evaluations (under baseline conditions), an increased 
elaboration of related arguments should enhance these evaluations. After all, if one 
carefully considers the pros and cons of condom use, one has to conclude that it is a 
positive product after all. 
Both affect-priming and cognitive tuning mechanisms seem to operate under 
conditions of high processing motivation. Although both mechanisms ultimately lead 
to the same outcomes, they both are expected to be structurally different: affect 
priming deals with a spread of (affect laden) activation, while cognitive tuning deals 
with systematic elaboration of arguments under conditions of negative mood. These 
two different mechanisms lead to different outcomes when no message arguments are 
available to elaborate on. The affect priming hypothesis predicts a spread of activation 
towards related, similarly valenced mental constructs, regardless of presented 
message arguments, while the cognitive tuning account predicts that evaluations will 
be more positive based on the message arguments that are presented to them. Hence, 
when there are no message arguments available to elaborate on (or when message 
arguments are not sufficiently persuasive), evaluations will not be more positive. This 
is exactly what we found ifwe presented our participants a visual, argument-free ad: 
under conditions of positive mood, evaluations were more positive compared to when 
mood was negative. 
In sum, when one wants to advertise a service or product that has some negative 
connotations, one should take into account consumers' motivation to process the 
advertised message. If consumers are likely to be only slightly motivated (as is often 
the case when consumers are for instance watching the commercial block in between 
a movie), one should advertise in a "positive atmosphere". In contrast, when 
consumers are expected to be highly motivated to process your message (as when you 
advertise a new car to automobile freaks), both positive as weIl as negative 
"atmosphere" can enhance evaluations. If managers however choose for a "negative 
atmosphere" (for example a commercial after the daily news or after a sad movie), 
they have to make sure that they have sufficient and convincing message arguments 
available. 
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Although we inferred from our results that affect-as-information had occurred under 
low processing motivation conditions, and affect priming under high processing 
motivation conditions, these were only post hoc assumptions. Unfortunately, we did 
not take any process measures into consideration. So strictly speaking, we were not 
able to discriminate between affect-priming and affect-as-information mechanisms 
(both predict the same outcomes, namely mood-congruent judgments). Affect priming 
influences attitudes indirectly through its effect on valenced thoughts (i.e. an indirect 
effect). This means that a positive mood will influence the proportion of positive 
thoughts that people will have, and path analysis (e.g. Baron & Kenny, 1989) should 
indicate that mood has an indirect effect on people's evaluations through the thoughts 
that they have. That is, increased happiness is associated with an increased positivity 
in thoughts, and an increased p ositivity in thoughts is associated with an increased 
favorability in evaluations. In contrast, affect-as-information predicts that positive 
mood has an impact on attitudes that is unmediated by thoughts (i.e. a direct effect). 
That is, positive mood will have no impact on the proportion of positive thoughts that 
people have, despite having an effect on people's evaluations. Also, path analysis 
should indicate that mood will have a direct effect on attitudes that is unmediated by 
thoughts. This structural distinction between affect priming and affect as information 
was examined by Petty, Schumann, Richman, and Strathman (1993). They indeed 
found that positive mood under low processing motivation had a direct effect on 
consumers' evaluation, while positive mood under high processing motivation had an 
indirect effect on evaluations. One of the purposes of the third study was to make this 
structural distinction between affect-as-information and affect-priming. 
Although not supported by the results of our visual ad type, we can still not definitely 
exclude the possibility that the "null"-effect in our high processing motivation and 
textual ad condition was due to processing motivation on its own, and not to different 
mood-mechanisms (affect-priming and cognitive tuning). After all, we did not fmd a 
pure effect of mood in this condition. This would mean that the effects that we found 
in our high elaboration condition were due to a more systematic elaboration of 
message a rguments a sar esult 0 fa m ere i ncrease i n processing motivation in both 
positive and negative mood conditions. This would mean that our effects are not due 
to mood, but to increased cognitive elaboration by itself. To exclude this possibility, 
we again need to take into account some process measures, to find out whether or not 
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our mood manipulation has an (indirect) effect on consumers' evaluations. Both 
affect-priming as well as cognitive tuning are expected to lead to an indirect effect of 
consumers' mood on their evaluations, by influencing the thoughts people have while 
looking at the ad, while an increased motivational account would not lead to any 
effect of mood on consumers' evaluations. In our third study we will further 
investigate the assumed presence of both affect-priming and cognitive tuning under 
conditions of high elaboration, and we wil! take into account some process measures 
( e. g. the positivity of participants ' thoughts) to distinguish between a mood-based or 
an involvement-(motivational)based account. 
Another purpose of our next study was to generalize our results from induced moods 
to consumers' feIt affect. While moods are defined as stimulus unspecific and low in 
intensity (see for example Luomala & Laaksonen, 2000), an affective reaction is per 
definition caused by a specific stimulus (e.g. an ad or a commercial) and is usually 
higher in intensity than a mood state. Effects of ad-elicited affect most often resembie 
effects that are derived from mood research (see for example Bagozzi et al., 1999). An 
additional purpose of the third study is tor eplicate 0 ur effects t hat we 0 btained in 
Studies 1 and 2 with ad-elicited affect instead of mood. 
7. Study 3 
7.1.Introduction 
Dur third study was designed tof urther i nvestigate t he effects 0 f feit affect 0 n t he 
evaluation of a product category that has negative connotations. The product category 
of interest in the present study is meat. In recent years, most European countries, 
including Belgium, suffered from meat crises that generated a lot of negative publicity 
in the mass media. Major meat-health related issues included BSE, growth hormone 
abuse, preventive antibiotic residues, pathogens, classical swine fever, and a major 
dioxin crisis. As aresuit, consumer trust in fresh meat decreases, and fresh meat 
consumption heavily declined (for a discussion see Verbeke, 2001; Verbeke & Ward, 
2001). These consumer concerns were also obtained from a free elication procedure 
that we used to check negativity of the mental schema of meat: people had more 
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negative than positive thoughts when asked about meat-associations. They associate 
meat with hormone abuse, fat, dioxins, etc .. Positive beliefs (that were less frequently 
given) were mostly associated with "good taste". 
The purpose of this third study is to further test our assumption (already partially 
supported in the first studies) t hat t here a re t wo m echanisms r esponsible f or m ood 
effects under conditions of high processing motivation: affect priming (if mood is 
positive) and cognitive tuning (if mood is negative). If affect priming and cognitive 
tuning are responsibie for the observed mood effects when processing motivation is 
high, then we should ob serve an indirect effect of participants' felt affect on their 
evaluations, mediated by their positivity of thoughts (see for example Cacioppo & 
Petty, 1981). When mood indeed has an effect on evaluations when processing 
motivation is high, it is expected that both positive affect (affect priming hypothesis) 
AND negative affect (cognitive tuning hypothesis) will influence the proportion of 
positive thoughts that people will have, and a mediation analysis should indicate that 
mood has a direct effect on people's evaluations through the thoughts that they have. 
In contrast, if our results of Studies 1 and 2 are solely driven by processing motivation 
(for instance because they were instructed to think harder about the messages 
presented to them), no effect of feIt affect (neither indirect or direct) is expected on 
participants ' evaluation. 
Opposed to the prior two studies, we wiIl approach consumers' affective state by 
inducing ad elicited affect instead of mood. While we acknowledge that both affective 
states (mood and ed elicited affect) are not perfectly comparabie (see for example 
Isen, 1984 an the Introduction part ofthe present dissertation), we would like to argue 
that b oth 1 ead t 0 comparabie affective valence effects. We are moreover convinced 
that this alternative operationalization will increase the generazibility of the results 
that are obtained in these studies. 
If our results of our fITst two studies are valid, then we should again ob serve more 
positive evaluations when mood is positive compared to when mood is negative (i.e. 
affect-as-information). But when processing motivation is sufficiently high we expect 
no difference between evaluations in the positive and negative mood condition: when 
mood is positive, we expect that positive affect will spread towards related positive 
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constructs, making evaluations more positive (i.e. affect priming). At the same time, 
negative affect will enhance message scrutiny, such that elaborations in the negative 
mood condition will also become more positive (i.e. cognitive tuning). 
7.2.Participants, Design, and Procedure 
Participants were 76 volunteers subjects who were recruited at a major shopping maIl 
in Ghent. They were offered a soft-drink while filling in the questionnaire. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 2 Tonality (emotional versus informational 
ad) by 2 Valence (positive versus negative ad) full factorial between subjects design. 
They were received in groups up to 4 by the experimenters, who had some tab les 
available at the shopping malI. 
Participants were presented an advertisement promoting a new (fictitious) meat 
quality label ("Excellent"). After they had read the ad, the ad was taken away by the 
experimenter, and subjects were asked to fill in the questionnaire containing our 
dependent measures. All 4 ads were created by a professional copywriter / advertising 
agency. 
We used the tonality of the ad to operationalize our participants ' processing 
motivation (see further). Tonality was manipulated by using an informational versus 
an emotional advertising strategy. Although both ads used the same nurnber and 
similar argurnents, the emotional ad focused on more "emotional" aspects by using a 
large picture (either positive or negative in affective valenee, depending upon the 
condition). The informational ad was more attribute-oriented by focusing the attention 
on the argurnents presented: instead of a vivid picture, a more statie and neutral logo 
was used. Following Chaudhuri and Buck (1995), who found considerable processing 
differences between emotional and informational ads, we argued that the emotional ad 
would elicit a more heuristic processing style (i.e. a decrease in processing 
motivation), while the informational ad would elicit a more systematic and detailed 
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processing style (i.e. an increase in processing motivation). The ads are showed in 
Appendix 3. 
Affective valence was manipulated using different headlines ("'Excellent' controls for 
potentially harmful sub stances" versus "'Excellent' garanties tasty and healthy 
meat"), and formulating the same arguments in different affectively valenced ways. 
Moreover, in our emotional condition, we used a positive versus a negative valenced 
picture (see Appendix 3). 
7.3.Dependent Measures 
After ad presentation, our dependent variables were measured. 
First of all, an affect manipulation check was included in participants' questionnaire. 
This measure asked about how subjects feIt after looking at the ad. Items were 6 7-
point bipolar items that were derived from Mehrabian and Russel (1974): happy / 
unhappy, pleased / annoyed, satisfied / unsatisfied, contended / melancholie, hopeful / 
despairing, relaxed / bored. These items were averaged for analysis (cronbach alpha = 
0.81). The items ranged from -3 to 3. 
Ad evaluations were measured on 4 7-point semantic differential items (ranging from 
-3 to +3): positive / negative, love / hate, good / bad, and desirabie / undesirable 
(Simons & Carey, 1998). These items were averaged for analysis (Cronbach alpha = 
0.80). 
We a lso m easured our participants ' thoughts that they had while reading the ad by 
using Cacioppo and Petty's Thought Listing Technique (Cacioppo and Petty, 1981). 
Participants were instructed to list all the thoughts they had while they were looking at 
the ad. Afterwards they were asked to indicate whether they considered each thought 
as positive ("write a '+' in the corresponding column"), negative (''write a '-' in the 
corresponding column"), or neutral ("write a '0' in the corresponding column"). On 
the basis of these thought listings we ca1culated each participants' "Positivity of 
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Thoughts"-rating. This final measure was derived by taking the ratio of positive 
thoughts (as was indicated by our participants themselves) to the total number of 
thoughts. 
7.4.Results 
7.4.1. Manipulation check 
fu general, our positive affective ad· elicited more positive feelings compared to our 
negative ad: t(69) = 2.76, P < .01 (M = 1.38, SD = 1.40 versus M == 0.69, SD = 0.94). 
This means that our Valenee manipulation was successful. 
7.4.2. Evaluation of the ad 
Figure 3 shows mean ad evaluation scores as a function of Valenee and Tonality. 
Multivariate analysis of varianee on our evaluation scores shows a significant 
interaction effect of Valenee and Tonality: F(l, 69) = 8.81, P < 0.ü1. Planned 
comparisons show that this interaction is due to mood-congruent evaluations in the 
emotional ad condition (F(l, 68) = 3.01, P = 0.08) and to mood-incongruent 
evaluations in the informational ad condition (F(I, 68) = 3.93, P == 0.05). When our 
participants were confronted with an emotional ad, so when processing motivation 
was expected to be low, positive affect led to positive evaluations while negative 
affect led to less positive evaluations (M == 1.00, SD = 0.98 versus M = 0.18, SD == 
1.54). The opposite pattem was found for our informational ad, where processing 
motivation was expected to be high: when affect was positive, evaluations were more 
negative than when affect was negative (M = 0.18, SD == 1.84 versus M = 1.16, SD = 
1.32). Nor the main effect ofValence (F(l, 69) < 1), nor the main effect of Tonality 
(F(1, 69) < 1) was significant. 
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Figure 3: Mean Evaluation Scores as a Function ofValence and Tonality 
7.4.3. Mediation of Evaluations by Positivity of Thoughts 
The goal was to test whether positivity of thoughts mediated consumers' evaluations 
under different conditions of feIt affect. We hypothesized that under conditions of 
high processing motivation (informational ad), e valuations a re i ndirectly i nfluenced 
by felt affect, through a mediation of the positivity of people's thoughts. Under 
conditions of low processing motivation (emotional ad), no such mediation is 
expected, and a direct effect of feIt affect on people's evaluations is assumed. 
Baron and Kenny's (1986) mediation analysis was used to test this hypothesis. Their 
mediation model assumes a three-variable system such that there are two causal path 
feedings into the outcome variabie (consumers' evaluations in our case, see Figure 4): 
the direct impact ofthe independent variabie (felt affect in our study), Path C, and the 
impact ofthe mediator (positivity ofpeople's thoughts in the present study), Path B. 
There is also a path from the independent variabie to the mediator (Path A). 
A variabie functions as a mediator when it meets the following conditions: (1) 
variations in levels ofthe independent variabie significantly account for variations in 
the presumed mediator (i.e. Path A), (2) variations in the mediator significantly 
account for variations in the dependent variabie (i.e. Path B), and (3) when Paths A 
and B are controlled, a previous significant relation between the independent and 
dependent variables is no longer significant. If the latter criterion is not completely 
met, we are dealing with a partial mediation. 
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For each stage of the mediation analysis we estimated a separate regression equation. 
We did this separately for our informational (high processing motivation assumed) 
and our emotional (low processing motivation assumed) ad. 
The outcomes of the different steps are also visually presented in Figure SA. For our 
Figure 4: Mediation Model 
Mediator 
Independent Variabie -------------..... Outcome Variable 
c 
informational ad, we found a significant effect of feIt affect on participants' 
evaluations (i.e. path C): B == 0.55, P == 0.001. This is consistent with Baron and 
Kenny' s first criterion. We also found, consistent with the second criterion (i.e. path 
A), a significant relationship between our participants' felt affect and their positivity 
of thoughts: B == 0.31, P == 0.08. We only found a partial mediation, since both feIt 
affect (i.e. path C) AND positivity of thoughts (i.e. path B) had an effect on 
participants' evaluations: B == 0.40, P == 0.007 and B == 0.48, P == 0.002 respectively. 
An additional indirect test of this mediation effect is given by Sobel (1982). As in 
Figure 4, the path from the independent variabie to the mediator is denoted as A and 
its standard error is SA ; the path from the mediator to the dependent variabie is 
denoted as B and its standard error is SB. The exact formula, given multivariate 
normality for the standard error ofthe indirect effect or AB is the square root ofB2SA2 
+ A2SB2 + SA2SB2• According to Sobel's test, the mediation effect of our results is 
near to significant: t(29) == 1.63 and p == 0.10. 
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Figure SA: Mediational Model for Informational Ad 
Positivity of Thoughts 
Experienced Affect ---------------.. Evaluations 
Step 1 
Experienced Affect ---------------.. Evaluations 
p = 0.55, p < 0.001 
Step 2 
Positivity of Thoughts 
ft~ 
Experienced Affect·····-··-·······---········-····-·····-·----··---_.--- .. --., '., 
Step 3 
Positivity of Thoughts 
p = 0.48, p < 0.001 
Experienced Affect ---------------.. Evaluations 
p = 0.40, P < 0.01 
Figure 5B shows the outcomes of our mediation analysis for our emotional ad. We 
found a direct effect ofparticipants' feIt affect on evaluations (path C) (B = 0.67, P < 
0.001), but the effect of affect on positivity of thoughts (B = 0.18, P >0.25) is not 
significant. This finding exc1udes the possibility that feIt effect indirectly influenced 
participants' evaluation ofthe ad via positivity ofthougbts when an emotional ad was 
presented to them. The latter finding suggests instead a direct influence of affect on 
evaluations. 
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Figure 5B: Mediational Model for Emotional Ad 
Positivity of Thoughts 
Experienced Affect --------------+. Evaluations 
Step 1 
Experienced Affect ----------------lo>.. Evaluations 
13 = 0.66, P < 0.001 
Step 2 
Positivity of Thoughts 
~ 
Experienced Affect 
Step 3 
Positivity of Thoughts 
Experienced Affect ---------------....... Evaluations 
13 = 0.63, P < 
7.5.Discussion 
As expected, and consistent with the results of our previous studies, we found that 
under conditions of low processing motivation (emotional ad), evaluations of the ad 
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were more positive when the surrounding affect was also positive. AIso, for our low 
processing motivation condition, we found no mediation of positivity of thoughts on 
participants' evaluations: participants' feIt affect was taken as direct information for 
the judgment to be made. Hence, when our ad was emotional, evaluations of the new 
quality label of meat were more positive when the affect elicited by the ad was 
positive compared to negative. Moreover, affect in the ad did not affect our 
participants ' thoughts. 
In contrast, when processing motivation was high, we found the opposite result: more 
positive evaluations when the ad elicited negative affect compared to positive affect. 
Hence, mood-incongruent judgments were obtained. A mediation analysis moreover 
showed that there was an indirect effect of consumers' feIt affect on their evaluations, 
mediated by their valenced (positive) thoughts. When an emotional ad was used, 
evaluations of the meat label were more positive when the ad used a negative 
approach compared to a positive one. Moreover, both positive AND negative affective 
cues seemed to affect people's thoUghts in a positive way. 
These results provide evidence for the dual role of affect under conditions of different 
conditions of processing motivation, as already mentioned by some researchers in the 
field of persuasive communication. For example, Forgas (1992, 1995) has recently 
proposed a multiroute model of the impact of affect on judgment (the affect infusion 
model, or AlM). In the AlM, several information-processing modes are described. 
Two of the modes address when affect has an impact on judgment, and two address 
when affect does not have an impact. Specifically, Forgas notes that affect can have 
an impact on judgments in two ways. In what Forgas caUs "heuristic processing", 
affect influences judgment because people "use their affect as short cut to infer their 
evaluative reactions to the target". In what he caUs "substantive processing", affect 
influences judgment "through its selective influence on attention, encoding, retrieval, 
and associative processes (Forgas, 1995, p.40). In essence, these two processing 
modes map nicely to what Petty conc1uded on the basis of his 1993 research (petty et 
al., 1993), namely that affect can influence judgments under low-processing 
motivation conditions by serving as a peripheral cue, and under high-elaboration 
conditions by biasing thinking. 
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Unexpectedly, we found mood-incongruent judgments In our high processing 
motivation conditions. On the basis of our assumptions however, we expected no 
difference in evaluation scores between our positive and negative affect condition. 
This is because we expected that in our positive affect condition positive affect would 
prime related positive material, resulting in more positive evaluations (i.e. affect 
priming hypothesis). At the same time, we expected that negative affect would lead to 
a more elaborate evaluation of our presented arguments, which would also result in 
more positive evaluations (i.e. a cognitive tuning hypothesis). In reality, we only 
found evidence for our cognitive tuning hypothesis, that is: only when feIt affect was 
negative we found more positive evaluations. 
Dne possible explanation for this effect is that we measured attitudes towards the ad 
(Aad) and not, as in our previous studies, attitudes towards the brand (Ab)' As is 
evident from the literature, there is not necessarily a one-to-one relationship between 
Aad and ~, so it may not be completely correct to threat Aad the same way as Ab. So it 
may be that our observed results are not due to persuasive effects, but are simply 
caused by temporary advertising effects. While some authors suggest a one-way 
causal flow from Aad to Ab (the so called excitation transfer hypothesis, see Gardner, 
1985), others have argued that there is no relationship at all between Aad and Ab (the 
independent influences hypotheses, see Howard, 1977). While a likeable (read 
positive) ad is often associated with more positive brand attitudes (for a review, see 
for example Geuens, 1997), a disliked ad (read negative affective ad) can sometimes 
lead to positive brand evaluations (e.g. Batra and Stayman, 1999). In the literature, 
there are a number of explanations formulated for this "law of extremes"(Moore and 
Hutchinson, 1985; Ray and Batra, 1983; Aaker and Bruzzone, 1985, Batra and 
Stayman, 1990): (1) a negative ad catches the attention and increases information 
processing without transferring the negative affect to evaluation of the brand, (2) after 
a certain amount of time one forgets the bad impression one had of the ad while 
product i nformation i s r emembered ( this i s t he so called sleeper -effect), and (3) an 
emotional ad distracts attention away from the message, leading to a decrease in 
cognitive elaboration and consequently, a decrease in counterargument production. 
While this theorizing can account for our results under conditions of high processing 
motivation, it still does not explain our observed differences between high and low 
processing motivation conditions. Research suggests moreover that the nature of the 
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relationship between Aad and Ab also seems to be dependent upon consumers' level of 
processing motivation (MacKenzie & Lutz, 1989). Although this is a very interesting 
topic, a careful examination of the differences between Aad and ~, is behind the 
scope of the present study, and would lead us too faro What we believe is important 
about the above argumentation is that the lack of a complete consistency between the 
present study and study 2 may be due to the difference in structure between Aad and 
~. In the next (and final) study we will also look at Ab. 
Another possible explanation for the lack of an affect priming effect in our high 
processing motivation condition can be that the mental schema of meat was too 
negative in order for positive activation to be spread towards related constructs; That 
is, because we were in the middle of a meat crisis, participants may have had no 
positive associations available connected to meat (except for "tasting good"). We 
collected the data from August to December 2000, and our country was only just 
recovering from a dioxin crisis. At the same time, there was a lot of political debate 
concerning BSE health-related issues, and during this time, the discovery of another 
BSE contaminated cow regularly reached the news. Given all this negative media 
attention, it is possible that our participants had no positively valenced thoughts 
associated with meat, such that activation could not spread itself towards s imilarly 
valenced (positive) constructs. As for negative affect (cognitive tuning): careful 
consideration of the pros and cons (as a result of increased elaboration) was very 
likely to result in more positive evaluations. After all, given all these crises, there was 
a need for more quality control with regard to meat consumption. As for our next 
meat study, we waited until the media fuss concerning meat related issues had cooled 
down, such that a number of positive meat-related associations could be expected. 
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8. Study 4 
8.1.Introduction 
The purpose of our fourth and last study was to replicate the findings of our third 
study, and to try to find some evidence for affect priming under conditions of high 
processing motivation (in which we did not succeed in our Study 3). 
Our first study was almost identical to Study 3, except for the fact that we waited until 
the worst part ofthe meat crisis was over. We conducted this research from August to 
December 2001. 
We a lso m easured participants' attitudes towards the new meat label ("Excellent"), 
instead of only the attitude towards the ad. 
In this study, we also wanted to make a distinction between affect that is diagnostic 
for the evaluation, and affect that is not diagnostic for the evaluation to be made. In 
our prior studies, we only looked at the valence of the affect, not to its diagnosticity. 
Recently, P harn ( 1998) P ointed 0 ut t hat t he d egree 0 fr elevance 0 f the affect has a 
considerable impact on consumers' subsequent decision process. He found that 
consumers with a consurnmatory motive (e.g. reading a novel for pleasure) were more 
influenced by their feelings when making a decision compared to consumers who had 
instrumental motives (e.g. reading a tax manual to prepare tax return). This means 
that, because subjects with a consurnmatory motive are primarily concerned with their 
affective experience and, consequently, fmd feelings toward the target very relevant 
they also take into account their feelings when making evaluations. In contrast, 
subjects who have instrumental motives are much less concerned with their affective 
experience and thus find feelings toward the target less relevant. Our purpose is to 
take a c10ser look at these "relevance effects". We therefore included a condition with 
affective pictures that were related to meat - a good looking and tasting steak 
(positive affect) and a patient in the hospital, presumably as a consequence of 
unhealthy meat (negative affect) - and a condition with pictures that are unrelated to 
meat - a picture of a happy farnily (positive affect) and a picture of a bloody 
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laboratory instrument (negative affect). The respective ads are included in Appendix 
4. Note that the ads that we used in Study 3 were the non-diagnostic ones (happy 
family and laboratory instrument). We expected that, in general, our diagnostic ads 
would be more effective than our non diagnostic ads. 
8.2.Participants, Design and Procedure 
Participants were 154 volunteer subjects (only people who are responsible for making 
purchases) that were recruited at the entrance of a large supermarket in Ghent. They 
were offered a soft-drink while filling in the questionnaire. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 3 Tonality (lnformational, versus Emotional 
/ Diagnostic, versus Emotional Non Diagnostic Ad) x 2 Valenee (positive versus 
negative affective ad) full factorial between subjects design. In total, there were 6 
different ads. They were individually approached by the experimenters who had some 
tab les available near the entrance ofthe supermarket. 
As in the previous study, participants were presented an ad promoting a new 
(fictitious) meat q uality I abel ("Excellent"). After they had read the ad, the ad was 
taken away by the experimenter, and subjects were asked to fill in the questionnaire 
containing our dependent measures. All 6 ads were created by the same professional 
copywriters as in the 3rd study. The only difference was the inclusion of some 
diagnostic emotional ads (see above). We also increased the size ofthe ads a little bit, 
since a few participants of the previous study complained that the text of the ads was 
somewhat smalI. Ads are shown in Appendix 4. 
8.3.Dependent measures 
In addition to the measures that were used in the previous study (affect manipulation 
check (Mehrabian and RusselI, 1974), Positivity of Thoughts (Cacioppo and Petty, 
1981) and attitude towards the ad), we also measured participants' attitudes towards 
the new meat label. This was done by using a 9-point bipolar scale ranging from -4 to 
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+4. Five items were included: negative / positive, disapprove / approve, bad / good, 
undesirable / desirabie, not needed / needed. These items were averaged for analysis 
(cronbach alpha = 0.95). 
8.4.Results 
8.4.1. Manipulation check 
Participants feIt s ignificantly more happy a fier s eeing t he p ositive ads compared to 
after seeing the negative ads: t(148) = 6.45, P < 0.001 (M = 1.58, SD = 1.06 versus M 
= 0.30, SD = 1.34). Importantly, we found no difference in pleasure between our 
diagnostic and our non diagnostic picture ads: t(100) = 0.23, P > 0.80. If this would 
have been the case, then possible differences could be ascribed to differences in 
strength of affective valence evoked by the different pictures. 
8.4.2. Evaluation of the ad 
Figure 7 shows mean ad evaluation scores for each Tonality condition and each 
Valence condition. A two-way ANOVA showed a main effect ofValence: F(l, 145) = 
19.20, P < 0.001. In general, evaluations of the ad were more positive when the ad 
elicited positive affect, compared to when the ad elicited negative affect (M = 1.29, 
SD = 1.55 versus M = 0.15, SD = 1.65). The effect of Tonality was not significant 
(F(2, 145) = 1.15, P > 0.30), while the interaction effect ofValence and Tonality was 
near to significant (F(2, 145) = 2.57, p = 0.11). Closer inspection of this very weak 
interaction (i.e. planned comparisons) revealed that both in the emotional diagnostic 
as weIl as in the emotional non-diagnostic Tona1ity condition evaluation ofthe ad was 
more positive when its affective valence was positive compared to negative: F(l, 145) 
= 18.27, p < 0.001 (M = 1.61, SD = 1.63 versus M = -0.29, SD = 1.77) for the 
emotional diagnostic condition and F(I, 145) = 4.12, P < 0.05 (M = 0.95, SD = 1.40 
versus M = 0.06, SD = 1.54) for the emotional non-diagnostic condition. For the 
informational Tonality condition however, no significant difference between affective 
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conditions was found (F(l, 145) = 1.84, P >0.15, M = 1.31, SD = 1.62 versus M = 
0.67, SD = 1.65). Additional planned comparisons showed that evaluations in the 
informational ad condition (where affect priming AND cognitive tuning is expected) 
were significantly more positive than evaluations of the condition where no, or 
negative effects of affect were expected (e.g. the emotional diagnostic, negative affect 
condition): F(l, 144) = 10.30, P < 0.001. 
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8.4.3. Evaluation of the brand (quality label) 
Figure 8 shows mean brand evaluation scores as a function of Tonality and Valenee. 
A two-way ANOVA showed no main effect ofValence (F(I, 147) < 1, and a near to 
significant effect of Tonality: F(2, 147) = 2.30, P = 0.10. In general, evaluations were 
more positive when the ad was emotionally diagnostic (M = 2.55, SD = 1.36) 
compared to when it was emotionally non-diagnostic (M = 1.89, SD = 1.88, F(I, 147) 
= 4.58, P < 0.05). More importantly however, we also found a significant interaction 
effect between Valenee ofthe ad and its Tonality: F(2, 147) = 2.80, p = 0.06. Planned 
comparisons show that the difference in affective valenee of the ad is only significant 
in the emotional diagnostic condition (M = 3.04, SD = 1.08 versus M = 2.42, SD = 
1.65; F(1, 147) = 4.90, P < 0.05). Nor in the emotional non-diagnostic, nor in the 
informational Tonality condition, a significant Valenee effect was obtained (both 
reveal F(I, 147) < 1). 
127 
Chapter4 
Affect and the Evalaution ofNegatively Valenced Mental Categories 
8.5 . 
:! 8 i 7.5 
'ii 
~ 7 
6.5 
~==~~=~=~==~ 
--------------------~ 
6~----------------~----------------~ 
positive affect negative affect 
Valenee 
I--info -!:>-emo-diagn -tr-emo-not-diagn I 
Figure 7 Mean Brand Evaluation Scores as a Funtion of Affect and Tonality 
8.4.4. Comparison of Aad and Ab 
We also wanted to compare scores of brand evaluations and ad evaluations. We 
therefore performed separate analysis for each Tonality condition, with Valence ofthe 
ad as between-subjects variabie and Evaluation (Aad versus Ab) as within-subjects 
variabie. 
For our emotional diagnostic condition we found both a main effect ofValence (F(I, 
49) = 16.30, p < 0.001) as weIl as a main effect of Evaluation (F(1, 49) = 57.00, p < 
0.001). These effects show that in general, the positive ad was valenced more positive 
compared to the negative ad (M = 1.62, SD = 1.36 versus M = 0.74, SD = 1.71). AIso, 
evaluations of the new quality label (i.e. the brand) were more positive than 
evaluations of the ad (M = 2.72, SD = 1.37 versus M = 0.66, SD = 1.71). The 
interaction effect between Valence and Evaluation (F(l, 49) = 3.76, P = 0.05) shows 
that the effect ofvalence is somewhat stronger for the Aad-scores. 
For our emotional-non diagnostic Tonality condition we did not find a main effect of 
Valence (F(l, 51) < 1). However, we did find a significant main effect of Evaluation: 
F(I, 51) = 31.05, P < 0.001. In general, evaluations ofthe new quality label were far 
more positive than evaluations of the ad (M = 1.90, SD = 1.88 versus M = 0.50, SD = 
1.47). We also obtained a significant interaction effect: F(I, 51) = 6.44, P < 0.05. For 
our Aad scores, evaluations were more positive when affect was positive compared to 
negative (M = 0.95, SD = 1.40 versus M = 0.06, SD = 1.54). In contrast, for our Ab 
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scores, evaluations were more positive when affect was negative compared to positive 
(M = 1.75, SD = 1.95 versus M = 2.03, SD = 1.81). 
For our informational condition we found a no main effect ofValence (F(1, 44) < 1). 
But we did find a main effect of Evaluation (F(1, 44) = 30.94, P < 0.001. In general, 
attitudes towards the brand were more positive compared to attitudes towards the ad 
(M = 2.25, SD = 1.36 versus M = 0.99, SD = 1.64). More interesting however, is that 
we also obtain a significant interaction between Valence and Evaluation: F(l, 44) = 
4.77, P < 0.05. For our Aad-scores, we found that attitudes were more positive when 
affect was positive compared to when it was negative (M = 1.31, SD = 1.62 versus M 
= 0.67, SD = 1.65). For our Ab-scores, the opposite pattem was found, that is: more 
positive brand evaluations if affect is negative compared to positive (M = 2.10, SD = 
1.25 versus M = 2.42, SD = 1.45). These effects are very similar to the effects that we 
obtained for our emotional non-diagnostic condition. 
8.4.5. Mediation of Positive Thoughts 
For each stage of the mediation analysis we estimated a separate regression equation. 
We did this separately for our three Tonality conditions: emotional diagnostic ad, 
emotional non-diagnostic ad, and informational ad. Figure 9A to ge visually presents 
the different steps ofthe mediation analysis per Tonality condition. 
For our emotional diagnostic ad, we found a significant effect of felt affect on 
participants' evaluations: B = 0.72, P < 0.001. We also found a significant relationship 
between our p articipants' feIt affect and theirpositivity 0 f thoughts: B = 0.46, P < 
0.001. Hence, the first two criteria of Baron and Kenny's mediation model (1986) are 
met. In addition, both felt affect (B = 0.37, P < 0.001) as weIl as positivity ofthoughts 
(B = 0.55, P < 0.001) are significantly associated with participants' evaluation of the 
ad. This latter result indicates that positivity ofthoughts partially mediates partipants' 
evaluations of the brand. Sobel' s (1982) indirect test of mediation also confirms this 
effect: t(46) = 2.57 and p = 0.01. 
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Figure SA: Mediational Model for lnformational Ad 
Positivity of Thoughts 
Experienced Affect --------------~~ Evaluations 
Step I 
Experienced Affect --------------~~ Evaluations 
J3 = 0.80, p < 0.001 
Step 2 
Positivity of Thoughts 
~ .~ 
Experienced Affect -_ ..... _-_ ..... 
Step 3 
Positivity of Thoughts 
J3 = 0.66, p = 0.00 
Experienced Affect --------------~~ Evaluations 
J3 = 0.26, p = 0.01 
For our emotional non-diagnostic ad, we also found a significant effect of feIt affect 
on participants' evaluation (B = 0.58, P < .001), but we were unable to obtain a 
significant relationship between participants' feit affect and positivity of thoughts. 
Hence, Baron and Kenny's second criterion is not met. This exc1udes the possibility 
that positivity of thoughts mediates the relationship between feIt affect and ad 
evaluation. When a non diagnostic emotional ad is used, feit affect seems to directly 
affect evaluations, without affecting the thoughts that people have. 
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Figure 8B: Mediational Model for Emotional Diagnostic Ad 
Positivity of Thoughts 
Experienced Affect ----------------.~ Evaluations 
Step I 
Experienced Affect ----------------.~ Evaluations 
J3 = 0.72, P < 0.001 
Step 2 
Positivity of Thoughts 
~ 
Experienced Affect --~----- --_._ .. _. __ ._._--~-----_._- -----_. 
Step 3 
Positivity of Thoughts 
J3 = 0.55, P = 0.00 
Experienced Affect ----------------.~ Evaluations 
J3 = 0.37, P < 0.001 
The results or our infonnational ad are consistent with the results that we obtained in 
Study 3. We found a significant effect of felt affect on participants' evaluations: B = 
0.80, P < 0.001. This is consistent with Baron and Kenny's first criterion. We also 
found, consistent with the second criterion, a strong and significant association 
between felt affect and participants' positivity ofthoughts: B = 0.55, p < 0.001. AIso, 
both felt affect (B = 0.26, P = 0.01), as weIl as positivity of thoughts (B = 0.66, P < 
0.001), are strongly linked with ad evaluations, indicating that when the ad is 
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Figure SC: Mediational Model for Emotional Non-Diagnostic Ad 
Positivity of Thoughts 
Experienced Affect ---------------I.~ Evaluations 
Step 1 
Experienced Affect --------------~. Evaluations 
f3 = 0.58, p = 0.00 
Step 2 
Positivity of Thoughts 
~ 
Experienced Affect 
Step 3 
Positivity of Thoughts 
f3 = 0.39, p = 0.00 
Experienced Affect ---------------I.~ Evaluations 
f3 = 0.55, p = 0.00 
informational, participants' positive thoughts seem to partially mediate their 
evaluations. Sobel's test confIrms this: t(43) = 2.24, P = 0.02. 
8.5.Discussion 
As in the previous study, we found evidence for the dual roie of affect under 
conditions of different processing motivation. When processing motivation was 
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assumed to be low (as in our emotional ad condition), we found a direct effect of 
participants' feIt affect on their evaluation. However, when processing motivation was 
high (as in our informational ad condition), we found an indirect effect of feit affect 
on evaluations, mediated by positivity ofthoughts. This means that, when subjects are 
motivated to think about the message arguments, affect has an influence on 
evaluations by biasing thinking. 
The results from our ad evaluation measures are consistent with our expectations: 
when processing motivation was sufficiently high, we found evidence for both 
cognitive tuning (expected to take place when felt affect was negative) and affect 
priming (expected to take place when feit affect was positive). That is, evaluations in 
both positive and negative affective conditions did not differ significantly from each 
other, and, more interestingly, were more positive compared to conditions where no 
effects of affect were expected (as was the case for the emotional non-diagnostic -
negative ad condition). Together with the results of Study 3 (where we did not find 
evidence for affect priming), these resuIts suggest that affect priming seems to depend 
upon the availability of other, similar valenced, related (associated) material. This 
conclusion is derived from our postulation that, since the meat crisis had subsided at 
the beginning of the fourth study compared to the third study, participants would have 
more positive associations available. This resulted in the fact that people in the second 
meat study were far more able than those in the third study to form positive beliefs 
while confronted with meat. After all, negative health-related issues were less 
prominent in the media landscape. 
When processing motivation was low, as was the case for exarnple in the emotional ad 
condition, our ad evaluation results are consistent with the affect-as-information 
hypo thesis : affect was taken a s i nformative f or t he j udgment, without a ffecting t he 
thoughts that participants had while looking at the ad. 
An interesting, and unexpected result was obiained from the data in our emotional-
diagnostic condition. In contrast with the emotional non-diagnostic condition, 
participants' felt affect that resulted from seeing the relevant (instead ofthe irrelevant) 
pictures in the ad, resulted in a corresponding effect on ad evaluations that was 
mediated by the positivity of participants' thoughts. This result is very similar to 
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affect priming, wbich is usually observed under conditions of bigh processing 
motivation. Note that the emotional diagnostic ad condition was assumed to result in 
low processing motivation, since the focus was on the ads picture. Moreover, the ad 
differed in notbing but the relevance of the picture from the emotional non-diagnostic 
ad, where we obtained the expected direct effect of felt affect on evaluations. How 
can this be explained? One possibility is that the relevant picture did increase 
subjects' processing motivation (e.g. it made them more attentive to meat, and more 
involved with meat related health issues), such that affect could spread itselftowards 
related, positive concepts. This explanation resembles what can be expected from an 
affect priming account. Because the focus was on the visual aspect of the ad, they did 
not elaborate deeper on the information given, such that no cognitive tuning effect 
was found. This all being post hoc, it would surely be very interesting to conduct 
more research with regard to differences between diagnostic and non-diagnostic 
emotional pictures in relation to both high and low processing motivation conditions. 
The results of our brand evaluation measure (evaluation of the new quality label) are a 
bit more equivocal than expected. But that does not mean that they are less interesting 
or thought provoking. They definitely promote further research into the topic. The Ab 
(brand evaluation) results indicate only affect-congruent evaluations when the picture 
in the ad is diagnostic (relevant) for the judgment to be made. That is, wbile there are 
also affect-congruent ad-evaluations observed when the picture is not diagnostic for 
the ad, this effect seems to generalize itself to brand evaluations only when the feIt 
affect is diagnostic for the j udgment. These results are in line with Pham's (1998) 
finding that especially when affect is relevant / diagnostic for the task, it will be 
instantiated in the decision-making process and color decisional outcomes. Although 
tbis is somewhat a different line of research, it would be interesting to try to replicate 
our diagnosticity findings in follow-up studies with different operationalizations and 
manipulations. 
The effects of our Ab and A.d results together suggest that there is not necessarily a 
rectilinear relationship between ad evaluation and brand evaluation, as is for example 
suggested by the "superiority of the pleasant" hypothesis (e.g. Silk & Vavra, 1974; 
Sbimp, 1981). According to tbis hypothesis, the more people like the ad, the more 
they like the brand. The core idea is that the consumers' reaction to the commercial 
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will be generalized to the brand via some conditioning process (e.g. Gom, 1982; 
MacKenzie & Lutz, 1982; Mitchell & Olson, 1981). Such a simple positive 
association between Aad and Ab was obtained in our emotionally diagnostic condition, 
but not in our other conditions. The results of our informational ad for example, more 
or less resembie the "law of extremes" hypothesis, wbich postulates a J-shaped 
relationsbip b etween I iking a n a dvertisement a nd i ts e ffectiveness (see for example 
Aaker & Bruzzone, 1985). Tbis model suggests that irritating or negatively valenced 
advertisements c an b e more e ffective t han neutral, a lthough 1 ess s 0 t han well-liked 
advertisements. One of the explanations that is provided in the literature for this J-
shaped effect of advertising effectiveness, is that in some contexts, attention and 
processing c ould bes timulated ( as aresult 0 f n egative affect) without the negative 
reaction being transferred directly to the brand (see for example Aaker & Bruzzone, 
1985; Moore & Hutchinson, 1983; Ray & Batra, 1983). This explanation very much 
resembles our cognitive tuning account under conditions of sufticient processing 
motivation. It is striking that we both found evidence for the "superiority of the 
pleasant" as for the "law of extremes" hypothesis. Tbis suggests that, similar to the 
dual role of affect, there can be two routes to ad effectiveness, depending upon the 
audience's processing motivation and / or diagnosticity of affect in the ad. This also 
may be another interesting line of subsequent research. 
9. General discussion 
Taken together, the results of our studies suggest that the effects of affect (mood or 
affect in the ad) on the evaluation of a product category that has negative connotations 
can not be ascribed to a single explanatory mechanism. When subjects are not very 
involved to process the information, they seem to relyon their current mood-state (or 
felt affect) while making a judgment. Moreover, under these conditions of low 
processing motivation, subjects' mood (or their felt affect) seems to directly affect 
their judgments, without intervening with their thoughts. These findings are consistent 
with the affect-as-information account, which postulates that people seem to take their 
current feelings as informative for their judgment (e.g. Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
Especially when the judgment task is ambiguous (e.g. Gom, Pham & Sin, 2001) and / 
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or when processing motivation is low (petty et al., 1993; Forgas, 1995), people seem 
to simply inspeet the way they current feel when they are asked to make a product or 
ad evaluation. 
Dur results showed a somewhat different pattem when our participants where highly 
motivated to process the ad. At first sight, we did not find any effect between our 
positive or negative mood conditions (see for example Study 1). Closer inspection 
however suggested that there were two mechanisms responsible for our mood effects: 
affect priming (when mood was positive) and cognitive tuning (when mood was 
negative). If the feIt affect was positive, it seemed to spread itself towards re1ated 
constructs, resulting in more positive evaluations overall (e.g. Bower, 1981). The lack 
of such a mood effect when positive associations are scarce (such as when one has to 
evaluate a meat label in the middle of a meat crisis, see study 3) provides additional 
evidenee for an affect priming account under conditions of positive mood. At the 
same time, negative affect seemed to increase processing motivation, resulting in an 
increased elaboration of presented message arguments (see also Mackie & Worth, 
1989). Elaborating harder (as a function ofnegative affect) on why one should wear a 
condom resulted in more positive product evaluations. This effect only occurred when 
there were sufficient message arguments available to elaborate on. When subjects 
were presented a visual ad (see for example Study 2), as could be expected, no effect 
of mood on evaluations was observed. The alternative explanation as could our "null-
finding" be ascribed to the mere increase in motivation, can be excluded by the 
establishment of a mediation effect of positivity of thoughts on evaluations: 
participants' judgments were indirectly influenced by their experienced affect, 
through the valenee of their thoughts. This is what both affect priming as weU as 
cognitive tuning would predict. 
The observation ofboth affect-as-information on the one side, and affect priming and 
cognitive tuning on the other side, was established with a variety of negatively 
va1enced product categories and services (blood donation, condoms and meat 
consumption) and under a different number of operationalizations (mood, feIt 
affect, ... ). The findings are moreover consistent with a dual-process view of affective 
persuasion (see Petty et al., 1993; Forgas, 1995). That is, the role of affect seems to be 
different depending upon the processing motivation of the consumer. When 
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processing motivation is relatively high, positive affect influences both thoughts and 
evaluations, but when processing motivation is relatively low, positive mood 
influences evaluations but not thoughts. 
A very interesting theoretical finding is the fact that we found evidence for cognitive 
tuning under conditions where processing motivation was sufficiently high. Our 
results suggest that in the case of sufficient processing motivation, feeling negative 
motivates one to process the information in a detailed manner, resulting in more 
positive product evaluations. The latter result is, to our knowiedge, new and never 
before demonstrated in the literature. However, the fact that negative mood motivates 
information processing is not new, and is for example consistent with the view that 
negative affect signals that the situation poses a problem, and that some kind of action 
is needed to change the problematic situation (see for example Ottati et al. 1997). We 
believe that our unique finding can only be obtained by using product categories that 
are negative in valence, a design issue that to our knowiedge, is never before 
encountered in other persuasion-related studies. The lack of such a cognitive tuning 
finding in other mainstream persuasion studies can be ascribed to the fact that prior 
studies purely looked at product categories that caB for neutral to mildly positive 
associations. There could have been a cognitive tuning account present, only, 
resulting in the opposite effect: more negative judgments when mood is negative. Ibis 
is not so surprising, since it is weB documented in the persuasion literature that 
negative affect leads to an increase in message scrutiny. Since people put more effort 
into this careful consideration of message argurnents, the likelihood increases that 
counterargurnents are formulated, and that evaluations become more negative (see for 
example Batra and Stayman, 1990). Our results seem to indicate that this is somewhat 
different if the product category is associated with negative feelings and beliefs. As 
was also suggested by Bagozzi (1996), further elaboration on a schema that is initial 
negatively valenced in nature (such as blood donation) will increase the likelihood 
that positive associations come to mind, resulting in more positive evaluations when 
one is in a negative mood. 
In sum, when one has to deal with product or services that have negative associations, 
the effects of mood depends upon a number of conditions. First, if people are not very 
motivated to process, it seems that positive mood, or positive affect, leads to 
137 
Chapter4 
Affect and the Evalaution ofNegatively Valenced Mental Categories 
corresponding positive evaluations (i.e. mood-congruent evaluations). Second, if 
people are motivated to process (for example as when the product is very important 
for them), both positive and negative mood seem to enhance product evaluations. 
Positive mood (affect) causes a spread of activation towards related positive 
constructs. This makes it important that there are positive constructs available. It is 
assumed that this is for example not the case for very negative products (for example 
meat for a vegeterian). Negative mood causes a higher motivation to process, 
resulting in an increased message scrutiny. It is therefore important to pro vide strong 
and pervasive message arguments in this condition. 
10.Practical Implications 
Several practical implications follow from the present series of studies. If a marketer 
for example wants to promote his product that automatically activates a negative 
schema, for example genetically manipulated food, choosing between an 
informational or an emotional ad will have serious consequences. Emotional and 
informational ads both elicit different processing styles. If one chooses for an 
emotional ad, one can best use an ad that elicits positive, diagnostic, affect. In this 
instance, the positive affect in the emotional ad will result in more positive 
evaluations of the genetically manipulated food. This is because an emotional ad is 
less likely to call for a detailed and systematic processing. In our study, the emotional 
ad elicited an affect-as-information effect: with positive affect resulting in more 
positive evaluations and negative affect resulting in more negative evaluations. This 
all, without affecting people's thoughts. If an informational ad is chosen, both positive 
as well as negative affect can elicit more positive evaluations of the genetically 
modified food product. That is to say, if a number of conditions are met. If the mental 
schema (genetically manipulated food) is extremely negative for example, than there 
are no related positive associations where the positive affect can spread to (i.e. affect 
priming under positive mood conditions). Ifthis is the case, one can best use negative 
affect. Since negative affect evokes message scrutiny (i.e. cognitive tuning under 
conditions of negative mood), one Can best make use of strong, pervasive and very 
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persuasive message arguments, since these arguments color thoughts and influence 
judgments. 
Marketers should also take into account consumers' level of involvement or 
processing motivation. Low involvement in the persuasion process2 caUs for a 
positive approach, since affect-as-infonnation (typicaUy associated with low 
involvement or low processing motivation) results in mood-congruent evaluations. 
This can for example have serious implications in the domain of ad-placement, since 
one can better place a commercial after a happy compared to a sad television program 
(e.g. the Cosby Show compared to the daily news), or in a happy compared to a 
neutral to negative thought evoking magazine. If one is in contrast highly involved in 
the persuasion process3 , and at least for negatively valenced product categories, it 
does not seem to matter much whether one is in a positive or in a negative mood. Both 
seem to elicit more positive evaluations compared to a more neutral mood condition. 
Some considerations however: (a) make sure that the product category is not 
extremely negative (if one deals with positive affect; otherwise the positive affect can 
not be spread towards associated positive beliefs / constructs) and (b) foresee in strong 
and pervasive message arguments (if one deals with negative affect; since people will 
base their evaluations on the strength and persuasiveness ofthe presented arguments). 
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Appendix 1 
Stimulus Material of Study 1 
Bloed geven aan de universiteit: een must I 
Wat? 
De universiteit van Gent l, van plan bloed 
geL'cn veillq{ het academiejaar 2oo(}-2oo 1 
wrpl/cht U: maken voor elke mliljdsc SUlden!. 
Dir zal tn!1mule" dat elke student die voldoet 
aan de vereLskm minswn.,<;; .1 maal per 
w::ademte)aar zul mot'wn l>loed gm.~n. 
Waarom? 
HliJcd geven is zeer Jlelangrljlc. Wie 01",,4 gee)t 
helpt andere nums,m. Wit' weet kali er zelfs 
een ICl-'en me;,:? gered worc.:lèn. Je kan bloed 
geven zien al... een kans OITI op grafto; 
dokterslJe?.oek te gaan. 1,,, het is rmg gezellig 
ook. Hel is een uitstekende gelegenheid om 
ni;~ul.Vf' m.en~en re ontmoeten. Bovendkm L~ her 
zo dar alle bloedinzamdactics plaat..'-uinden in 
hygiënische situaHes en ollden.v(npcn z!jn aan 
sUcllf)e controLes. Een bljkornermc reden OlTl 
blt",d te !IeLJen fJ;; hei jeit dal dit steeds een 
f,,>ede itutnlk maakt op soUicitati"fJesprekken. 
Wie? 
Naua,rlgk ~ç niet iedereen geschikt om bloed te 
geVim. Daarom werden enkele uereisten 
opgeswlfJ. In principe kan al wiL' minstens 18 
jonr L,<) ~n ge7.ond is bloed geven. Er zUn edller 
nog een C1fUlrnl bykomende t:.XX.lrUJOJudI?'n. Zo 
wordf'm homoseksuelen ,tie! tocgelaren. 
evenals mensen: die seksuf:ie panners hebben 
die tot een ri..sicogrocp tOOf Aid..;; l)p.twren .. 
Bovend'û?r! mogen hloedgevers !Jt.'?t!1l drugs 
.<worulkcn. alsook gl'"n contracepttua. Ook 
ueuetariërs en bezitters UCUl tropische 
diersoorten. worden nicr toegelaten. 
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Appendix2A 
Stimulus Material of Study 2 
Textual Ad 
Flexus condooms : een must! 
Wie? 
Ben jij nog vrijgezel, heb je iemand op het 
oog. heb je reeds een voste 
vriend/vriendin, of ben jij iemand die 
graag experimenteert ? 
Flexus condooms zijn in elke 
situatie de juiste reflex. 
Waarom? 
flexus condooms beschermen je tegen 
AIDS. Ze kunnen lang bewaard worden, 
en beschermen je tegen allerlei seksueel 
overdraagbare ziektes. Fiexus condooms 
zijn goedkoop en ze kunnen de angst om 
voor de eerste keer met iemand te vrijen, 
verlagen. Bovendien zijn ze een goed 
voorbehoedsmiddel, en beschermen ze je 
bij wisselende seksuele contacten. Flexus 
condooms kunnen het liefdesspel zelfs 
leuker maken. 
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Appendix2B 
Stimulus Material of Study 2 
Visual Ad 
Flexus Condooms een must! 
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Appendix3A 
Stimulus Material of Study 3 
Emotional Positive Ad 
O "'" kindanln liJn do _.t Als..-doet u er alle> aan om hen hot besIe te gwan. En __ .... gelOI1de 
voodIng natuurtijk oen onontboe!1ijk doel van 
uit. Ook aIS u ze nn:M8ifS geeft wilt u absolute 
__ dOl het om ...... ltoIànJn<lvl ... gaat. 
Dus kB u dan ZOOC1er Aaftéfen voor vléM met 
het E_lent·label. 0 .... kOOpt uni.' aI_ 
v_dat -iJl< ma~ en lekker K, ..... dot 
"'* voldoEt aan do str~ .isen "'" betreft 
k .... I\:Illt on V811~<1 
0. boeIdor!Jon die E_IIent·_k_ 
on do E_'_Jen behoren tot de_ 
op hot vlak .... hygIlInt. OoIt dragon z!l-' 
vr1endoIijkheid hoog In hot ......... (MklIg 
-....".._jj.~vande_ 
kwalilOlt>voodn!l __ van het leed """ de 
-""). E_tont -"'_met-. 
,,_ «JIlUllIesysto dat nog ..., wJl< 
verdof' gut den do _jke controle>. 
InIlI1tlI<en op do ElCC8Ilent-oormen ...... nnn 
_ijk In een lwenslange schoning van do 
___ Let op ons label In uw _el en 
goniet mol .... gerust gemoed .... uw notuurtijk 
.., ...... sn;,;o _ ... _. 
Excellent. het kwaliteitslabel voor rundvlees 
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Emotional Negative Ad 
Bont u ook bang om uw gezondleid op hal """ 10 _ als u rundYIee$ eet? Oerundvl __ '-11 _ h •• 1 
wa. "'_ gekend de laai"" jaren. Vla de 
introductte van het kwallteitHbel Excellent 
bieden we u nu meer veillgheidsgafantieS aan. 
Omo controle begint .....m In de boer4e<ij. 
Vism.el. vIoos-oI_1 en _Iijke 
volten lijn uitgoslOW1 In hot ranooon van 
de r1llderen. Uw nmdsvlees wordt daarna in 
loboraloria gecootrole«d op afweZigluid van 
~Ion(._~. 
_en~).n~· 
noten (zwore -'Ion. JlO'licidon PCB's." 
dioxine) door hal VBL on het PROBO. In het 
sllICI101Uis rorgen we eovoor dat de Ph_de 
(~) na hOt sIilchb>n 1_ bI!iIt dan 6, 
Oa _gebeurt _ door de c:eI 
resitiJen van het HGF. 
T_lOfgI_ rijping van 11Dl 9 degen 
voor oen mals ""kje kwallboitsrundvkoes. In 
1999 _kIon wo 10% van de 1lO1<M .... 
flI"WCIle __ op de EU-richll!jnen. 
\.\ortrouw dUS op E .... Uentl 
Excellent, het kwaliteitslabel voor rundvlees 
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Infonnational Positive Ad 
W ilt U ahsotut& zekernejd dat u kwaliteit,. fUI1dvleo. op uw bord krjjgt? Kies don zonde( Uil&l.en VOOf \itMs rnét het 
ExceUtnt-label, Dan koopt u niet alleen vlM!. 
dat hMrf!jk mals en ~ IS. maar dat ook 
vokIOet aan dit ~ elSllfl wat betteft 
kwliten en vfHJ~ 
De bOerder!jen dl. EJ«e11ent·n#ldererJ k-.o 
on de [xcoilent-siathlOl1jen boI1o<en lDt de olit& 
op tlel vlak van hyglöno. 
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Ook a-~'9 dIervrieodel9khoid hoog in het 
_ (weinig dIoren .... bOerdoli;. gozoncIhald 
van de cMel ...... kwaltteitsvoodlng. oopeówn van 
hot Ioo<Ivanà1>dIoren). ElU:""",,, WOlkt bDVon· 
dien meI _ sl\Jltond _1OSy>tHm "'" nog 
een stuk _ gut dan do _9ke <ontrol ... 
Im,.uk"" op do EXcoilant·normen multoron 
-iJk in oen I_lange schorWIg van de 
_.lel op ons _I In uw winkel en 
got1I8t mot ..., gorust 9""00<1 van uw l1alllur1ijk 
en ma" 1tu6ge kwelitemruncMees. 
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Informational Negative Ad 
O .rundv_ta"heettpr_gekend de laatste jaren. Via de introductkt van het kWalltoitsIaIloI Extolient bI-. wo u 
.... __ vollighekhgoranties aan. 
Crue controle begint reeds In de boorderij. 
Vismeel ...... -d """"""""'" en dWljj" ......, 
lijn Uitgesloten in het rantsoen van de rtIlderen.. 
Uw fU!"l<Mees wordt daarna H1laboratorla 
go<:ontroItird op alwe'lg1eid van dieren-
!J8Il'I'ISIIl- (antibiotica. veroovingsm.ddeien 
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en MtWOITning>mlddolon) 011 eentami ........ 
( ...... metalon. pesocldlll. PCB'. en dioxine) 
do« hot VBL en het PROBO. In het slaclllhuiS 
zorgen ... """"" dat de 1'11_ (~) 
na hot __ lager blijft dan 6. 0. karI<assoiectie 
gebouIt I"'" do« de cel resICU!n van hot HGF. 
TèII'lSIOtW zorgt een f jjping van 7 tot 9 dagen 
voor een mals stJ.Jtge kwaUteit5rtJndvktes. in 
1999 _kien wo 10% van de rundIIl ... -
p«>OJctle ~ _n op de EU-lichtlijnan. 
VenrouwdUSop Excellentl 
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O ". ze kmderen zijn de VXkÓ.}!J.l:>t. Al:,; ouder d:()ct u er aHc~ aan om hl.:n het L"I:'ilt..: ct geVc!Il. b, Jam nw.ah {"cn gc:nnd..: 
wording n:m.i.urlijk een onombl'~!liJk ded van 
Uit. O,'lk Hb u ze runJvlees geeft \Vlir u ab-soIUlt.!" 
~l"kt:thdJ dut h~t om kW<llit~it.uundvl('es gi::!,jt, 
nw t..ieH u dan z()ndcr ~"<'Ir;;d~fI VlltJf de..:;.: md 
het ExecUcnt-!abd. Dan b0J,t u o.Ü't :tliel..'11 
vlees dat hè1.'nijk lllatr cu lckh:l 4, maar d"'l 
\'I()k \'oIJ\>et :-cm de srren\~tc CI~t.'n war /:Iclrett 
kwaliteit .:n vl"il~g!)~~u.l 
De boerderijen dt~ Exccll\!nHtIOJcft.'fI kweken 
en de Exccl!enNllachtt!'rijt~ behoft'n tut dt:- din' 
('Il~ hd: vlak van hygtê:ne-. Ook Jt~('n zij .1(l~I· 
vut':nd~lijl.:heid hnf)~ i.n her V,11.0Uel (\4-eill~ 
dieren p.!r h,>en.ft.'nj, gezondhew \':(n de di.:.:rcn, 
kW;Jlitt:ibvO<.'<iing, beperken ',an hN kcJ WU'\ di' 
dicn.-n), Excellent ........ '1''\t,{ N.)\'cndien mer ,,-oen 
slnitcnd p.>ntn>le:.lostc·cm J:.tt n .. 'u ècn $tak 
verder b'<l.'ll d!!.n Je WNtdi.Jk~ (~)f)tl\)h~~, 
]nbr~'\lkcn<lp dl! Ex('.dkn.t·(\Ofrlh:!l ff;~uhcn.11 
.iaddijk in l'f.r1 h,~\"t'I,,~bn~e SCh(IHing '"'om cl" 
\'.:dwuder, Let or ons labd in uw winkel '::Il 
gt'Olct m~t ('cn f.C'rust gem ... ·'ed va1"lIlW n:nuurliJk 
rm nuh stukje kWllJitt'It:lHlOdvl":'es 
Excdlent, het kwaliteitslabel voor rundvlees 
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Emotional Negative Ad: Diagnostic Condition 
B ('lH li o:'t,)k bang om uw ~'C::i.\)lt~!Kd ~, hn /op"'! ~c ::d'en 3.1.. II nm,h îCt~~ e-l.~r ! lie fln""h·!eo('.4i:<t-<:tm h~ctt immer~ hl,,"<.ll 
Wol: pld.ft,tl'.d\ ji!(:kl!'f1J d<! hiJ.tHi! jM<O'!'. \\" cl ... 
1'i'l1 r~>Ju~.rii' V.lH hN k~'ahH·lt$L.t!:'It'l b:.\: ... U.~nt 
l'u.'tÎcn we ti HU m:!<!l yt:lfu:,:hdJ:>:Méu::rnnç') :.un. 
,)n:e -:-<r::ltf,·-L·1Vf::m ra .I, In J.: h;,,~rd .. ~dj. 
\ i-nut'!' \'ti.!c:'·'.ll b.,~dt;rrn~d ,,:'1', JlcrLJkc 
·;,;-q·m ;;1)11 Im)..'l:i<lorCn In ht-t r,lnt!">.!o "·Jn 
,,~. t,mJt'f\';:. t'w HwJn'j ... p w.wih {b;)~n:'" m 
Jtcr~nt;'.t'1\e~'s.midJck·n (amtb~t)tj(.oi. wrJ"winJ.,:2.A 
middd~n ,..'1) ilntwÜrnl1nI.!Anlddt;.h~r.} ('.tl {"1mtam~· 
lUlen {;Wil1'è metul~n. pc~t.idJ'I.'il. N.:f::" cn 
Jioxtn<!'} i.:kxlt' her VRL en h.:'t PROfi(). In 1\(-/ 
"L-Khthub !ucj..rt'n \\:e ~~r .. '()ot &u dtê I'h.w'~l(\.k 
Ü\lurtc~n\l.ü) ,M hel slada:.en i.lg:!!f Hiir. J:i!H ó. 
ik brk~l>.-s('lecfie to,,<t<:.'t.Jn her .. kxl:" Ik çel 
n:tidu<t'n V,ln l1('t Hr,E 
kll:,k'ue wr~l een rij~'i(\l;f V\1l-1 7 t(,t () di~ell 
\",..,t' een mah 6tlJkle b.~·;!hf~u::;ru~·dvkt:< .. hl 
1'»}) w~'.~-rhidJl~n W',' 10<:,:, \'ln ~k rtJl:dl/lt'\'~' 
t flxhK..I:i<! W(>~'t'1li": iuh:'C'uk1..'1~ <'P .j(' h: .. ··1Khtlijlwn 
V.~nr.nl'ol- Jus or txt:dh.,·nr: 
Excellent, het kwaliteitstabel voor rundvlet:s 
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Emotional Positive Ad: Non-Diagnostic Condition 
O mI: killd.~f(,:n ~i;n d, toc:t.·ln~t. Ab ·,.'\ld~1 Jr)..:::t u ("t HlI,,~, l.m \-ml hl::!l kt b.::.'r..:: ho' g.~Vi..'1\_ ln d,l.:<f m;l:lb Ct'll ~:.~Jthl", 
v,.'lI.~~Jing lB~Ut:rliJk t,;.'1l (ltl'lmt-. ..... :'fhjk ded \\·m 
UIL ')nt :d.> ;.J '.:t.: nltl.j .. k~'S go:<.'Ït \vih u <i~..tlltt 
!~h· .... h.é·1J det( h'.~t t'm kw ... lin>1tHunJdt::('~ i!,Ul 
L}u"'-' hest u &m .:(.n ... !<!'r J<lr;·l'lcn 'l.'t)nT vk"C~ m"'l 
her l~x:ç .. dknd.\l o.!L t)<ln kOI.~ft IJ n.wt :dlm,:'n 
\'b~i, ;:1.,1 hJ:<:ttijk nM1:.. en ltkb:r H, mi·nr .k" 
<<iÁ "'\'i;&,,?t ,1.:11 J~ ~t:~'tl).!"l<.· eÎ..·,ltH ~··It h(Hló:it 
k~,II\te,,{ ~n V;:;lhghciJ 
Ik hotrdt:f,~n di~ k::.t1.iLmt·IltlY..kren \.:w-à'en 
t'11\.1:.! l;.x~'dkn~'st""htl.'lijèn h.·hOlX'1) tot de dit~ 
,",P nt!t vLtk \,.\!\ hYl'-iën\..~. eNk Jr ..l.~1t'!"; :ij d~~'i' 
V'lINddiJkh~~Id- ht.:lO)J trl h,!f v,t:lnJcl {\t"in* 
dkrt:p I""r l'x},!rJ<~riJ, ~e:"J)dh';fJ V'Hl .1\: Jwrt:'ll.. 
~w~i.Jlell:,vl)!.,..Jing, loepcri<".cn vót-n fwl k~d .. ::m de 
Jlef<;'-I';}. F..xçdk'nt ~""'~i'k! bJ\'<t' .. álien m~l C(;n 
~hl~(,.'nJ ~:',l1nr(,h::"'i>!"CHll J:tJ. n<~~~ Ci;"H ;;W}: 
\'crdrr "M:H .Jan (h- wt'trdt,J ... i.' ,:'<>fHfdlt:" 
Id}I~'IAçH IJ).' ,;:,: Ixcdlent~hOlmt l\ IC~{liu:,'[~n 
,ll<idl.lk Hl e~'n kv~ü;jhn~1.! ~ h.:;!~;j~,!.: \oM,.k 
",.·d,/)\.Ri~r. L~~t op :>:;;1.i b.lx·l In uw \'.1tÜ,d ... ·n 
~>:'nkt m.:t een ~enl<;'( v.(~m, \t.J ,':~rl uw H'l{lwrli;k 
en tiMh ~tukjt:" kwal·I'C";t>rUlhlVk·(!:o.. 
Excell~nt, het kwaliteitslahel voor rundvlees 
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Emotional Negative Ad: Non-Diagnostic Condition 
B ~m \l ook h~n.~ l,~,llj\.\' gc;o.,JhJ~IJ -Of' h·i't s]'ellr:: :.wllen4lib {.'; run,hh,·<!'S eet I l:k wndvlct'~~.;ctof heeü lltlln.:t, ht;l'! 
w;u rf(~)l<."m<:n f:t",hod J~ b.}tit~ j,U'C;) \Î .. d..: 
tmrcJn..:tic V,U\ ~l('; l.:\ ... ;.;:lit<!lUh~i E>i.c~lI~nt 
hh:\h"n \\'~':1 rw m~t't Yflll.1j,~hdd"g ... nntlt') lf.M1 
Olr:t" ~,'ntd.~ t"<t~~"Int I cd., in Je oocnk'rij 
\'l;;llt,;d, vkc:;,,)(Î"x;~:nd(;rm~~>l t'n dll.'l'hJk~~ 
\"("ttcr. ;jJl" \Jit~i~~k)feJ1 Lr! hi.èt r<lnTht) •• 'h \'<'" 
'.k rtlrWn.:-n. l;w r~InJ~\i~"e~ \\-,)fJt tb . .\md b 
bh)l~i{,}ria gc-~\'\ltml~t'ld tlf) "jwc~h::tleiJ \MI 
,.h<tret\~nee .. nr\-1.klcl\ (:.ultiHorh.-<:o. v.::rd.:nmp. 
nlid.>kkn en .-ml"ol-l)fTiJl!WtuidJdcn) en "1.'lJl~an.t· 
OÁti'll (~'W<J.Tf: ml.'Gdo!o. f){,5tidJcn, PCfV~ en 
dw)iu\~} dom ht.'f V8L t'll het PROBn lJl h\,t 
shu:hrhuis ~:(lt'g .. ~n we efV().){ J;u: J~ Ph~w".i.rdt> 
(~·ulUtl'gf;!t.d; ru ~f <sh"htcl\ h*,t h!:,fr .. hn ti 
1.).,- k.;:ul,~~" . d1!X t k ~",'lx fin htcf Jnor de <0:-1 
rt~~iducn vlin iwt HUr. 
11~n:-wtre ::orgt Cl!n rijping "<in '7 tot q d,lb'fO 
V·lor bm m'lls :;tuki~ h~·,Üi.!(':1{.~Hl(b:·d~{'s.. In 
19'-)<) \Y{'I:.fhicl.J.cf< \\"1" H)'i} vatl dt t\.;uJ\"ltX'~· 
f)f\xllJ'~' \h'p.'l~ mbft·uku1 t1F ~k, [U'.rn..·hüj~n\'1't, 
\-~ nrmH\' dm or I.xó,:dlem! 
Excellent, het kwaliteitslabel voor rundvlees 
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Infonnational Positive Ad 
W ih ~1 -'lh,~tth: h~.1>:erh!!d d'u tI hv::.tlldt·~ r~mj\'l(>cj. <'P uw bliJ hl)f~~! KK.~ J"l'l ~ntd,-" ,Ml'v • .'b~n V1)·X \.!t'ö t'M'1 het 
Ex.:.-~·nt·n.t,!A)(:J. {',m k\t.~pt \1 ,u\'t ".)b~n dç('> 
,bt hf..'nLjk tU,lh t'fI kkk"'f b, ll'-<l.:l:r ,1<11 (.l\}k 
W.llJ,A;'t ,!"U~ dl:' "i;leo;,;,"l~ ei~en w.tt h'l.rdt 
Dt' hut!rJt:rlJG\ dk hxcdlcm'runJ.:r,~n k"'·IJk:.:n 
(-I) th- r.~~·dbBt v\h, ht"l"\I':o b-;>Îl()rcl'l t>:.'t dl' d!,~' 
up lll:f vhk \il.ii h}::!Î~lh'_' 
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Ook d.a)l(,11 n] dl ... r\'rit.mldjjkh{~d h<.)<'{"! Hl hr.t 
r:J.llud,,-l (\\.t:ioig Ja:ICl1 I~r bxtJeriJ, lI.,'Ct-'ndl~:l';: 
\~.JO J~ J!N"'(), bnb;:~lb\.'(W,J:n.~f h:pt·rkcn \·,.Jl~ 
het keJ \.',H\ de Jièren). E>;cCdl,~nI ~\:fl.:t l-"WeH-
dl~'n llh:t ~~:H ~ju·:t{'nd n.>flt,·>1 ... ·;'.~"ts:·-:rn dJf U<),(; 
~:çn ~(ljk \.,:dt>t 1~,lc11 J.-m d~ ... ;t"rtl'lijh~ l-00.tft)le~, 
Jnt.Il«U~.t·11 o~ J", f:}l.çdl~nt.nmnhn r.:!-ul((.'.H'll 
JilJdiik in t'l'n tt~\'nd:l,\~:t: ~ch'.1r:,in;! \';~., Jt.' 
\ ,~(h.'ll~l.<:l. ~t ür nll..' ï>ü:,d in uw winkd N, 
~:'(l.;;~l m~~f ~ ... :n gem.';t s:a(J!)<.\! \',.ifl UVi nJwll~'lilk 
!'n m:11~ ,,,nikj(,lwahr':'lfst"un..ldf'l!$ 
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Infonnational Negative Ad 
D e rnn,jvi,:~,;~,n:'l lx'dr ~r\'I!~lt'mf;n gcl'>I\\.i ... k 1\ n~t!:. J~fCr,. VLI .. k l!)lr,-..Juoi,· van k:t l\\";:i;ü~'I1 .... j<~l~1 hJit"·dk.·ht bt •. 'Jt"fi wC' u 
nu me.;-! \·~dlgh::.J;-,~;M.",-ntit"~ a,<I), 
('lr:::~,~ ..:~mtr;>!.,; k.'gl.l1t (',.'ü!:. In tk- I-ü('"da!;. 
\,~rr~,><.A, "j('~.:.~,,;' I.l<:n~J('nn<'i'l ,,'u Jil~rlijb~ \'('t(,'1) 
~IJn UHJ,;,·:Zl01':t'l lil hN r,1n~)\.·n Vil;) J<.. n.mJ.:'!CTL 
Uw tUHJvit~~~~ W(\rdt ,bc.rrl..l m bb..~,ltou<.' 
,';'comrdct'r:j '1' ·itW('~,;~b.ï,1 \'-iH, dICft.'Ll' 
?:n,',(>dui .. kk-!<:H ! .. 1Ildh\)IV,l, '·(.f(b'-IHé;>,1Ut.1.Jdi'l"i 
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~ n !)Jw.l.wm;lll!'m~;!dd.eni en ü)!U:;UIlUli.lt;,:n 
I:v:\r.' !Tl":Pl.i.'n.. ff\.-·.s.no<kll, PCfh i"n dK)XIT;<) 
d~).;)f ln.~t VBL \~n hel PROSO. In n.~t ~.J;chthl'" 
;::, 'F1.<~n \\.t: ,;rw)11 "hl Ik Pln.v!Ht;k {?IJlul('g'I';1,ld) 
n ~ h.:'l .. bcl,kn hgt~r f:-;hjf~ .jan 6 .. lk brk:d':t'\'f'lè(l.1.l 
~ l'\t.'qn hil'l ,Jv)( ~'.: •• :1 n .. ·NdU'~';1 v Jn Iwr i'R~'F 
l~B.>;t)u.' :">rg-r (:'::1'1 nh)JI\~ \"u\ 7 tü! 9 J;'l,{t<1l 
\';Xlr 0:\.:1) m .. tf- H1..:kJ~· kwahtd1"rllndYI~~~;;. ln 
1 'l'n l~ ~'~rh!"\·.iJeI~ w~· W'iz, .... AI J<: nlitui\'k<.",~ 
Pt\l!..~w:tk \I-'ti"t;t'm. inrWtlh'fI "f" d~' EL'-n\..hthjl',CII, 
V~~rr:lIIIW dlh ~)r' E','(,dl{~m 
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Chapter 5 
How Arousal Affects Consumers' Use of Persuasion 
Knowledge 
1. Abstract 
This study investigates the influence of consumers' state of activation (arousal) on 
their use of persuasion knowledge to cope with persuasion attempts. In order for 
persuasion knowledge to be used (Campbell & Kirmani, 2000) consumers need to 
have sufficient processing capacity available. Since high levels of arousal have been 
found to reduce processing capacity (e.g. Eysenck, 1982), we hypothesized that when 
consumers are highly aroused, they are less likely to use persuasion knowiedge. 
Results of 3 studies are consistent with this prediction, and indicate that when arousal 
is high, consumers' are more likely to succumb to even blatant persuasive tactics. 
2. Persuasion Tactics and Persuasion Knowledge 
Consumers are often confronted with marketer attempts to influence their preferences 
or choices. Especially in a retail setting recommendations are mixed signais. To 
some extent they may reflect sincere and diagnostic information to help the consumer 
improve her outcomes. But they mayalso reflect ulterior motives, for example as 
when salespeople receive larger commissions on the products they recommend or 
praise. Consumer welfare would require that consumers are able to discount 
salespeople's words or actions to the extent that they are driven by mere ulterior 
motives. 
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The Persuasion Knowledge Model (Friestad & Wright, 1994) states that consumers 
cope with persuasion attempts using acquired knowledge about marketer influence 
tactics. Persuasion knowledge reflects what they know about the persuasive attempts 
of advertisers and marketers. It inc1udes beliefs about marketers' motives, strategies 
and tactics; about the effectiveness and appropriateness of these attempts; and about 
ways to deal with these attempts (see for example Campbell and Kirmani, 2000). 
Persuasion knowledge acts as a schema: it guides consumers' attention to aspects of 
an advertising campaign or sales presentation, it provides inferences about the agent's 
(i.e. for example the salesperson or the advertising firm) underlying motives, and it 
generates predictions about the outcome of the 0 bserved persuasion a ttempt. Int he 
field of advertising for example, Kirmani and Wright (1989) and Kirmani (1990) 
observed that consumers make spontaneous inferences about the quality of a brand on 
the basis of their perceived advertising costs: moderate perceived advertising costs 
seem to reflect high quality products, while either extremely high or low costs are 
associated with products of inferior quality. According to Kirmani and Wright for 
example, perceived costs act as a signal ofa manufacturers' advertising effort, and 
this in turn reflects (to a certain degree) managerial confidence in the product. Also, 
persuasion knowledge provides in further information about how to cope with the 
persuasion attempt. For example, when a consumer starts to have doubts about the 
salesperson's sincerety, he or she may decide to leave the store without further 
listening to the salesperson's persuasive talie Or he can decide to start a discussion, 
and try to get a good deal either way. 
The Persuasion Knowledge Model presumes moreover that people's persuasion 
knowledge is developmentally contingent. People leam about persuasion in many 
ways: from firsthand experiences in social interactions with friends, family and co-
workers; from conversations about how people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors can 
be influenced; from observing marketers and other persuasion agents; and from 
commentary on advertising and marketing tactics in the news and media (Friestad & 
Wright, 1994). Campbell and Kirmani (2000) moreover point out that persuasion 
knowledge compounds of a loose set of beliefs or intuitive beliefs, that are not 
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necessarily accurate. Hence, what a consumer believes to be a blatant persuasion 
attempt, is not always meant as such by the marketer. 
3. Factors that Influence the Use of Persuasion Knowledge 
Surprisingly little consumer research has addressed how and when consumers are able 
to use their persuasion knowIedge. Campbell and Kirrnani (2000) suggested that 
inferences about persuasion motives are influenced by at least two factors: a) their 
accessibility from memory, and b) the cognitive capacity available to the consumer. 
3.1.Accessibility 
Accessibility refers to how easily a mental construct (such as persuasion knowIedge) 
is activated from memory (Higgins and King 1981). This ease of retrieval is 
influenced by factors such as: The expectations that consumers have, the strength and 
intensity of the association between ulterior motive and consumers' persuasion 
knowIedge, the frequency of activation of the ulterior motive, and also the recency of 
activation. 
One can expect that, during a sales encounter, the motive of influencing the 
prospective customer in order to make a sale or a commission is likely to be more 
accessible than other motives, for example building long-term relationships or making 
the prospect feel good. Consistent with this, Sujan, Bettman, and Sujan (1986) show 
that consumers are more likely to associate clothing salespeople with a focus on 
selling the product than with a focus on determining customers' needs. 
Campbell and Kirmani (2000) found that increased levels of accessibility of a 
disguised selling motive led to heightened use of persuasion knowIedge. On the basis 
of scenarios, their subjects had to evaluate a salesperson in a clothing store making a 
compliment to a customer. In one condition he made this compliment after the 
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customer had bought a product. In the other condition he made the same compliment 
before she bought the product, which should activate consumers' persuasion 
knowledge regarding the salesperson's ulterior motive (e.g. try to sell as much as 
possible). As expected, the participants evaluated the salesperson in the latter scenario 
as less sincere than in the former. 
3.2.Cognitive Resources 
Research shows that the use of persuasion knowledge also depends upon the 
availability of cognitive resources. In the field of person perception it is found that 
when people have to draw inferences about others' behavior, people first draw a 
correspondent inference about the behavior, and then correct this inference with 
information about situational constraints, such as ulterior motives (e.g. Gilbert & 
Malone, 1995; Gilbert, Pelham, & Kroll, 1988). Whereas the first stage (making 
inferences on the basis of observed behavior) appears to be largely automatic, the 
correction stage (i.e. adjusting the inferences for additional situational influences) 
requires higher-order attributional processing (e.g. Winter & Uleman, 1984). It can 
therefore be assumed that making higher-order inferences about possible situational 
constraints or ulterior motives (hence, applying one's persuasion knowiedge) requires 
an essential amount of cognitive capacity (e.g. Gilbert, Pelham & Kroll, 1988). Hence, 
the more cognitive resources the consumer has available, the higher the likelihood that 
she employs persuasion knowledge when making a judgment. Campbell and Kirmani 
(2000) found that when their participants were cognitively "busy" (i.e. when they had 
to perform other simultaneous and cognitive demanding tasks), they evaluated the 
salesperson as more sincere compared to when they were not cognitively "busy". 
Campbell and Kirmani' s work is a useful starting point for investigation, but may 
overstate the ability of consumers to really deal with persuasion attempts. Their 
conc1usions are based on participant's reactions to scenarios, and as such may reflect 
consumer theories on how they should cope with persuasion tactics rather than their 
actual reactions in such circumstances. Our study will contribute to this literature by 
testing whether persuasion knowledge is applied in a response to actually experienced 
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marketing tactics. We subject participants in OUT study to a blatant attempt to 
influence their preferences, and manipulate both the salience of the ulterior m otive 
and the arousal provoking properties of background music. 
4. Arousal 
Arousal is defined as the level of a lertness 0 r a ctivation, r anging 0 n a c ontinuum 
from extreme drowsiness to extreme alertness (Humphreys & RevelIe, 1984). In 
addition, it is assumed that arousal is a non specific form of activation, meaning that 
both positive as weB as negative forms of arousal exist (see Schachter & Singer, 
1962): delight as a positive emotional state for example is associated with high levels 
of arousal, and anger as a negative emotional state is aJso associated with high levels 
ofarousal. 
ArousaJ has considerable effects upon the way people process information, as weil as 
on the way evaluations are made (for a review see Bagozzi, Gopinath, & Nyer 1999). 
In general, an inverted V-relation is found between arousaJ and performance. In the 
early 80's, Cacioppo (1979) for example found that an acceleration ofpeople's heart 
beat (as a method to induce content free arousal) led to increased levels of cognitive 
elaboration. By placing a capped versus uncapped magnet over a read in each 
subjects pacemaker, C acioppo was a bie t 0 vary heart rate (72 versus 88 beats per 
minute) without changing other bodily processes and without subjects' awareness 
that a heart rate change had occurred. Vsing this manipulation, Cacioppo found that 
increased heart rate was associated with an increased tendency for subjects to 
generate counterarguments in response to messages designed to elicit unfavorable 
cognitive responses. 
In contrast, higher levels of arousal have been found to disrupt information 
processing (e.g. Berlyne, 1969; Zajonc, 1965). In the field of consumer behavior, 
Sanbonmatsu and Kardes (1988) for example showed that argument strength in an 
advertisement was most effective in influencing consumers' brand attitudes when 
they were moderately rather than highly aroused. Vnder conditions of high arousal, 
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subjects were not further able to discriminate strong arguments (for example "this 
pen is guaranteed to write every time") from weak arguments (for example ''this pen 
is guaranteed to write most ofthe time"): under conditions of high arousal subjects' 
were equally persuaded by weak as by strong arguments in the ad. 
In the literature, there is ample evidence that high arousal impairs working memory 
capacity (Eysenck, 1982; Humphreys and Revelle, 1984). But how does this reduced 
capacity affect the way consumers evaluate new products or advertisements? 
5. Arousal and Persuasion Knowiedge: Expectations 
The persuasion knowledge model assumes that consumers' life-long experiences 
provide them with ample abilities to react to persuasion attempts. We propose that 
conditions of normal (and presumably optimal) arousal will approach best the 
situation in which individual coping capability is maximal. The consumer would not 
only recognize the tactic, but also appropriately discount it in the formation or 
updating of their attitudes toward the recommended products. Increased arousal will 
gradually narrow down attention to those features of the situation that are apparently 
diagnostic for choice, and less capacity demanding (Easterbrook 1959; Pham 1996). 
Because using persuasion knowledge is capacity demanding (see Campbell & 
Kirmani, 2000), and high levels of arousallimit processing capacity, we expect that 
when arousallevels are high, consumers are not very likely to apply their persuasion 
knowledge when making evaluations. Hence, making salient an ulterior motive is not 
expected to influence judgments. Instead, we expect consumers to be more likely to 
accept the superficially diagnostic recommendation of a salesperson, without critical 
reflection on the underlying reasons for the advice. 
More c oncretely, wee xpect t hat w hen 0 ur participants are normally aroused, they 
will follow the advice of a salesperson when there is no ulterior motive salient, but 
not when there is an ulterior motive salient (this result would be in accordance with 
Campbell and Kirmani's persuasion studies). When arousal is high, they will, 
because of reduced processing capacities, not apply their persuasion knowledge, and 
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will follow the advice of the salesperson, even when an ulterior motive is made 
salient to them. 
6. Study 1 
6.1.Expectations 
The purpose of this first study was to test whether higher levels of arousal would 
lead to a decreased use of persuasion knowledge when subjects are confronted with 
an ulterior motive. 
6.2.Participants, Procedure and Design 
116 undergraduate volunteers were asked to participate in a scientific study 
sponsored by a market research institute. The design was a 2 Arousal (Medium 
versus High) x 2 Salience of Ulterior Motive (Not Salient versus Salient) x 2 
Promotion (promoted Brand versus Not Promoted Brand) mixed subjects design. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one ofthe between-subjects conditions. 
The apparent purpose ofthe study was to test consumers' evaluations oftwo German 
brands of lemonade presumably to be introduced soon on the local market. They 
were presented two cups ofunknown lemonade, and were asked to taste and evaluate 
both of them. The two cups actually tasted almost identical. To 'facilitate their 
evaluation', the experimenter always told that she preferred brand X over brand Y, 
because of its natural taste. To avoid brand effects, preference instructions were 
counterbalanced across brands. Hence, Promotion (Promoted Brand versus Not 
Promoted Brand) is a within-subjects factor. 
Arousal was a between-subjects factor, manipulated by varying the beat of otherwise 
identical melodies playing as background music in the test room throughout the 
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experiment: 30 Beats per Minute (BpM) for the low arousal condition, and 170 
BpM for the high arousal condition. In a pretest (N = 40), we found that the faster 
beat induced significantly more experienced arousal then did the slower beat: t(37) = 
11.04, P < .01 ' . 
Salience of the ulterior motive was manipulated by the researcher by either wearing 
a T-shirt of the promoted brand (Salient condition), or by wearing an unrelated T-
shirt. (Not Salient Condition). Note that the experimental setting was ambiguous 
with regard to commercial purpose. Participants were told that it was a scientific 
study, sponsored by a market research institute, but they were left uncertain and 
uninformed about its real purpose. We expected that without the branded t-shirt, the 
researcher's recommendation would be seen as sincere advice. In contrast, when the 
researcher wore a T-shirt ofthe brand that she recommended, the ulterior motive of 
the research (influencing consumers' perceptions and preferences towards one ofthe 
brands) would become salient. 
6.3. Dependent Measures 
The dependent variabie was evaluation of both the promoted and the non promoted 
brand on five 9-point bipolar items (ranging from -4 to +4) labeled: good / bad, like / 
dislike, fresh / musty, tasty / unsavory, love / hate. These items were averaged for 
analysis (Cronbach alpha = .89). 
Also, at the end ofthe session, subjects were offered a can oflemonade ofthe brand 
(Trendy Orange versus Flight) that they most liked. This binomial data yielded our 
brand choice variabie. To exc1ude experimenter demand effects, the cans were 
placed in such a position that the participants believed that the experimenter could 
not see their actual choice. 
1 Arousal was measured using 6 bipolar items that were derived from Mehrabian and Russell (1974): 
stimulated / relaxed, excited / calm, frenzied / sluggish, jittery / dull, wide awake / sleepy, aroused / 
unaroused. The items were averaged for analysis (cronbach alpha = 0.89). 
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6.4. Results 
6.4.1. Evaluation scores 
Figure 1 a shows mean evaluation scores as a function of Promotion of the brand and 
Salience of the ulterior motive for the Medium arousal condition. Figure 1 b shows 
these scores for the High arousal condition. 
A 3-way ANOV A was performed with Arousal and Salience as between-subjects 
factors and Promotion as within-subjects factor. The results of this ANOV A are 
presented in Table 1. 
Table 1: 3-way ANOVA results of Study 1 
Souree of Variation Sum of squares 
Arousal (Ar) 2.80 
Salience (Sa) 6.52 
Promotion (Pr) 15.34 
ArxSa 5.99 
ArxPr 0.07 
SaxPr 0.27 
ArxSaxPr 3.51 
DF MeanSquare 
112 2.12 
112 2.12 
112 0.83 
112 2.12 
112 0.83 
112 0.83 
112 0.83 
Medium Arousal Level 
I-pramoted Brand 
1-0-Not Promoted 
L Brand 
UM Not Salient UM Saliont 
F 
1.32 
3.08 
18.45 
2.83 
0.08 
0.32 
4.22 
Figure 1 a: Mean Evaluation Scores of the Medium Arousal Condition in Study 1 
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High Arousal Level 
&,,:1·····~ 
!o,:Fm~ 
UM Not UM Salient 
Salient 
....... Promoted 
Brand 
-D-Not 
Promoted 
Brand L-____ _ 
Figure 1 b: Mean Evaluation Scores of the High Arousal Condition in Study 1 
We observed a strong main effect of Promotion (F(1, 112) = 18.45, P < .001). 
Evaluations of the promoted brand were significantly higher than evaluations of the 
non promoted brand (M = .93, SD = 1.15 versus M = .40, SD = 1.30). This means that 
in general, the experimenter was able to influence the participants. 
The only other significant effect was a 3-way interaction (F(1, 112) = 4.22, P < .05) 
between Arousal, Salience and Promotion. Accordingly, we analyzed both simple 
two-way interactions. 
When arousal was medium, we found that evaluations of the promoted brand were 
more p ositive t han e valuations of the not promoted brand when the ulterior motive 
was not salient (M = 0.94, SD = 1.05 versus M = 0.15, SD = 1.35; F(l, 112) = 11.74, 
P < .001). This effect was not found when the ulterior motive was made salient (M = 
0.65, SD = 1.27 versus M = 0.48, SD = 1.27; F(l, 112) < 1). When arousal was high, 
we found no significant difference between promoted and not promoted brand when 
the ulterior motive was not made salient (M = 0.63, SD = 1.27 versus M = 0.26, SD = 
1.19; F(l, 112) = 2.32, P = .13), but when the ulterior motive was made salient, we 
found that evaluation of the promoted brand was more positive than the evaluation of 
the not promoted brand (M = 1.47, SD = 0.82 versus M = 0.74, SD = 1.38; F(I, 112) = 
8.84, P = .003). These results suggest that under conditions of medium arousal, 
subjects followed the advice of the experimenter when the ulterior m otive was not 
salient, but not when the ulterior motive was salient (F(I, 112) = 3.55, P = .06). 
Interestingly and as expected, when arousal was high, subjects followed the advice of 
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the experimenter even when the ulterior motive was salient. In this condition, the 
interaction between Promotion of the brand and Salience of the Ulterior Motive was 
not significant (F(l, 112) =' 1.07, P =' .30). 
In addition, when analyses were performed for our promoted brand alone we found a 
significant 2 Arousal by 2 Salience interaction effect: F(1, 112) = 7.45, P < .01. When 
arousal was medium, evaluations went down when the ulterior motive was made 
salient compared to when it was not (M =' .65, SD = 1.27 vs. M = .95, SD = 1.05). The 
opposite p attem was f ound w hen a rousal was high: evaluations were more positive 
when the ulterior motive was made salient compared to when it was not (M =' 1.47, 
SD = 0.81 vs. M = .64, SD = 1.28). For the not promoted brand, no such interaction 
effect was found: F(I, 112) < 1. 
6.4.2. Choice Behavior 
Consumers got to choose a can of lemonade of the brand they preferred most. A 
logistic regression with Salience and Arousal as weIl as their interaction as 
independent factors was performed on the binary data (1 if they picked the promoted 
brand and 0 i fthey picked the otherbrand)(-2LL=' 157;;e= 3.09, p = .37). The 
results are shown in Figure 2. We did not find any main effect (Arousal: p > .20 and 
Salience: p>.90). The interaction effect was also not significant (p > .20). 
80 
70 
60 
50 
40 
30 
20 
10 
o 
Percentage choice of promoted brand 
Medium Arousal High Arousal 
Figure 2: Percentage of Choice of Promoted Brand in Study 1 
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6.4.3. Choice Behavior, Reduced Data File, Explorative 
Analysis 
These null findings could be due to some dutter in our experimental procedure. 
Subjects were a110wed to enter the experimental room in groups up to two, and some 
comments that were sometimes heard while they were picking a can of lemonade was 
"If you pick this one, 1'11 pick the other one". This is not so surprising, since it were 
two unknown brands, and participants presumably wanted to try both cans. 
Therefóre, we again ran our logistic regression, but excluded all participants that 
answered inconsistently (i.e. people that evaluated brand X more positive as brand Y, 
but actually choose for brand Y). The results of tbis additional analysis are shown in 
Figure 3 (-2LL = 134; X2 = 4.90, P = .18). Here we find no significant main effects 
(Arousal: p > .20; Salience: p > .50). But our interaction effect was significant: B = 
1.60, P = .05. We see in Figure 3 that, when arousal was medium, participants 
followed the advice of the experimenter more when the ulterior motive was not salient 
compared t 0 w hen i t was s alient. However, when arousal was high, this effect was 
slightly in the opposite direction. Tbis indicates again, that high arousal makes people 
less likely to employ their persuasion knowIedge. 
r: 
I 80 
I
' 60 
40 
, 20· 
I 0 I 
Percentage choice of promoted brand 
IJ UM No! Salien! 
.UMSalien! 
1__ Medium Arousal High Arousal 
Figure 3: Percentage of Choice Data of Reduced Data File in Study 1 
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6.5. Discussion 
As expected, we found that consumers were less likely to follow the advice of a 
salesperson when an ulterior motive was made salient compared to when it was not. 
This finding was found under conditions were participants were medium aroused. In 
contrast, when arousal levels were high, the opposite pattem was found: consumers 
were more persuaded when an ulterior motive was made salient compared to when it 
was not. 
These findings can be explained by a reduced processing capacity account, resulting 
from increased arousal levels (see for example Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). 
According to studies done by Campbell & Kirmani (2000), consumers need sufficient 
cognitive resources in order for persuasion knowledge to beu sed. A fier a 11, u se 0 f 
persuasion knowledge is considered as a higher-order attribution process (see Winter 
& Uleman, 1984) that requires a considerable amount of cognitive resources for it to 
be applied successfully (Fein, 1996). 
Note also that we found a considerable difference between evaluations of both salient 
and non salient conditions when arousallevels were high. In general, evaluations were 
more positive when the experimenter wore a T-shirt promoting the brand (salient 
condition) versus when the T-shirt was not of the promoted brand (non salient 
condition). It is noteworthy that this finding is not in conflict with our expectations: 
the T-shirt of the promoted brand can be seen as a peripheral cue (see Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986). Especially when processing capacities are limited (as is the case 
when level of arousal is high), consumers are more likely to base their persuasion on 
cues that are extemal (peripheral) to the persuasion process. When consumers follow 
this "peripheral route" to persuasion, this mostly results in more positive evaluations 
(see Petty et al., 1991). 
One problem of the present study is that we did not control for effects of our pieces of 
arousing music on people's mood. Our high arousal piece of music could have 
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brought people in a positive mood state, while our low arousal piece of music could 
have brought people in a more negative mood state (or the other way around). Since 
we did not control for the effect of these mood states, we can not exclude the 
possibility that our effects were driven by mood, and not by arousal. In line with this, 
a large body of studies have demonstrated that people's mood states have a 
considerable effect on both the way that they process information as weIl as on the 
way they make evaluations (see for example Bagozzi, Gopinath, & Nyer, 1999). 
Therefore, it seems natural to assume that people's mood state could also have an 
influence on their application of persuasion knowIedge. 
It has been argued in the psychologicalliterature that the processing of information by 
individuals in positive affective states is characterized as heuristic and less systematic: 
in general, it is assumed that happy individuals have either reduced processing 
capacity (e.g. Mackie & Worth, 1989) and / or have reduced processing motivation 
(e.g. Schwarz, 1990). In contrast, individuals in mildly negative affective states often 
seem to show amore careful and analytic type of processing (for an overview, see for 
example Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz & Bless, 1991). 
People that are in a good mood, for example, tend to be equally persuaded by strong 
as by weak arguments, suggesting that when in a good mood, one is not able to 
differentiate between qualitative different arguments. These findings have accordingly 
been interpreted as indicating that these people are less likely to engage in 
"systematic" (Chaiken, 1980, 1987) or "central route" processing (Petty & Cacioppo, 
1986) of the content of persuasive messages. Because they appear not to elaborate the 
content of a message extensively, recipients in a good mood are more likely to be 
influenced by the use of simplifying cognitive strategies to asses message validity. 
Similarly, Sinc1air and Mark (1995) found that happy participants who were 
confronted with a statistical problem were less accurate, used fewer digits in their 
estimates, reported least concentration and wrote less comprehensible explanations 
compared to their more neutral counterparts. 
Translating these findings to the present study, it could have been the case that 
positive mood (which could have been elicited by the beat music in our high arousal 
condition) made people less suspicious about the ulterior motive, and made them rely 
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more on peripheral persuasion cues (the experimenters' T-shirt). While negative mood 
(in our low arousal condition?) made people more think about the persuasion attempt, 
resulting in an increased use of persuasion knowiedge. In the second study we try to 
exclude this alternative explanation. 
7. Study 2 
7.1. Introduction 
The purpose of this second study is twofold. First, we want to exclude the alternative 
explanation as could or effect be ascribed to the effects of mood. As discussed earlier, 
the high arousal condition of study 1 could have elicited positive affect, and it could 
have been this positive affect that led to the use of the promotional T-shirt as a 
peripheral cue. AIso, our low arousal condition could have elicited negative affect, 
and it could have been this negative affect that made subjects discount the influence of 
the peripheral persuasion cue and use their persuasion knowledge instead. Therefore, 
in the present study, we use an arousal manipulation that is as content free as possible: 
the ticking of ametronome. Importantly, in a pretest, we will also control for the 
affect that this metronome elicits under conditions of different ticks per minute (i.e. 
different levels of arousal). 
7.2. Expectations 
So if arousal influences consumers' use of persuasion knowledge independent of 
mood, we should find arousal effects on the application of consumers' persuasion 
knowledge independent of consumers' mood state: higher levels of arousal should 
lead to decreased usage of persuasion knowiedge. 
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A second aim of this study is to investigate how positive versus negative affect 
influences consumers' evaluation of the different brands. Consistent with the 
literature, we expect that evaluations of all our brands (i.e. both the promoted brand as 
weU as the not promoted brand) will be congruent with subjects mood. That is, 
evaluations of products will be more positive when subjects are in a positive 
compared to in a negative mood state. Mood-congruency effects have been well 
documented in the literature (Mayer, Gashke, Braverman, & Evans, 1992; Mayer, 
McCormick, & Strong, 1995; Sedikides). One explanation for these mood-
congruencyeffects sterns from memory based models (e.g. Bower, 1981). The general 
explanatory mechanism here is that people in negative moods have more negatively 
toned memories in mind than do people in positive moods. When people use these 
mood-congruent memories as the basis for their judgments, the result is a mood-
congruent judgrnent. Hence, for both our promoted AND our not promoted brand we 
expect mood-congruent judgments. 
Since mood also affects consumers' processing capacity (see earIier), we also expect 
that mood will influence consumers' application of persuasion knowiedge. Positive 
mood seems to be associated with a more heuristic kind of processing, while negative 
mood is associated with a more systematic kind of processing (see also Isen, 1984; 
1987). Therefore we can generally assume that negative mood, compared to positive 
mood, leads to an increased use of persuasion knowiedge. However, since this 
increased processing motivation will depend upon the actual processing resources that 
are available to our participants, and since the availability of cognitive resources also 
depends on participants' state of arousal, we expect that our results are not that clear 
cut. Therefore, a further exarnination of this plausible three-way interaction is behind 
the scope ofthe present research project. 
7.3. Design and Procedure 
Subjects were 132 undergraduate students (other than in Study 1) who participated on 
a volunteer basis. As in the previous study, they were asked to participate in a 
scientific s tudy t hat i s s ponsored b yam arket research a gency. The design was a 2 
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Arousal (Medium versus High) x 2 Mood (Positive versus Negative Mood) x 2 
Promotion (promoted Brand versus Not Promoted Brand) mixed subjects design. 
Except for one baseline condition, we made the ulterior motive salient in every 
condition. This was done as in the previous study: the experimenter wore a t-shirt of 
the brand that was promoted. We assumed that the t-shirt should make the 
experimenter look more suspicious. 
The procedure was identical to that used in Study 1, except for the fact that subjects 
were first brought in the intended mood state (hence, mood was a between-subjects 
factor). They were told that the Psychology department of the University was working 
on a "Life Event Inventory", and was stilliooking for positive (in the positive mood 
condition) or negative (in the negative mood condition) life events. Subjects were 
given 5 minutes time to report onone specific, recently experienced, positive or 
negative life event (see also Bless, Clore, Schwarz, Golisano, Rabe, & Wölk, 1996). 
This first part of the study was ostensibly unrelated to the remaining of the study 
(tasting the lemonades), and was done in a different experimental room. 
Different as was done in our first study, we manipulated arousal by using the tics of a 
metronome. We choose for metronome tics because we believed that it was a content-
free fonn of arousal manipulation, and it was not re1ated to affect. In our low arousal 
condition, there were 25 metronome tics per minute, while in our high arousal 
condition there were 110 tics per minute. A pretest showed that both manipulations 
differed with respect to levels ofarousaI (t(79) = 5.57, P < .001), but not with respect 
to pleasure (t(79) = 0.22, p > .50). 
We also inc1uded a baseline condition where we only manipulated Promotion as a 
within-subjects factor ("Personally I would pref er brand X over Y", see Study 1). In 
this baseline condition we did not manipulate mood, arousal or salience ofthe ulterior 
motive. Note that because there is no uIterior motive salient in this condition, we 
expect evaluations of the promoted brand to be very positive. 
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7.4.Dependent Measures 
As in the first study, we measured evaluations of both the promoted and the not 
promoted brand. The same 5 bipolar items were used as before. 
To avoid that people would discuss their brand choice with their confederates, we now 
provided coupons from which subjects had to choose from on an individual basis. 
They were told that they could turn in their coupons at a later time (because we 
ostensibly had troubles with our delivery service). 
7.5. Results 
7.5.1. Evaluation scores in the 2(promotion) x 2(Arousal) x 
2(Mood) condition 
Table 2: 3-Way ANOVA results of Study 2 
Souree ofVariation Sum of squares DF MeanSquare F p< 
Arousal (Ar) 0.71 102 1.16 1.32 .25 
Mood (Mo) 9.17 102 1.16 3.08 .08 
Promotion (Pr) 12.38 102 0.94 18.45 .00 
ArxMo 0.73 102 1.16 2.83 .09 
ArxPr 1.77 102 0.94 0.08 .77 
MoxPr 0.13 102 0.94 0.32 .57 
ArxMoxPr 0.96 102 0.94 4.22 .04 
A surnmary of our analysis of variance is displayed in Table 2. Figures 4a and 4 b 
moreover display Evaluation scores on the promoted and not promoted brand as a 
function of arousal and mood. In our medium arousal condition, we found no 
significant difference between the promoted and the not promoted brand F(1, 102) = 
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2.48, P =.11 (M = 0.50, SD = 0.83 versus M = 0.20, SD = 1.24). hl our high arousal 
condition, we find a substantial difference between evaluation ofthe promoted and the 
not promoted brand: F (1, 102) = 12.69, P < .001. As can be seen in Figure 4b, when 
arousal was high, evaluations of the promoted brand were more positive compared to 
evaluations ofthe not promoted brand (M = 0.76, SD = 0.71 versus M = 0.15, sn = 
1.19). These results indicate that our participants were not eager to follow the advice 
of the experimenter when arousal was medium (because they used persuasion 
knowledge as a result of the salient t-shirt). Moreover, and consistent with 
expectations, they did follow the advice when arousal was high, even though the 
ulterior motive (the t-shirt) was made salient. These findings were not caused by 
mood. 
ä 
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! 0 
~ 
-0,5 
Medium Arousal Level 
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Figure 4a: Mean Evaluation Scores under Medium Arousal Levels in Study 2 
High Arousal Level l 
Positive Mood Negaüve Mood 
Figure 4b: Mean Evaluation Scores under High Arousal Levels in Study 2 
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7.5.2. Evaluation scores in the 2 (arousal) x 2 (mood) condition 
promoted brand condition, comparison with baseline 
condition 
Planned comparisons (for a summary see Table 3) show that when arousal is medium, 
and the ulterior motive is salient, evaluations are significantly less positive compared 
to a baseline condition were the ulterior motive is not made salient: F(l, 127) = 8.64, p 
= .003 (see also Figure 5). This suggests that participants notice the ulterior motive 
and apply their persuasion knowledge when making a judgment. In contrast, when 
arousal is high, evaluations do not differ significantly from the evaluations in a 
unbiased baseline condition (F(I, 127) = 1.88, P > .15). Despite the salience of the 
ulterior motive, participants seem to evaluate the promoted brand equaUy weU as 
when the advice comes from an unsuspicious source (baseline condition). This again 
suggests that when arousal is high, subjects do not seem to apply their persuasion 
knowiedge. 
Evaluatlon of Promoted Brand 
1,5 
fO,5--~--
i 0 
Ol 
-<>,5 
-1 -I---_--~--~ 
Positiw Mood Negative Baseline 
"ood 
Figure 5: Mean Evaluation Scores of the Promoted Brand, Compared to Baseline Conditions in 
Study 2 
Table 3: Specific Planned Comparisons: Mean Evalaution Scores ofthe Promoted Brand 
Compared to the Baseline Condition in Study 2 
Arousal Mood F(I,127) p< 
Low Positive 2.84 .09 
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Negative 
Positive 
Negative 
11.48 
<I 
3.97 
.0009 
.69 
.04 
7.5.3. Actual Choice Behavior 
As in the previous study, alogistic regression analysis was performed on the binary 
choice data ( 1 i f participants' c hoice was similar to the promoted brand, 0 if else). 
Arousal and Mood, as weIl as their interaction were included as independent variables 
(-2LL = 123; X2 = 16.30, P = .001). The results are shown in Figure 6. We found a 
significant main effect of Arousal (B = -2.16, P = .003) as weU as a significant main 
effect of Mood (B = -1.39, p = .05). Consistent with study 1 and with our evaluation 
data, we found that participants were more likely to foIlow the advice of the 
experimenter if arousal is high compared to when it is low, suggesting that they are 
less likely to use their persuasion knowledge when they are highly aroused. Also, 
negative mood seemed to heighten acceptance of experimenters' advice more than 
positive mood. The interaction was not significant. 
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Figure 6: Percentage Actual Choice Behavior in Study 2 
179 
Chapter 5 
How Arousal Affects Consumers' Use ofPersuasion Knowledge 
7.6.Discussion 
Our results are consistent with the results found in the first study, and with our 
proposition that increased levels of arousal decrease the application of persuasion 
knowiedge. Under conditions of increased arousal, our participants seemed to be more 
persuaded b y t he e xperimenter compared t 0 w hen a rousal levels were normal. This 
was the case even though the ulterior motive (wearing a T-shirt of the promoted 
brand) was made very salient to participants. AIso, when levels of arousal were high, 
our participants were equally persuaded by the "sales encounter" as when this 
encounter reflected a sincere attempt to help participants make a decision (our 
baseline control condition). In contrast, when normally aroused, our participants were 
far less persuaded by the encounter compared to participants in the baseline condition. 
This latter finding suggests, as in our first study, that our manipulation of the ulterior 
motive (the T-shirt) had been successful in inducing consumer suspicion. Moreover, 
our data reflecting actual choice behavior also indicate that when an ulterior motive 
was made salient, our participants were more eager to follow the experimenters' 
advice when under high compared to under normal arousal conditions. 
Our results question whether successful coping with persuasion attempts is as 
common as suggested by the persuasion knowledge model, and the results of 
Campbell and Kirmani. In their study the mere awareness that an attempt preceded a 
purchase appeared sufficient to cue participants to the ulterior motives of the sales 
person. We demonstrated that these results are not generalizable. Our participants 
were faced with a probably unexpected and blatant attempt to influence their 
preferences. Also the cue to ulterior motives was blatant and impossible to ignore. 
Appropriate discounting only occurred when the environmental conditions were such 
that arousal was optimal, and available cognitive resources at a maximum. When 
situationally induced arousal was high, the opposite pattem was found: consumers 
were more persuaded when an ulterior motive was made salient compared to when it 
was not. Moreover, the salient identification of the researcher with one brand added 
to the apparent diagnosticity of her recommendation, and strengthened preference for 
the recommended brand. The field setting of the experiment did not allow us to take 
process measures, but the reported interaction is only consistent with the inference 
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that in the high arousal condition available persuasion knowledge was not activated, 
or at least not integrated in an appropriate manner with marketer provided cues. 
Since we carefully controlled for effects of affective valence (different speeds of 
metronome tics did not lead to any changes in participants' affective state) and since 
we did not find any significant interaction effects, we can s afely c onclude t hat 0 ur 
persuasion knowledge results are not caused by differences in mood state. Arousal by 
itself seemed to have been responsible for decreased usage of participants ' persuasion 
knowiedge. 
Our results are consistent with the mood-literature in the sense that we found a 
significant main effect ofmood (for a review see for example Bagozzi et al. 1999): for 
both the promoted and not promoted brand we found more positive evaluations when 
mood was positive compared to when mood was negative. Ihis indicates that mood 
seemed to have colored all judgments, independent of which brand was or was not 
promoted. 
With regard to the effects of mood, the results of our actual choice behavior (picking 
one of the two brands of lemonade) seem in contraction with the data obtained from 
our evaluation measures. Consistent with the affective persuasion literature (see 
Bagozzi et al. 1999 for a review) we found that evaluations of the promoted brand 
(and also of the not promoted brand) were more p ositive w hen m ood was p ositive 
compared to when mood was negative. In contrast, and surprisingly, the main effect of 
our 10gistic regression indicates that when mood was positive compared to negative, 
our participants were less likely to choose for the promoted brand, even though 
evaluations were more positive. Critical reflection however indicates that for our 
brand evaluation data, mood affected all evaluations, that is: ofboth the promoted and 
the not promoted brand. So, when confronted with an actual choice, negative mood 
seems to enhance persuasion, and seems to dilute the influence of the salient ulterior 
motive, somewhat comparabie to the influence of increased arousal. 
Further inspection of the binary choice data reveals that the difference between 
positive and negative mood is only significant when arousal is high. Logistic 
181 
Chapter 5 
How Arousal Affects Consumers' Use ofPersuasion Knowledge 
regression performed on the high arousal data alone reveals that people choose more 
for the promoted brand when mood is negative compared to when mood is positive (B 
= -1.38; P = .05). Although there is no overall interaction effect, this effect is far from 
significant when we repeat the analysis for the medium arousal data (B = -0.23; P 
>.65). So why do people choose more for the promoted brand when they are feeling 
negative and while they are highly aroused? One possibility is that, in addition to 
arousal, negative mood reduced the capacity to process even more, such that there is 
less capacity available compared to the high arousal positive mood condition. This 
might explain the observed difference in choice data between the positive and 
negative mood condition. After all, negative mood has been found in the literature to 
motivate people to process information in a more detailed and systematic manner than 
do people in a positive mood state (e.g. Sinclair & Mark, 1992). Naturally, this 
increased systematic processing uses up processing capacities (Ellis & Ashbrook, 
1988). But since increased arousal also uses up cognitive resources, we might assume 
that our negative mood participants were confronted with additional cognitive 
restraints. As a result of these decreased resources, participants could have been less 
able to use their persuasion knowiedge, such that they were even more persuaded, 
than participants in the positive mood condition. 
A possible altemative explanation for the results ofboth the fitst and the second study 
is that our results are not due to arousal by itself, but to other aspects that are elicited 
by the different pieces of music. For example the fast piece of music, or the fast 
metronome, could have induced distraction or tiredness. In that sense, our participants 
could have experienced problems in making a careful evaluation of the brands, or 
could have experienced more difficulties in filling in the questionnaires. After all, the 
music (or metronome) was constantly playing at a background level, and could have 
leaded to a more general form of distraction away from the task. Hence, to generalize 
our findings, we need to replicate our findings with a different arousal manipulation, 
that does not interfere with levels of participants' distraction. This was one of the 
purposes of our third study. 
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8. Study 3 
8.1. Introduction 
The results that we obtained in our first two studies suggest that the arousal that we 
induced to subjects by letting them listen to a fast piece of music (or metronome 
ticking) was dysfunctional with regard to participants' use of persuasion knowiedge. 
Although we did not use any process measures, we could infer from our results that 
higher arousal led to decreased processing capacities, and a decreased use of 
persuasion knowiedge. 
Given the inverted U-shaped pattem of arousal, a slight increase in arousal however, 
is expected to lead to enhanced perfonnance on the to be perfonned task. In dual task 
studies it is typically found that increased arousalleads to a better perfonnance of the 
first (and most important) task, but to a decreased perfonnance on the second (and less 
important) task (see Eysenck, 1982). Easterbrook (1959) suggests that heightened 
arousal produces an attention narrowing process, restricting the range of cue 
utilization. Primary task cues are attended at the expense of secondary task cues. This 
attention narrowing process results from the fact that people try to deal with the 
capacity limitations that result from the increased levels of arousal. 
Pham (1996) proposes that the overall effect of arousal on persuasion is driven by two 
types of processes: (1) the selection effect, which increases the influence of cues 
perceived to be diagnostic, and (2) the representation effect, which dilutes the 
influence of cues that are capacity demanding. Pham moreover assumes that the 
selection effect usually preceded the representation effect. 
8.1.1. The selection effect of arousal 
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Pham (1996) suggests that aroused consumers first try to cope with their impaired 
capacity by selectively processing cues that are most diagnostic for the task at the 
expense of less diagnostic cues. This view is consistent with findings in the arousal 
and performance literature in that arousal induces an attention-narrowing process (e.g. 
Eysenck, 1982). According ~o Pham's "selective processing hypothesis", fust 
proposed by Easterbrook (1959), aroused consumers will first try to process those 
cues that have the highest information value at the expense of cues that have little 
information value. 
This hypothesis can account for perseverant findings that in dual task studies the 
performance on the secondary task declines under bigh arousal, whereas performance 
on the primary task is unaffected or improved. 
In three studies, Pham found evidence for tbis selection effect. When subjects are 
bighly aroused (by letting them perform some physical exercise), he found that 
subjects were still very weB able to discriminate the strong versus the weak arguments 
in an advertisement. This was only the case however, when tbis cue was diagnostic for 
subjects' evaluation process, making it relevant for participants' task. Subjects were 
presented with 3 different advertisements for dictionaries, with one of them the target 
ad. Two different kinds of cues were manipulated: endorser status (expert versus non 
expert) and argument strength. It was assumed that relying on endorser status when 
making an evaluation would require less cognitive resources than would 
discriminating the strong from the weak arguments. Another factor that was 
manipulated in Pham's studies was diagnosticity ofthe cue. When a cue is diagnostic, 
it delivers useful information for the persuasion process. In one condition for example, 
the target a d was embedded between 2 other ads, and argument strength was made 
diagnostic: the target ad differed from the fiBer ads in the sense that there was a 
difference in argument strength between (i.e. arguments were stronger) the target ad 
and the other ads. In another condition, endorser status was made diagnostic: the 
target ad differed from the others in that the status of the endorser was that of an 
expert instead of a non-expert (in the other conditions). Pham found that when arousal 
increased, participants based their evaluations on those cues that were the most 
diagnostic, independent whether processing of these cues required little or a lot 
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cognitive resources. That is, when argument strength was made diagnostic, 
participants were still able to discriminate the strong from the weak arguments. 
8.1.2. Tbe representation effect of arousal 
Even higher levels of arousal will result in additional impairment, even though only 
diagnostic cues are attended t~. High arousal has been found to result in lower levels 
of processing and a decreased elaboration of information (for an overview see 
Eysenck, 1982). 
In his representation hypothesis Pham (1996) therefore suggests that an additional 
effect of (increased) arousal is to dilute the influence of capacity-demanding cues such 
as complex product claims. This hypothesis is consistent with Sanbonmatsu and 
Kardes' (1988) finding that high arousal significantly reduced the effect of claim 
strength on subjects' subjective assessment of the product claims. In contrast, high 
aroused subjects could still discriminate between expert level of endorser status. As 
discussed before, the latter process requires no or little cognitive resources. 
In a next experiment, Pham increased arousal levels to higher levels, by adding 
presentation arousal to different conditions (participants were told that they would 
have to give a presentation afterwards). With this increased arousal, subjects were able 
to discriminate between endorser status (which was an effortless process), but not 
between the strong and the weak arguments, which is assumed to be a cognitive 
demanding task. This latter result supports the representation hypothesis. 
8.2.Expectations 
If we take into consideration both the selection and the representation effect of 
arousal, we can expect that a slight increase in arousal will heighten participants ' use 
of persuasion knowiedge. When an ulterior motive is made salient to our participants, 
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the ulterior motive can be seen as a relevant cue for the evaluation task. We can 
therefore expect that, according to Pham's selection effect, a slight increase in arousal 
will enlarge the influenee of diagnostic cues, also including the ulterior motive. 
Because the role of the ulterior motive increases, we can expect that participants win 
be even less persuaded eompared to eonditions of normal arousal: evaluations will be 
less positive. If we inerease arousal, we expect that arousal will become dysfunctional 
(as is predieted by Pham's representation effect and as is found in the previous two 
studies). As aresuit, our participants win have insufficient processing capacities 
available to apply their persuasion knowiedge, and win instead be more persuaded by 
the peripheral cues that are present in the "sales encounter". 
In order to investigate the effect of these different levels of arousal on consumers ' use 
of persuasion knowiedge, we use two different arousal manipulations, entered in a 2 
by 2 experimental design: music (as is done in the previous studies) and presentation 
fear (as is done by Pham, 1996). As a result, we obtain 3 different arousal eonditions: 
(I) low arousal (slow music and no presentation fear), (2) medium arousal (both (a) 
slow music and presentation fear and (b) fast musie and no presentation fear), and (3) 
high arousal (fast musie and presentation fear). It is important to note that in our 
previous studies, we also manipulated high arousal by playing a fast pieee of music. 
We found that this fast music worked dysfunctional. In the present study, we try to 
find a fast piece of music that increases arousal, but that is not as dysfunctional as the 
piece of musie in the previous studies (i.e. the arousal level must be significantly 
lower as the music pieces that were used before). 
We also used a different accessibility (salience) ofthe ulterior motive manipulation as 
in the previous studies. We manipulated salience of the ulterior motive by a 
purportedly unrelated task in a separate booklet, handed out prior to the actual 
evaluation task and in a different room as were the actual evaluation task was 
conducted. The booklet contained three newspaper articles, and was disguisted as a 
eomprehension task of newspaper articles (as was done by Campbell and Kirmani, 
2000, study 3). One of the newspaper articles was the ''target'' article. In the not 
primed condition, the target article was about imitation clothing. In the primed 
condition, the article was the same, but instead it described imitation electronic 
equipment. This article was expected to increase the accessibility of ulterior-
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persuasion motives because it discussed that the local police often finds a lot of 
imitation equipment in a certain town (Antwerp ), that is later on sold in local shops at 
a very low price. The actual evaluation task was about some cheap versus expensive 
digital cameras (see later). Many researchers that have used such a priming paradigm 
have shown that people's interpretation ofinformation often depends on the particular 
knowledge structures (e.g. concepts and schemas) that are currently active (e.g. 
Higgins & King, 1981; Wyer & SruIl, 1981; Yi, 1990). Hence, reading the newspaper 
article of imitation electronic equipment is thought to activate participants' mental 
schema associated with crime. As aresuit, they are expected to interpret subsequent 
information in the light of this activated knowiedge. The type of interpretation given 
seems to depend on which of the related concepts is most accessible at the time 
information is processed (Srull & Wyer, 1980). Priming effects have been mostly 
observed when product information is ambiguous (Ha & Hoch, 1989), as is the case 
when a very cheap digital camera is offered to you while no obvious reason is given. 
8.3. Participants, Design and Procedure 
131 Undergraduate students participated in this study. They were told that the study 
consisted of two parts: the first part concemed a "comprehension task" where they 
were asked to read three newspaper articles as comprehensive as possible. The second 
part (ostensible unrelated to the former part) was presented as a scenario-reading 
exercise: participants' task was to imagine the scenario they received as good as 
possible. Afterwards they would have to make a product evaluation as if they were the 
main character in the scenario. 
The design was a 2 (Salience of the Ulterior Motive: salient versus not salient) x 2 
(Presentation_Arousal: having to make a presentation versus not) x 2 (Music_Arousal: 
Low versus High arousal) full factorial between-subjects design. 
Subjects were given a scenario about a student that went on a holiday-trip. Before he 
left, he needed a digital camera to take along his trip. Because he needed the camera 
very urgent, he only had time to visit a local shop in his home town (Antwerp). The 
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salesperson in the shop offered him two cameras that differed not significantly in 
quality (as was evident from some objective features as weIl as from the advice ofthe 
salesperson). The brands were new and fictitious. One of the cameras was on 
considerable promotion. The student had to decide t hat d ay, s ince t his p romotional 
offer counted only until the present day. 
8.4.Independent Variables 
Salience of the Ulterior Motive was manipulated by letting subjects read a newspaper 
story about imitation electronic equipment that was found by the police in Antwerp. 
The newspaper article was considered as prime for the ulterior motive (as we 
discussed earlier). In the not salient condition the story was the same, but dealt with 
imitation clothing instead of imitation electronics. The other newspaper articles were 
used as filler articles, in order to disguise the real purpose of the study. We assumed 
that participants in the salient condition would infer that the promotional camera was, 
because of its very low price, an imitation of the real camera. This would make them 
more suspicious about buying the camera. 
Presentation _ Arousal was manipulated be telling our participants, after they read the 
newspaper articles, that there was a considerable chance that they would make a 
presentation about one ofthe articles (see also Pham, 1996). This presentation had to 
be made after the scenario-task (but was of course unrelated to reading the scenario). 
Hence, it can be assumed that there would be considerable more arousal during the 
scenario-evaluation task under conditions where subjects thought that they would have 
to give a presentation. Note that this manipulation did not affect comprehension of the 
newspaper articles in any way, since they were told about this presentation after they 
had read the articles. Hence, if we would find significant results as a result of 
presentation fear, these can not be ascribed to a better or a worse comprehension or 
elaboration of the newspaper artic1es. After the scenario task, subjects were told that 
there wasn't enough time left to give a presentation, so that this part of the study was 
skipped. 
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Presentation _ Music was manipulated by speeding up a sequence of three slow songs 
from St-Germain. In the low arousal condition we actually lowered tempo to 30 Beats 
per minute, while in the high arousal condition we fastened tempo to 200 Beats per 
minute. Result of a pretest show that both sequences differed significantly in arousal 
levels: t(171) = 8.34, p < .001. Note that we wanted this arousal manipulation to be 
less in intensity than the one on OUT first study: we wanted this music to elicit optimal 
arousal, and not arousal that leads to dysfunctional processing. Therefore we 
compared high arousal scores with high arousal scores of the music used in the first 
study. We found that this St. Germain high arousal manipulation was significantly less 
arousing than the high arousal music that we used earlier: t(85) = 3.40, p = .001. 
8.5.Dependent Variabie 
nependent variabie was participants' evaluation of the promoted camera. We used 7 
bipolar 9-point differential items, ranging from -3 to + 3: bad / good; undesirable / 
desirabie; useless / useful; worthless / valuable; imperfect / perfect; ineffective / 
effective; I hate it / 1 love it. These items were averaged for analysis (Cronbach alpha 
= 0.77). 
8.6.Results 
A 3-way ANOV A was performed on participants' evaluation scores. The results are 
shown in Table 4. Mean evaluation scores are shown in Figure 7a and 7b. Both the 
main effect of Arousal_Music, as the main effect of Arousal_Presentation reached 
significance. Faster music was associated with more positive evaluations (M = 1.67, 
sn = 0.36 versus M = 1.40, sn = 0.60; F(l, 123) = 7.52, P = 0.007), while greater fear 
to make a presentation was associated with less positive evaluations (M = 0.93, sn = 
0.59 versus M = 1.68, sn = 0.49 ; F(l, 123) = 9.62, P = 0.002). The main effect of 
Salience of the Ulterior Motive was near to significant (F(1,123) = 2.91, P = .09): 
Evaluations were slightly more positive when the ulterior motive was primed (and 
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salient) compared to when it was not primed (M = 1.61, SD = 0.56 versus M = 1.12, 
SD = 0.52). The interaction effect between Arousal m usic and arousal presentation 
was also near to significant (F(1,123) = 2.82, P = .09): compared to slow music, fast 
music lead to more positive evaluations when presentation fear was high (M = 1.60, 
SD = 0.60 versus M= 1.16, SD = 0.60), but not when presentation fear was low (M = 
1.73, SD = 0.62 versus M = 1.63, SD = 0.38). The interaction between 
arousalyresentation and salience was highly significant (F(1, 123) = 11.80, P < .001). 
This interaction effect is due to the fact that when presentation fear is high, 
evaluations are more positive when the ulterior motive is primed (and salient) 
compared to when this motive is not primed (M = 1.64, SD = 0.52 versus M = 1.12, 
SD = 0.66); and this effect is not significant when presentation fear is low (M = 1.60, 
SD = 0.60 versus M = 1.77, SD = 0.39). Specific planned comparisons that deal with 
this latter interaction effect are shown in Table 5. 
Table 4: 3-Way ANOVA results of Study 3 
Souree of Variation Sum of squares DF Mean Square F p< 
Arousal Music (Ar_Mus) 2.42 123 0.32 7.52 .007 
Arousal Presentation (Ar ]res) 3.09 123 0.32 9.62 .002 
Salienee (Sa) 0.94 123 0.32 2.91 .09 
Ar_Mus x Ar_Pres 0.91 123 0.32 2.82 .09 
Ar Mus x Sa O.ot 123 0.32 0.03 .86 
Ar_Pres x Sa 3.79 123 0.32 11.80 .0008 
Ar_Mus x Ar_Pres x Sa 0.02 123 0.32 0.07 .79 
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Figure 7a: Mean Evaluation Scores in the Low Arousal-Music Condition in Study 3 
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Figure 7b: Mean Evaluation Scores in the High Arousal-Music Condition in Study 3 
Table 5: PLanned Comparisons of Study 3: Salient versus Non-Salient Condition 
Arousal Music Arousal Presentation F(I,123) p< 
Low Low <1 > .50 
Low High 7.63 .006 
High Low <1 >.50 
High High 5.56 .01 
8.7.Discussion 
According to Pham's (1996) selection effect, we expected that medium aroused 
consumers would be less persuaded when they are confronted with a salient ulterior 
motive compared to when there was no ulterior motive present. Under medium 
arousal conditions, people have been found to cope with their impaired processing 
capacities by focusing on those cues that are most diagnostic for the evaluative task. 
Therefore, we expected, in both medium arousal conditions, evaluations on the 
promoted camera to be less positive in the salient ulterior motive condition compared 
to the not salient ulterior motive condition. For our "fast music, no presentation fear" 
medium arousal condition, our mean scores were somewhat in the expected direction, 
but we found no statistical support for this. For our "slow music, presentation fear" 
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medium arousal condition we found the opposite: evaluations were more positive 
when the ulterior motive was primed compared to when it was not primed. This latter 
finding is consistent with a representation effect explanation: higher levels of arousal 
impair cognitive capacity, and lead to a decreased usage of persuasion knowiedge. As 
aresuit, consumers will be more persuaded. 
Careful consideration of this latter finding makes this result seem not so strange after 
all. Having to give a presentation is far more arousing than listening to a fast piece of 
music, so it seems logic that our participants were actually"over-aroused", leading to 
a representation effect instead of the expected selection effect. So our medium (slow 
music, presentation fear) arousal condition turned out not so medium in arousal after 
all. Unfortunately, we did not perform a pretest nor a manipulation check of our 
presentation fear manipulation, so we do not have exact figures upon how severe the 
arousal induction actually was. 
Also, we did not find any significant difference between our low arousal (slow music, 
no presentation fear) and our medium arousal (fast music, no presentation fear) 
arousal conditions. For both conditions we expected that mean evaluation scores 
would be somewhat more negative when an ulterior motive was made salient 
compared t 0 w hen i t was not. Because slight increases in arousal were expected to 
narrow down attention to relevant evaluative dimensions, including the salient ulterior 
motive, we expected that this effect would be even stronger in the medium arousal 
condition. For neither conditions we found any significant difference between 
evaluation scores in the primed and the not primed ulterior motive condition. This 
null-effect is unexpected, and may indicate that our priming manipulation was not 
successful. However, since we did find a significant priming effect in our "slow 
music, presentation fear" medium arousal condition, and in our "fast music, 
presentation fear" high arousal condition, this possibility seems very unlikely. Another 
possibility for the absence of any effect is that we obtained ceiIing effects in both 
conditions: evaluations in both conditions were indeed very positive. 
A possibility that is somewhat related to this latter argumentation is that priming 
imitation-electronic equipment did not induce any suspicion at all, because we used 
fictitious brand names for the digital cameras. Indeed, it is probably less bad if you 
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buy imitation electronic equipment from a brand that you do not know, compared to 
when you buy an imitation "Sony" camera for example. Therefore it is possible that 
our subjects did make the inference that the camera probably was an imitation one, but 
they did not care because it was an unknown brand ("Picture" or "Close"). 
One could ascribe the lack of differenee between our low arousal (slow musie, no 
presentation fear) and medium arousal (fast music, no presentation fear) condition to 
an unsuccessful music manipulation. This would indeed be a logical conc1usion, since 
both conditions only differed in their music manipulation (slow versus fast 
manipulation). An unsuccessful music manipulation however seems very unlikely. 
First of all, in a pretest, we did obtain a significant difference in arousal between the 
fast and the slow music condition. Second, in conditions were subjects had to give a 
presentation, we did find a significant difference between our fast and slow piece of 
musie. Hence, the cause for this null-effect probably lies at a different level. One 
possibility is that subjects are always somewhat "optimally" aroused when they enter 
a laboratory setting: the setting is quite new for them, and they do not really know 
what to expect. Therefore, it seems more than likely that being in this kind of situation 
induces some state of arousal. So for follow-up research it would be interesting to try 
to induce real "low arousal", for example by letting participants perform arelaxation 
exercise prior to the experimental manipulations. 
Importantly, the results of our high arousal condition (fast music, presentation fear) 
were consistent with expectations: when arousal is severe, participants are less likely 
to apply their persuasion knowiedge, and more likely to be persuaded by peripheral 
persuasion cues. 0 ur r esults 0 f 0 ur medium (slow musie, presentation fear) arousal 
condition also pointed in this direction. When the uIterior motive was primed, subjects 
evaluated the promoted product more positive than when the ulterior motive was not 
primed. This finding is consistent with the results that were obtained in the previous 
two studies. The difference here is that there was no peripheral cue present while 
evaluating the target camera (such as the T-shirt while evaluating the lemonades in the 
prior two studies). The resuIts obtained in our high arousal condition more or less 
resembie a mere exposure effect: subjects who had already heard of electronic 
equipment (by reading the newspaper artic1e), although in a negative light, evaluated 
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digital cameras more positive. The mere exposure effect, where a simp Ie repetition of 
objects leads to a more positive evaluation of those objects (even when subjects are 
not aware of prior presentation) (see for example Zajonc, 1968), is usually observed 
under conditions were processing motivation is limited, or where cognitive resources 
are constrained (for a discussion see Petty, Unnava, & Strathman, 1991). 
In sum, the results obtained in our low or medium arousal conditions are not so 
straightforward as we expected. As we discussed earlier, one of the reasons could be 
that the ulterior motive that we provided to subjects (the camera is cheap because it is 
an imitation-made one) did not lead to real consumer suspicion. Further studies should 
take this plausible shortcoming into consideration. We also suspect that our low 
arousal manipulation did not really induce "Iow" arousal, but somewhat "optimai" 
arousal. It would be interesting to employ conditions where people wou1d be really 
relaxed (very low a rousal), a nd i nvestigate h ow a nd w hen these relaxed c onsumers 
would employ their persuasion knowiedge. hnportantly, our high arousal conditions 
did deliver the same results as our previous studies: when an ulterior motive is made 
salient, highly aroused participants seem to be more persuaded by the ulterior motive. 
We can again conclude that arousal seems to impair processing capacity, leading to a 
decreased use ofpersuasion knowledge and to decreased suspicion. 
9. General Discussion and Conclusions 
Our basic p roposition wast hat a n increase in consumers' arousal would result in a 
decreased use of persuasion knowledge when consumers are confronted with a 
persuasion attempt. As a result, we expected that when we confront our participants 
with a persuasion attempt, they would be more likely to accept the superficially 
diagnostic recommendation of a salesperson, and they would be less likely to reflect 
criticaion the underlying reasons for the advice. This assumption is based on the well-
established finding in the domain of psychology that high levels of arousal limit 
processing capacity (Easterbrook, 1959; Eysenck, 1982; Humphreys and Revelle, 
1984). Since use of persuasion knowledge is capacity demanding (Campbell and 
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Kirrnani, 2000), we inferred that increasing levels of arousal would lead to a 
decreased application ofuseful persuasion knowiedge. 
The results of OUT three studies are consistent with this proposition. In general, we 
showed that an increase in participants' state of activation resulted in an increased 
acceptance ofthe salespersons' advice, especially under conditions where we made 
the ulterior motive salient. 
In OUT first study we confronted OUT participants with a mixed persuasion attempt. OUT 
participants were b rought i n a n ambiguous persuasion s ituation: t hey were not SUTe 
whether the experimenter was part of the academic staff (and the advice could be 
considered as sincere), or from a market research institute (and the advice could be 
considered as misleading). In general, we found that when the experimenter wore a T-
shirt from the brand that she promoted, participants did not accept her advice (while 
they did follow the advice when she did not wear aT-shirt of the promoted brand). In 
the T-shirt condition, they believed that the experimenter tried to influence them. 
Interestingly, the opposite pattern was obtained when OUT participants were highly 
aroused: in this condition, wearing aT-shirt of the promoted brand had a beneficial 
effect on acceptance of the experimenters' advice. Under conditions of high arousal, 
the T-shirt served as a peripheral persuasion cue in OUT participants' evaluative 
process. The results of OUT second study replicated the findings of the first study, and 
moreover showed that the effect of arousal on consumers' application of persuasion 
knowledge is not confounded with consumers' mood state. Although the results of OUT 
third study were not as straithforward as those that we obtained in the previous 
studies, we again were able to show that an extensive increase in arousal lead to 
decreased suspicion and increased acceptance of superficial (and often misleading) 
recommendations. 
OUT results are consistent with dual-process theories of persuasion such as the 
elaboration likelihood model (ELM, e.g. Petty and Cacioppo, 1986) or the heuristic-
systematic model (Chaiken, 1980). These frameworks pose that as the amount of 
processing capacity available decreases, consumers are less able to diligently consider 
the attitudinal implications of the arguments presented in a persuasive message, and 
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subsequently they are more likely to process less complex information such as simp Ie 
peripheral cues. Examples of such peripheral cues that have been successfully 
investigated in the dual-process literature are: attractiveness of the source, expertise, 
message length, background music, ... (see for example Petty, Unnava, & Strathman, 
1991 for a review). Applied to our studies, one could easily consider our branded T-
shirt (Studies 1 and 2) and mere message repetition (Study 3, see our mere exposure 
discussion) as peripheral cues. According to dual-process theories, any variabie that 
affects the amount of cognitive capacity available for processing a persuasive message 
also i nfluences t he I ikelihood 0 f c onsumers' e laborating u pon t he message. S everal 
motivational variables, such as involvement (Batra & Ray, 1986; Park & Young, 
1986; Petty, Cacioppo, & Schumann, 1983; Swasy & Munch, 1985; Yalch & Elmore-
Yalch, 1984) and need for cognition (Cacioppo et al., 1986), and several ability-
related variables, such as message repetition (Batra and Ray, 1986; Cacioppo and 
Petty, 1985), time compression (Moore, Hausknecht, & Thamodaran, 1986) and 
distraction (petty, Wells, & Brock, 1976) have been f ound tom oderate e laboration 
likelihood. Sanbonmatsu and Kardes (1988) moreover carefully showed that 
physiological arousal is another variabie that influences consumers' ability to 
elaborate upon a persuasive message: When the resources available for cognitive 
elaboration are reduced, consumers focus on less complex information that requires 
relatively little cognitive processing capacity (the nice T-shirt in the frrst two studies, 
or the mere exposure to a related topic in our last study). Our studies indeed showed 
that increased arousal leads to more positive product evaluations under conditions 
were our participants had the opportunity to attend to peripheral persuasion cues, as 
when our ulterior motive was made salient. 
10.Practical Implications 
It should be noted that our manipulation of arousal is ecologically common in retail 
settings, and has effects that are desirabie form a marketer point ofview. In-store 
musie for example can be easily adapted to the specific sales motivation. Further 
research should also attempt to generalize the effect to other types of arousal inducing 
circumstance that are manageable by marketers (store design, crowdedness, ... ), and 
196 
Affective Persuasive Communication: 
Multiple Roles of Affect in Persuading the Consumer 
to other persuasion tactics (praise, friendliness, calling the customer by name, physical 
attractiveness, ... ). 
From a welfare perspective our results may induce some pessimism about consumer 
vulnerability. Our results show that consumers are often not able to resist or ignore an 
even blatant persuasion attempt. We are weIl aware from the fact that, from an ethical 
perspective, our findings have far going implications with regard to consumer 
exploitation. However, our results also show that "optimal arousal" is the best way to 
resist blatant and misleading persuasion attempt. We believe that this information is 
useful for governmental policy-makers, for if one wants to protect the consumer and / 
or if one wants to start up a govemmental campaign. 
11. Suggestions for further research 
Note that in neither of our studies we found evidence for real discounting behavior. 
That is, our participants always followed the advice of the experimenter (even though 
in a number conditions not statistically significant). We never found that the not 
promoted brand was evaluated as more positive than the promoted brand. A 
straightforward conclusion would be that "giving advice never hurts". From a 
practical viewpoint, this would be a very interesting finding. Further research is 
needed to look into thls. 
One explanation for the above finding is that our persuasion attempt was never overtly 
misleading: we always used somewhat ambiguous persuasion stimuli. One suggestion 
for follow up research would be to use an overtly misleading persuasion attempt. We 
could for example induce a stronger difference in tastes between the lemonades, and 
always promote the brand that tastes worse. If people would really make honest 
evaluations (without attending to peripheral stimuli and the like), they would evaluate 
the not promoted brand better than the promoted brand: They would make an 
evaluation that goes against the one of the experimenter. When arousal is high 
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however, consumers are less likely to use their persuasion knowiedge, and as aresuit, 
more likely to follow the misleading advice of the experimenter. S uch a follow-up 
experiment is expected to result in much stronger effects as those that we obtained in 
our first two lemonade studies. 
Another possible explanation for the fact that we never found real discounting 
behavior could be that subjects really had nothing to loose if they went along with the 
experimenters ' a dvice. T his c ould h ave i nduced s ome kind of demand effects: they 
just went along with the experimenter. Things would perhaps be different if people 
could really loose a lot of money if they made the wrong choice. A study that involves 
some kind of risk would perhaps deliver more extreme results, or even some real 
discounting behaviors. 
Another interesting line of research is the difference between intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation of our participants. By letting our participants listen to fast pieces of music 
we induced extrinsic motivation. That is, the source ofthe arousal was never related to 
the sales encounter. It would be interesting to see whether or not the same results (or 
maybe more extreme results) could be obtained ifpeople are intrinsically aroused (for 
example induced by the message ofthe salesperson). 
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1. Recapitulation 
The present dissertation broadly looked at the effects of feelings on the consumers' 
persuasion process. More specificaIly, consumers' feelings were approached fiom 
their two-dimensional perspective (RusselI, 1997; Watson & Tellegen, 1985), 
composed of a valence dimension (positive versus negative) and an arousal dimension 
(from drowsiness to extreme wakefulness). 
Inspired by dual-process theories of persuasion (Petty & C acioppo, 1 986; C haiken, 
1980, Forgas, 1995), we investigated the multiple role of affect in consumers' 
persuasion process. We aimed to 1) provide further evidence for the multiple role of 
affect in the persuasion domain, 2) extend the (primarly psychological) findings to the 
domain of consumer behavior and advertising and 3) apply the acquired knowledge to 
consumer behavior related contructs. 
In a first research paper (Chapter 2), we investigated the moderating role of affect in 
an advertising context. More specificaIly, we looked at the effects of affect on the way 
that people process the information in an ad in a self-referent manner (i.e. the way 
they process self-relevant information). We found that both ad elicited affect as weIl 
as ad recipients' mood had a significant influence on the way that people process ad 
information. Our results moreover indicate that negative mood acted as a motivator to 
process, such that under conditions of negative mood self-reference prompts could be 
picked up and used in consumers' evaluation process. Using mood as a processing 
motivator, we were also able to show that the process of self-referencing, usually 
found to have salutary effects on both information processing and evaluation, is an 
active, data d riven b ottom-up p rocess, t hat i s I ikely t 0 0 ccur 0 nly w hen consumers 
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have sufticient processing motivation available to process the information in a self-
referent manner. If processing motivation is lacking, self-reference effects are not 
picked up, and will have no or little beneficial effects. 
The second research paper (Chapter 3) discussed the dual-role of affect in the context 
of ambient odors. We presented our participants an ad of grapefruit juice that either 
smelled like grapefruit, smelled like lavender, or did not smell at all. Both lavender 
and grapefruit were found to elicit positive affective feelings. The results obtained 
from this study showed that when participants' Need for Cognitio~ was low (and their 
processing motivation was also expected to be low), both the congruent (grapefruit) as 
wen as the incongruent (lavender) scents resulted in more positive product evaluations 
compared to a condition were no scent was presented (neutral condition). However, 
when participants' Need for Cognition was high (and their processing motivation was 
also expected to be high), we found only enhanced evaluation effects when the 
surrounding odor was congruent with the advertisement. These results are congruent 
with dual-process modeis: when processing motivation is low, consumers are not very 
likely toe ngage i nat houghtful e laboration 0 ft he p resented message, and will not 
notice (or mind?) the incongruency of the scent with the product category. When 
consumers are not very motivated to process, they will take their currently feIt affect 
as informative for the judgment to be made. In contrast, when processing motivation 
is high, consumers will notice the incongruency with the product category, either 
because (un)related constructs are activated or because consumers think more 
elaborately about the message because of increased processing motivation. These 
findings have far reaching practical implications (as will be discussed later in this 
chapter). 
In Chapter 4 we investigated the influence of affective stimuli and moods on the 
evaluation of product categories and services that are associated with negative 
feelings a nd b eliefs. We h ereby i nvestigated t he impact 0 f p ositive versus negative 
feelings on the evaluation of a blood donation advocacy, on the use of a new brand of 
condoms, and - very topical - on the evaluation of a new meat quality label. Other 
examples of negatively valenced product categories or services are life insurances, 
genetically manipulated food, nuc1ear transportation and nuclear power, drugs, charity 
organizations, .... The results of four studies suggest multiple roies for affect. Under 
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conditions of low processing motivation, we consistently found that evaluations were 
more positive when affect was positive compared to when affect was negative. When 
processing motivation was high, our results were not so straightforward. In most 
cases, we surprisingly did not find any difference between positive and negative 
affect. Further inspection of our data, and follow-up research however indicated that 
there were two evaluative mechanisms at play: one for positive affect, and the other 
for negative affect. When affect was positive, our results suggest that positive affect 
influenced evaluations by activating positively related material in memory. When 
affect was negative we argued that negative affect motivated people even more to 
think about the advocated message, such that evaluations became also more positive 
when mood was negative. These results are consistent with a multiple process view of 
affect on persuasion, and extend current insights into the process. 
In our last series of studies (Chapter 5) we investigated the role of affect on the way 
that consumers deal with (un)suspicious persuasion attempts. Based on a model that 
was originally formulated by Friestad and Wright (1994) we investigated the 
influence of affect on the way that consumers try to discount influenee salespeople's 
persuasion attempts that could raise suspicion. According to Friestad and Wright, 
people cope with persuasion attempts by applying their "persuasion knowiedge" (i.e. 
acquired knowledge that contains information about persuasion attempts, ways to deal 
with these attempts, the appropriateness of these attempts etc.) Contrary to the prior 
studies, we focused mainly on the effects of arousal instead of affective valence. 
While affective valenee can influence people's processing motivation (as found for 
example in our first series of studies discussed in Chapter 2) we assumed that arousal 
would influence people's processing ability. More specifically, we assumed that 
higher levels of arousal would impair people's processing capacity (see also for 
example Sanbonmatsu & Kardes, 1988), such that they are less able to applytheir 
persuasion knowIedge. In three studies we indeed showed that when arousal is high 
(i.e. when processing ability is 10w), consumers are less likely to apply theÏr 
persuasion knowIedge, and will instead be more likely to succumb to even blatant 
persuasion tactics. We also found that higher arousal led to a much larger persuasive 
impact of persuasive message cues, such as the presence of promotional material, or 
the mere prior exposure to a product or a topic. 
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2. Conceptual Framework: More Evidence for the Multiple Roles of 
Affect 
Our main purpose was to explore the multiple roles of affect in a consumer behavior-
related and an advertising context. Based on the literature we argued that the influence 
of affect on the consumers' persuasion process could be threefold: 1) affect may be a 
motivator to process, 2) affect may be a peripheral cue, 3) affect may color 
consumers' thoughts while they process message arguments. In our studies, we found 
evidence for these three different roles, depending on consumers' motivation or 
ability to process information. We wiIl briefly recapitulate these different roles of 
affect and discuss our findings in the light of the multiple role of affect on consumers' 
persuasion process. 
2.I.Affect as a motivator to process 
2.1.1. Motivation ... 
It is well documented in the literature (see for example Petty, Unnava, and Strathman, 
1991) that while people in neutra! or negative moods are persuaded by strong but not 
by w eak a rguments, p eople i nag ood m ood seem to be equally persuaded by both 
kind of arguments. These findings indicate that mood has a motivational impact on 
people's persuasion process. According to this motivational view ofmood (see for 
example Isen, 1984; 1987), most people seem to act to maintain their subjective 
feelings of well-being. Since extensive thinking usually leads to increased feelings of 
distress (Janis & Mann, 1979), message recipients in a positive mood might be 
motivated to avoid further processing in order to maintain their mood (see also Isen, 
Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982). According to this mood-maintenance view, people 
in a positive mood suffer motivational deficits: they are ab Ie to process the 
information in a detailed manner, but they don't want to invest effort in it. 
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Evidence for this motivational view of affect was found in our first series of studies 
(Chapter2), concerning self-referencing. We found that under conditions where people 
are not very likely to process systematically, and non-salient cues are not very likely 
to be picked up by ad recipients, negative mood can enhance attention to and / or 
processing of non-salient cues, such as the self-reference prompts. That is, when our 
participants were not very motivated, we only found self-reference effects under 
conditions of negative mood, suggesting that under positive mood processing 
motivation was too low to pick up or to use self-reference prompts in making a 
product evaluation. 
We also found evidence for increased processing motivation in our forth chapter (that 
investigated the effects of consumers' feit affect when evaluating a product or service 
that calls for negative beliefs or feelings). When our participants were highly 
motivated to process (because oftask instructions or because the ad was informational 
in nature), we found that negative affect induced increased processing motivation. 
AIso, because participants elaborated more on the advocated position (associated with 
a negative valenced construct), they started to see "the positive out of it". That is, in 
some instances (e.g. see our 3rd study) negative affect lead to more positive 
evaluations compared to positive affece. Take our meat study as an example: after the 
recent meat crises, people had a very negative attitude towards meat (as indicated for 
example by decreased sales figures). When presented with a new meat label, negative 
mood participants (who were sufficiently motivated to process) had more positive 
attitudes toward the quality label compared to positive mood participants. These 
results can be explained by the fact that negative mood resulted in increased 
processing of message arguments, resulting in more positive evaluations. After all, 
thinking hard about a new quality label for meat makes one naturally conclude that 
the label has a number of advantages. 
Note however that our motivation results of our Chapter 2 (self-referencing) and our 
Chapter 4 (negative schemata) do not seem to be very consistent at first sight. In our 
I Note however that in most cases we did not find an objective difference between evaluations in our 
positive and negative affect condition when processing motivation was high. Based on a comparison 
with the low processing motivation conditions we must conc1ude that there is a dual effect of affect on 
evaluations when processing motivation is high, one for each affect condition. That is, affect priming 
(to be discussed somewhere later in this chapter) when affect is positive, and increased processing 
motivation when affect is negative. 
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self-referencing study we found enhanced motivation effects (as aresult ofnegative 
affect) when consumers' processing motivation was low. In contrast, we found this 
motivational effect in our forth study when processing motivation was high. We argue 
that further research is needed to clarif)r this possible inconsistency. One possibility is 
that increased elaboration takes place in both high AND low processing motivation 
conditions, but is not always recognized as such. For example, under conditions of 
high processing motivation and negative affect ánd dealing with positive to neutral 
valenced product categories (as is usually the case in consumer behavior research) 
increased motivation may lead to increased production of counterarguments, resuIting 
in less positive evaluations. In contrast, as we found in our forth chapter, dealing with 
high processing motivation, negative affect ánd NEGATIVE valenced product 
categories lead to increased recognition 0 f s upporting arguments, r esulting in more 
positive evaluations. In both instances there is an increased processing motivation, but 
tbis is only evident in evaluations when the product category is negatively valenced. 
Partly consistent with this assumption is that it is shown in the persuasion literature 
that negative affect leads to an increase in message scrutiny. Since people put more 
effort into this careful consideration of message arguments, the likelihood increases 
that counterarguments are formulated, and that evaluations become more negative 
(see Batra and Stayman, 1990). 
2.1.2 . ... but also Ability 
While we showed that affective valence influenced people's processing motivation, 
the results of our final research paper (Chapter 5) indicate that arousal (i.e. the second 
dimension of an emotion, orthogonal to affective valence) can influence consumers' 
processing ability. Note that both motivation ánd ability affects people's likelihood to 
elaborate on a message advocacy (see for example Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). One of 
the important distinctions is that while decreased processing motivation still enables 
people to scrutinize on a message (but they just don't want to), a decreased ability is 
more structural in nature. Decreased ability is most often the result of impaired 
cognitive resources (as one has to remember or attend to too much information for 
example). Researchers have suggested that increased levels of arousal impaired 
210 
Affective Persuasive Connnunication: 
Multiple Roles of Affect in Persuading the Consurner 
available cognitive resources (e.g. Sanbonmatsu and Kardes, 1988). When we made 
our participants feel more aroused, either by exposing them to fast, arousing music, or 
by inducing presentation fear, they were less able to discount our experimenters' 
suspicious persuasion attempt. Instead, they were more likely to revert to peripheral 
and less taxing information processing techniques. That is, when our consumers were 
more aroused, they were more likely to be persuaded by peripheral message cues. 
2.2.Affect as Peripheral Cue 
When people are not very motivated to process, they sometimes may take their 
current feelings as information for their judgment (e.g. Schwarz & Clore, 1983). Tbis 
heuristic has been labelled in the literature as the "How do I feel about it heuristic?". 
Tbis mechanism is thought to have a direct effect on consumers evaluations, hence 
without i nfluencing a ssociated thoughts (Petty, Cacioppo, Richman, and Strathman, 
1993). According to Clore, Schwarz and Conway (1994) people use their affect as 
information when they, amongst others, 1) lack motivation to process the presented 
message on a systematic way (low processing motivation), 2) when the information is 
complex (low processing ability) and / or 3) when there are time constraints (low 
processing opportunity). In this dissertation, we found extensive evidence for affect 
being a peripheral cue. 
First, in our ambient odor study (Chapter 3), we found that when need for cognition of 
our participants was low, implying that processing motivation was also expected to be 
low, the semantic content ofthe odor (lavender versus grapefruit) did not matter when 
making an evaluation about the advertized product. Because both odors elicited 
pleasant feelings, both odors colored evaluations more positive compared to a control 
condition were no odor was presented together the ad. So it seemed that under low 
processing motivation conditions our participants employed an "I feel good so the 
product must be good" heuristic. 
In our next series of studies (Chapter 4), that dealt with the effect of affect the 
evaluation of product / services that are associated with negative beliefs, the 
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peripheral influence of affect was again illustrated. In our four studies, we 
consistently found evidence for the fact that, under low processing motivation, 
participants relied on their feelings when making an evaluation. That is, despite the 
fact that they felt somewhat negative about the advertised product categories and 
services, and despite the fact that this positive affect was in contradiction with their 
negative affect, they consistently evaluated the products and ads more positive when 
they were i nap ositive m ood, 0 rw hen the ad elicited positive affect (compared to 
when they were in a negative mood, or when the ad elicited negative affect). Again it 
seemed that if motivation to process was low (either because of task instruction or 
because the ad was emotional in nature), participants seemed to make positive 
evaluations "because they just happened to feel good". 
2.3.Affect and Colored Information Processing 
According to memory-based models (e.g. Bower, 1981), a spread of activation is 
expected towards similarly valenced constructs. Since positive memories are highly 
interconnected (e.g. Isen, 1987), positive mood will prime and activate more related 
and many unrelated positive memories, leading to 1) colored evaluations and 2) 
cognitive capacity constraints. According to affect priming, people suffer from 
capacity constraints because too much positive material is activated, resulting in a 
capacity 0 verload. Petty et al. (1993) and later also Forgas (1995) argue that affect 
priming moreover leads to the fact that the thoughts that one has while exposed to a 
message are also influenced by the felt affect. Moreover, affect priming is likely to 
occur under conditions ofhigh processing motivation (petty et al., 1993). 
Consistent with the affect priming hypothesis, we found that under conditions of high 
processing motivation, participants were sensitive to the semantics (hence memory 
traces) associated with a given odor (Chapter 3). This means that they noticed the 
difference in meaning between the odor of lavender and grapefruit, and were only 
influenced by that odor that was associated with the to-be-evaluated product category. 
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We moreover found that when people were highly motivated to process, their 
evaluations were significantly affected by their thoughts, which were, in turn 
significantly influenced by participants' feIt affect. This means that affect indirectly 
influenced our participants' evaluation by coloring the thoughts they had while they 
were exposed to the ad. 
3. Practical Implications 
3.1.Affect in Practice: Some General Remarks 
We successfully used a variety of affective stimuli throughout this dissertation. We 
manipulated affective valence of ads in a variety of ways: we used different kinds of 
emotionally laden pictures (see Chapters 2 and 3), we manipulated the emotional 
valence of headlines (e.g. riding a bike in the woods versus being stuck in traffic jam, 
see Chapter 2), we manipulated the emotional content of message argurnents (see 
Chapter 4), we used pleasant odors surrounding an ad (see Chapter 3), we used music 
to make participants' more or less activated (see Chapter 5) and we manipulated our 
participants' mood state (see Chapters 2, 4 and 5). 
Consistent with the academic literature, we found this variety of affective stimuli to 
have q uite s imilar effects 0 n c onsumers' e valuation. T hat is, w ith s ome exceptions 
(see for example Chapter 4), mostly affect-congruent evaluations were found. We 
believe in the applicability of these diverse stimuli in both an advertizing as well as in 
a retail setting. Pleasant and/or activating music for example can be used in a retail 
setting to attract consumers to a given promotional aisie, or can be used in a television 
commercial to establish positive associations with the brand or product category. At 
the same time, ambient odor can be easily applied in a retail shop (some firms are 
experimenting with the production of technical devices to vaporize in the retail 
environment), affecting consumers evaluation of the shopping environment, or 
specific products / brands in the supermarket. Although the application 0 f ambient 
odors in an advertising context is somewhat more difficult, they are successfully 
applied in some campaigns. The state ofUtah for example, used floral scenting ads to 
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in a tourism campaign. A car manufacturer ran an ad campaign using leader scented 
strips. In the field of e-marketing, some technological innovations with regard to scent 
distributors (to be attached to a personal computer) can be particular interesting for 
advertisers and marketers. The same is true for emotional pictures and word use: they 
can all be easily applied in both an advertisement as wen as a retail setting. 
While the former stimuli can be easily manipulated by marketers, things are 
somewhat different for consumers' moods states. The least one can say is that it will 
be kind of strange, if feasible at all, to manipulate consumers' or prospects' mood 
state before they are exposed to a persuasion attempt (at least not in the way that we 
have manipulated consumers' mood, see below). Presumably, you will not make a 
very good impression if you would ask your consumers to write a story about a happy 
ora sadlifeeventwhentheyentera shop. People will be astonished. We want to 
point out that we especially used this kind of manipulation to make our participants' 
mood states somewhat more extreme in order to find more extreme effects. In reallife 
however, people are always in some kind of mood state, and it can be especially 
relevant for marketers if they know upfront in what kind of mood state their 
consumers or ad recipients are in. There are a number of situations in which one can 
easily predict ones' mood state. After a soccer game for instance, you can easily 
assume that the supporters ofthe winning team are in a good mood, while those ofthe 
loosing team are in a bad mood. It may be evident from .our results that this will have 
major implications ifyou were, for example, a beer manufacturer that advertises at the 
end of the game. At the same time one can also assume that, especially when it is an 
important game, supporters of both teams will be more or less aroused at the 
beginning of the game, since they are eager to know whether or not their team will 
win or not. AIso, after viewing a tear jerker, your ad recipients will be in a bad mood, 
while after viewing a comedy, they will be in a good mood. Or imagine that you are 
watching a thriller or a horror movie, and just before the climax (Freddy Krueger is 
just about to make his fifth victim) the movie is interrupted for the commercial breaks. 
No doubt that you will still feel somewhat aroused while exposed to the commercials. 
Hence, the results of the present series of studies highlight the importance of ad 
placement. On the other hand however, and this may especially apply to a retail 
setting, one cán influence consumers' mood state by making the shopping atmosphere 
more firn or exciting by playing appropriate musÏc and / or by manipulating the colors 
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in the environment. For kids for example one can hire a funny clown, or foresee in a 
little children's fair to enhance children's ánd parents' mood state. 
3.2.Multiple Role of Affect: Implications and Guidelines 
The main purpose of this dissertation was to provide evidence for the multiple role of 
affect in a persuasion context. As may be evident from our discussion, we succeeded 
in this purpose. This finding has far going practical implications. 
First, negative affect has been found to be able to motivate people to process. This can 
have beneficial effects when one for example wants to make ad recipients responsive 
to non salient ad cues (such as our self-reference cues in Chapter 2), or if one wants to 
stimulate additional message scrutiny. 
AIso, we found that high arousal limits processing ability, making people less likely 
to elaborate on difficult message arguments. Instead, when highly aroused, people 
seem to attend more to peripheral message cues, such as promotional material 
provided or wom by salespeople, celebrity endorsers used in ads, number of 
arguments given, affect in the ad, music played in the shop, colors used in the retail 
environment, etc. Moreover, high arousal seems to prevent people from using their 
persuasion knowiedge, resulting in less suspicion and scepticism towards persuasion 
attempts. 
AIso, if processing motivation or ability is low, consumers seem to use their current 
feelings as informative for the judgment to be made. This is a quite important finding, 
since a 1 ot 0 f persuasion a ttempts t ake p lace u nder conditions 0 flow i nvolvement. 
When people are exposed to television commercials, they often do not really pay 
attention, and their minds most 0 ften wander a way f rom w hat i s h apperung 0 n t he 
screen. The same is actually true for print advertising: when reading a magazine, 
people are most often not interested at all in the displayed ads. We showed that under 
such instances of low processing motivation, people use their mood states or the affect 
in the ad as informative when making an evaluation. Hence, affect can be seen as a 
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useful peripheral persuasion cue. Note that all tbis will happen without affecting 
people's thoughts: that is, what p eople are really thinking (if they have ad-relevant 
thoughts at all) is not influenced by the affect in the ad. 
fu contrast, when people are motivated to process the information, the affect that they 
experience will color the thoughts that they have. That is, when exposed to a 
persuasion attempt, people in a positive mood will actually have more favorable 
thoughts when processing the message, and will approach the message arguments 
from a more positive view. Important here is, that since thoughts and beliefs are 
affected, it is important that the associated beliefs are consistent with the advertised 
product or service category. fu our ambient odor study for example (see Chapter 3), 
affect of the odor did not have any effect when the semantics of the affect were 
inconsistent with the product category (i.e. when the grapefruit ad smelled like 
lavender). When one uses for example an informational ad (i.e. increasing motivation 
to process the messages), one should use emotional arguments that are in accordance 
with the product category: for instance, don't talk about wbite sunny beaches when 
advertising for a new sports car, since these are quite unrelated to cars. Hence, 
especially when processing motivation is high, marketers should take into account the 
meaning of the affective stimuli, and use only those stimuli that are relevant for the 
campaign. 
It will be clear from the above argumentation that it is important for marketers to 
know whether or not processing motivation and ability is low or impaired. It is behind 
the scope of the present dissertation to provide in a full overview of different factors 
that can influence processing motivation and / or ability, but in the remainder of this 
paragraph we will shortly discuss some of these. High processing motivation can for 
example be the result of high personal relevanee (resulting in increased personal 
involvement), as cosmetics being often more personally relevant for women than for 
men. When you watch an ad of personal computers, you will surely experience 
different levels of processing motivation when you are about to buy a new personal 
computer, versus when you are not planning to buy one at all. More easy to 
manipulate by marketers is situational involvement, which also leads to increased 
processing motivation. fucreasing situational involvement, for example by pointing at 
social pressures, by introducing a sales promotion, or by increasing the exclusivity of 
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a certain brand, will make people more attentive to the (affective) campaign. In 
addition, when people carry personal responsibility for their purchases (as when they 
are accountable for their purchases) they will also be more motivated to process. 
Processing motivation can also be the result of individual difference variables such as 
people's need for cognition. People with a high need lor cognition have been found to 
enjoy scrutinizing on message arguments. People's need for cognition can be easily 
determined using standardized questionnaires. In that sense, certain groups can be 
identified that score high or low on need for cognition. People with a relative high 
need for cognition are for example university students, engineers, college professors, 
high educated staff members, .... Processing ability on its turn is usually associated 
with the degree of cognitive resources one has available. The availability of cognitive 
resources on its turn is also dependent upon a variety of factors. One of it is the 
number of simu/taneous tasks one is performing. The larger the number of tasks, the 
lower the available capacity. For example, while driving a car, one is less likely to 
carefully process the advertisements that are presented across the road. lndividual 
difference variables are another factor influencing people's processing capacity. 
Older people usually have less processing capacity available compared to young 
people. This surely has a lot of implications when marketing to seniors. 
3.3.Specific Contributions 
A number of more specific practical contributions can be derived from our different 
studies. In the next four sections we will shortly recapitulate these different 
contributions. 
3.3.1. Affect and Self-Referencing 
Consumers are often not able or not willing to pay attention to ads or non-salient ad 
attributes. We found that urging consumers to relate the presented information to 
aspects of their self-concept is one technique to enhance message processing. Making 
the information in t he ad s elf-relevant (by u sing t extual s elf-referencing t echniques 
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such as second person wording), or putting the ad recipient in the position ofthe scene 
actor (i.e. visual self-referencing) has beneficial effects on both the recall of 
infonnation, as well as on product evaluations. 
We moreover showed that these self-reference prompts are most likely to be picked 
up by ad recipients when they are sufficiently motivated to process. When people are 
not very likely to process the ad content, they do not recognize or process the self-
reference prompts in much detail, such that referring to people's self-concept will 
have no or 1 ittle p ersuasive effect. I mportantly, we f ound t hat n egative affect ( as a 
processing motivator) can in such cases elevate attention to self-referencing prompts. 
Hence, advertisers that are experiencing very low processing efforts (for example as a 
result of advertising c1utter) can increase the likelihood of message scrutiny by 1) 
increasing ad recipients' processing motivation by taking a negative approach (for 
example by pointing at the dangers of not buying your product / service) and 2) use a 
self-referencing perspective. 
In addition, once you can assume that people are likely to pick up and process the 
self-reference cues, it is important to take in consideration that self-referencing is an 
active bottom-up process, and that it is driven by the data in the ad. That is, self-
referencing is likely to induce increased message scrutiny and especially makes 
people attentive to new product infonnation. This is of high relevance if one wants to 
promote new product features or new product benefits. Hence, under conditions where 
self-reference will occur, new infonnation is more likely to be processed. Since we 
did not find any support for self-referencing being a schema-based process, it is not a 
good tooI to use when one wants people to rely on past experience or on 
autobiographical memories. 
3.3.2. Ambient Odor in a Marketing Context 
We f ound 0 dor tob e a very e ffective stimulus in coloring c onsumers' e valuations. 
Pleasant odor (such as lavender or grapefruit) resulted in positive evaluations. This 
does not mean however that odor will have beneficial effects in all situations. When 
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consumers' are likely to be motivated to process the information, they will link the 
semantic content (such as it may be derived out of autobiographical memories) with 
the product category. When the semantics of the odor do not match with the product 
category, ambient odor will have no or little beneficial effect on consumers' product 
evaluations. One such application can be when consumers are at a car dealership to 
look at a new car (where theyare expected to be very motivated to process car-related 
information). In this case vaporizing a pleasant floral scent in the show room will 
probably have no or little effect on evaluations of the cars of the dealership per se. 
Instead, a car related scent (for example the scent of leather) is more likely to 
influence consumers' evaluations. 
In our study, we investigated ambient odor in an advertisement situation. This may 
have some complications in reallife: ifyou include a nice smelling ad in magazine for 
example, the complete magazine is very likely to adopt the scent. This means that all 
other advertisements will smell alike, and people will not make the specific link 
towards your ad, which may temper the effect. In addition, other advertisers may have 
objections to the use of ambient odors (how would you feel i fyou promoted your 
bacon in a magazine smelling like flowers?). Creatives Can be very helpfui in finding 
a way to circumvent this disadvantage. It is probably much easier however to use 
ambient odor in a retail environment, were you can use aspecific odor in every 
specific department. At the moment, special devices are being developed in order to 
distribute the specific amount of odor in retail settings. 
3.3.3. Negative Product I Service Categories 
When advertisers or marketers have to deal with products or services that have 
negative associations (such as life insurances, meat labels, blood donation, genetically 
manipulated food, ... ) affect can have a different number of effects on product 
evaluations, again depending on consumers' processing strategy. 
Under conditions where people are not very likely to motivate extensive on the 
information given (such as when personal relevance is low and / or the ad is emotional 
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in nature rather than infonnational) we consistently found that positive affect resulted 
in more positive evaluations. Hence, under conditions of low processing motivation 
we advice practitioners to use positive rather than neutral or negative affect in the ad. 
When processing motivation and ability is sufficiently high, a different pattem 
appeared. Here we found beneficial effects when affect was both positive AND 
negative, although we assumed the explanatory mechanisms to be somewhat different. 
When affect is positive, positive material is assumed to be activated from memory, 
resulting in more positive evaluations. When affect is negative, we assumed that 
negative affect motivates people even more to process, resulting in increased 
recognition of supporting arguments, and as a consequence, in more positive 
evaluations. The latter assumption was only supported when people had the 
opportunity to process the message arguments (i.e. the effect was not found when a 
complete visual ad was used). This theorizing imp lies that marketers have to consider 
a) that the product category is not extremely negative when positive affect is u sed 
(because otherwise there simply will not by positive constructs to spread to) and b) 
strong and persuasive arguments are used when one deals with negative affect. 
3.3.4. When Consumers Apply their Pers ua sion Knowledge 
The results of our fifth chapter show that consumers are often not able to resist or 
ignore an even blatant persuasion attempt, especially when arousallevels are high. 
We are well aware of the fact that, from an ethical point of view, our findings have 
important implications with regard to the welfare ofthe consumer. 
It is certainly not our aim to stimulate any further consumer exploitation. We would 
like to argue that our findings are important for policy-makers to take into account, 
and to guide consumers' welfare. In addition, our results also indicate that "optimal 
arousal" is the best way to resist blatant and misleading persuasion attempts. This may 
be especially useful for govemmental policy-makers, when they want to protect the 
consumers and / or in making people more responsive and attentive to govemmental 
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campaigns. Also marketers may use optimal arousal levels to increase message 
scrutiny. 
4. Shortcomings of the Research and Directions for Further 
Research 
In the present series of studies we approached emotions from their two dimensional 
constitution (affective valence and arousal). It may be very interesting in follow-up 
research to take into account the role of specific emotions. The approach we have 
taken in the present series of studies was that emotions that are similar with regard to 
the level of arousal they elicit and their affective valence are expected to have similar 
persuasive effects. This actually means that fear and anger, both high in arousal and 
negative in affective valence, would have rather similar effects. Plutchik (1980) 
however, who advocates a more motivational view of emotions (in terms of approach 
and avoidance), found anger and fear to be polar opposites: anger is more associated 
with approach behavior, while fear is more associated with avoidance behavior. In a 
related vein, and more r ecently, R aghunathan and P ham (1999) found both anxiety 
and fear (both negative emotions) to have different effects on consumers' decision 
making process. Further research should take into account the more specific nature of 
emotions. 
We mostly concentrated on the evaluative effects of emotions. However, based on the 
literature we can also assume more behavioural effects of affective cues as a function 
of their multiple role in the persuasion process. In our fifth study we found in part 
evidence for the behavioural implications of arousal on consumers' actual brand 
choice. Based on the ELM (petty & Cacioppo, 1986) discussed earlier in this 
dissertation we can assume that attitudes that are formed through the central route are 
more predictive for behavior (see for example Petty, Unnava, & Strathman, 1991 for 
an overview). This may lead to the fact that affect that influences consumers' 
persuasion via "the central route" (hence, when affect priming is the case, i.e. under 
conditions of high processing motivation / ability) may have a larger effect on actual 
behavior compared to affect that influences persuasion via "the peripheral route". It 
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may be interesting in further research to take into account the rea! behavioural effects 
of affective persuasion. 
We did also not make a real distinction between attitudes towards the brand (Ab) and 
attitudes towards the ad (Aad)' In our forth chapter (study 4) we found some indication 
that both Aad and Ab may not always have similar effects: for Ad the relevance the 
emotional picture did not really seem to matter, while this did seem to matter for Ab (a 
non diagnostic emotional picture did not seem to have beneficial effects on 
evaluations). Related to this, Park and Young (1986) demonstrated that the 
relationship between A.d and Ab may depend upon the nature of the information 
processing in the ad. Broadly they found that focusing on performance attributes (they 
called this "cognitive involvement" had a larger effect on Ab, while focusing on image 
aspects (called "affective involvement") seemed to influence Aad. In follow-up studies 
attention has to be given to a clear distinction between Aad and Ab. 
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